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Chervov Interviewed on CFE Treaty

PM2702211391 Moscow IAN PRESS RELEASE in English (undated)

[Interview with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, "aide to the chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces," by Yuriy Lebedev; date, place not given: "Nikolay Chervov on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe"]

[Text] Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, aide to the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, talks to Novosti's Yuriy Lebedev about the influence of the Treaty on international security.

[Lebedev] The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is being actively discussed and analysed in connection with its forthcoming ratification. What do Soviet experts think of it?

[Chervov] Most Soviet experts agree that the Treaty takes into account mutual interests and is based on reasonable compromises and the principle of equal security of the sides. I think this is indeed so.

But there are some critical remarks. It is argued, for example, that more Soviet armaments will be reduced, that our secrity will be damaged, and that the destruction of military hardware will call for major allocations.

[Lebedev] What do Western experts think about it?

[Chervov] They admit that NATO countries will gain more from the Treaty. They mention the fact that the Soviet Union will reduce more armaments and speak about the demise of the Soviet military threat. The unprecedented scope of inspection will enable the West to read the Soviet armed forces as an open book.

Western diplomacy is said to have won the following victories: the aggregate ceilings include paramilitary formations (troops of the Ministry of the Interior, the KGB and the DOSAAF voluntary society of assistance to the army, the air force and the navy), the limitation of shore-based naval aviation (less carrier-based aviation) and the possibility for NATO to increase the number of their aircraft in order to attain the ceiling of 6,800 combat aircraft established by the Treaty.

[Lebedev] Do you agree?

[Chervov] Indeed, we shall reduce more armaments than the West because we have more tanks, aircraft, artillery systems and armoured fighting vehicles. It is true that the scope of verification of compliance with the Treaty will be unprecedented—but equally so for either side. Thus, we shall accept one inspection daily. After the reductions are carried out, NATO will have 1.5 times more ground forces.

Some Soviet military experts argue that "proceeding from our military doctrine" this "does not contradict the criterion of minimum defence sufficiency." Such statements are highly dubitable, because the scientific criteria of minimum sufficiency have not been elaborated yet. It would be more correct to assume that the ceilings established by the Treaty for the Soviet Union, coupled with our powerful nuclear capabilities, will suffice to guarantee the fulfilment of defensive tasks in any conditions.

[Lebedev] Why did we agree to sign a Treaty that puts so much stress on us?

[Chervov] This Treaty is fully in line with the Soviet-approved strategy of liberating Europe from the mountains of weapons, dismantling fences erected by the Cold War and creating a new system of European security. The main task is to get rid of a part of the military burden which is weighing down on us, to help the country overcome the economic crisis and to guarantee normal living standards for the people.

[Lebedev] Will we attain these goals?

[Chervov] I think so. Specialists say that the economic and social consequences of the Treaty will be very favourable.

Of course, we shall not see them tomorrow. At the initial period we shall have to allocate much money to the elimination of weapons and on inspections. Disarmament costs money, too. But the end economic effect will be fantastic.

As for security, it will be strengthened through the mutual lessening of military capabilities of the sides, the elimination of the risk of a surprise attack, and the elimination of possibilities for waging large-scale offensive operations.

In a few years the military map of Europe—the number of troops, their composition, deployment, the creation of groups and the intensity of combat training—will change beyond recognition.

In these new conditions, especially after the Paris summit which passed the Charter for a New Europe and the Joint Declaration of 22 on non-aggression, security on the continent will grow stronger and our interests will not be damaged. The ratification and realisation of this Treaty is in everybody's interests.

[Lebedev] What should be done to maintain stability in Europe in the future?

[Chervov] We should keep in mind at least two conditions.

First, the disarmament process must go on, spreading to naval forces and tactical nuclear weapons.

Second, we must take practical action to materialise the decisions of the London Declaration of the NATO Council that concern the transformation of NATO and a review of its military doctrine and strategy. Since the West has agreed that the Cold War is over and there are no military adversaries in Europe, the military organisation of NATO appears as a destabilising factor of asymmetry.

[Lebedev] What should be done now that the armed forces are being reduced in order to keep up national defences?

[Chervov] We must do a great deal of work concerned with the military reform in order to keep the army and the navy at the level necessary to repel an aggression.

In particular, we should review our defensive capabilities within national borders, improve the quality of our armed forces by eliminating obsolete weapons and hardware, eliminate overlapping structures and elements in the command quarters, widely introduce computer systems, and improve the quality of combat training.

All this should be done in conditions of the maximum possible savings of resources.

CFE Controversy Over Tanks Examined

PM2702124791 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7, 19-25 Feb 91 p 11

[Galina Sidorova article: "Tossed Tanks"]

[Text] We keep on getting things tossed our way. According to what the president says, it's mostly ideas that are tossed our way by the democrats. The conservatives though toss us something more material, to wit paratroopers and patrols. The top brass specializes in tanks.

As I see it, in the next few days the policy of new thinking will come in for one more ordeal. The sore thumb in Soviet-West relations as regards security, or rather Soviet relations with the 21 West and East European states plus the US and Canada is treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe in particular those 800 tanks that the Soviet military have extricated from the mandated cuts by giving them a fresh coat of paint and transferring them to the Navy.

Yet what do a mere 800 tanks signify against the backdrop the crisis mauling the country, the war in the Gulf or, for that matter, the other issues in Soviet-West relations.

This magazine noted earlier that the tank attack against the treaty started long before it was signed, when 15,000 tanks were transferred beyond the Urals. Our partners watched this operation with concern but tolerated it, showing understanding of our difficulties at home and the vicissitudes of the political struggle.

At the time of the Shevardnadze-Baker talks on the eve of the Paris summit, at which the 22 heads of state were to sign the said treaty, those "naval" tanks to wit the repainted ones, almost surfaced. The military were determined to cling to them as part of the Soviet marines arsenal. But then, as far as we may judge, the president had to intervene. Because when at a meeting of the working group the Americans wondered what the tanks rumour spelled, they were told that the problem was nonexistent. The chief US delegate at the conventional arms talks, R. James Woolsey, was given the appropriate assurances. I can well imagine his amazement on seeing a several digit figure down in the lists that the parties exchanged when the treaty was signed, and his feelings upon learning that the negotiated mandate appeared to have no bearing upon the Navy. There were also other surprises in store for our negotiating partners. The Soviet armaments data reflected rather intent than actual facts. The number of installations subject to control was likewise greatly reduced against that negotiated earlier.

In other words, this card trick caused Soviet diplomats to blush and military experts to grin as they saw it as a success. To avoid a row and prevent the signing from being called off, as the heads of state concerned were already in Paris, the parties to the treaty reached a gentleman's agreement to iron out the controversial aspects and refer the clarified data to the joint advisory commission by mid-February following which ratification would begin.

However, what followed was a series of arguments that the Soviet military trotted out to shore up their actions. Compatriots are told that this is essential to ensure national security, that the advantageous agreement concluded is due exclusively to top-brass sagacity. Our MPs are told of the dexterity with which the cards were shuffled. On the other hand, partners in the talks are fold that the said manipulations are lawful.

To sum up, the transfer beyond the Urals from the Euroepan part of the USSR of 60,000 units of heavy ordnance is no violation of the treaty, as this was done before it was signed. However, it does betray intent, specifically of concealing large quantities of arms from reduction. Even if we take on trust what the military say to the effect that some amount of this weaponry is to be converted, while more will self-destruct in the open air.

Another reason has been devised to explain the Soviet reduction in the number of installations slated for inspection. This is that the personnel and weaponary the Soviet armed forces are presumably being modified in accordance with the adequate-for-defence doctrine. This means that the weaponry slated for inspection by the treaty is being withdrawn from some units to which it had been attached earlier, which is why these units will no longer be on the inspection list. One frankly finds it hard to imagine gunners without artillery or motorized infantry transported by jeeps and equipped with Kalashnikovs. Is that a strategic ruse too? Because the treaty specifies which units are subject to inspection and given the desire arms subject to reduction can be transferred to an installation not subject to control.

The mlitary are as proud as peacocks. They have discovered juridical loopholes. But when such malpractices are added up, we get not simply the treaty's violation, but its complete emasculation.

But could these manoeuvres be for some supreme national security interest?

Let me first note that thereby we simply create a precedent, a way of getting round the treaty. Suppose similar numbers of "naval" tanks are attached to the coast guards of the twenty or so other states? The USSR would then find itself faced by multiple superiority in such weaponry.

I greatly doubt that, given the continued Soviet stance chiefly as regards tanks, the treaty in question will be ratified by 21 of the 22 states concerned. Moreover, in this situation, even its reference to parliamentary ratification would be suicidal for many national leaders. Indeed, everyone will realize that if one country, the Soviet Union in this case, has evolved ways and means of circumventing the treaty surely others could follow suit. So why sign it generally? Why waste so much energy and enormous resources on perennial negotiation?

Before the culprits are shown up years will pass. I am almost convinced that Moscow will blame the "intransigent" West for everything. Do the few extra hundreds of tanks mean so much to it?

But how can one trust a person if he says one thing and does another? How can one trust a nuclear power if it cheats and is proud of doing so?

If the treaty is not ratified, Germany's commitment to halve its armed forces become invalid.

The demise of an agreement placing so substantial a foundation under the overall edifice of European security and cooperation, under a united Europe, under normal East-West relations will impel conservatives all over the world to fault their respective governments for this "bad" treaty for their myopia in respect to Moscow. In that case the pendulum of world politics will swing to the right and Moscow will be responsible for a new round of confrontation.

Our current tank dispute is not directed, in effect, against the military. It merely reflects an ideological offensive against perestroika, one more attempt by the agonizing System to take revenge, to instill in society a siege mentality, populated by the image of internal and external foes. To which end it is tanks and only more tanks that are required.

The one and only man who can put paid, at least to the tank saga, is the President of the USSR as the Commander-in-Chief. He is the only man who can today issue the order to abandon those extra tanks and thus rescue the treaty and, in effect, the policy of the new thinking.

USSR Possesses ABM Defense 'Similar' to Patriot

PM2802123791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Reader's letter and response from Air Defense Forces Antiaircraft Missile Troops staff published under the "From Competent Sources" rubric: "The USSR Has Similar Missiles"]

[Text] U.S. troops are successfully bringing down Iraqi missiles with their "Patriot" missiles. Do our Air Defense Forces have systems of this kind?

[Signed] V. Ivanov, Donetsk

According to available information, roughly 50 Iraqi missiles have been fired against Israel and at least 14 have been brought down by the "Patriot" antimissile missiles. The relatively high effectiveness of this complex is achieved by combining such elements as phased array radar, an automated control system with a high-speed computer that receives information about missile launches and computes their probable flight paths, and missiles with a semi-active homing head.

The USSR Armed Forces also have similar air defense systems.

This answer was obtained from the Air Defense Forces Antiaircraft Missile Troops staff.

Lushev: Already Told To Disband Structures

LD2802095891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0748 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—"I have already been given all the necessary insructions for disbanding the military structures of the Warsaw Pact," Army General Petr Lushev, commander in chief of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member-states, stated today. He took part in the session of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact member-countries in Budapest that ended a few days ago, where a decision was adopted on the curtailment of military cooperation within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. Petr Lushev explained in an interview with a TASS correspondent that "the cabinet of defense ministers, the united command and staff, the military council, the military scientific and technical council of the Warsaw Pact Council will be disbanded" before March 31. He added that the representation apparatus of the commander-in-chief at the national ministries of defense will also be recalled.

Petr Lushev believes that when the mechanisms for ensuring security that have taken shape start to disappear, and new ones guaranteeing security on the scale of the expanse of Europe have not yet been set up, "it will be necessary to approach the ensuring of the security of each state with a great sense of responsibility."

The decision of the Warsaw Pact member-states to abolish the military structure does not mean, in the opinion of General Lushev, "that our countries should automatically cease to be partners". It seems to be possible for former allies to develop relations "first and foremost on a bilateral basis including on issues of security and military technical cooperation," he noted.

The commander-in-chief stressed that the Warsaw Pact member-countries have consistently come out in favor of the simultaneous disbanding of all the alliances and for a transition from a bloc to an extra-bloc model of security. "After the abolition of the Warsaw Pact military organization, it would be nice if the corresponding steps followed on the part of NATO," General Petr Lushev said in conclusion.

No 'Substantial' Impact From Pact's Demise

PM2702170191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Correspondent F. Lukyanov report: "Agreement on Dissolution of Warsaw Pact Military Organization Signed in Budapest: Troops Will Return Home"]

[Text] Budapest—The fashionable Duna Intercontinental hotel—the venue for the extraordinary conference of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee [PCC] at foreign and defense minister level convened to disband the organization's military structures—is without any doubt a place where history was made.

Under the agreements in just over one month the military organs and structures of the Warsaw Pact—the Joint Armed Forces and the Joint Command—will cease their activity and the military agreements concluded as part of the alliance, on whose account separate protocols were signed, will cease to operate. An organization which for 35 years played the role of one of the most important components of the postwar structure of Europe and which in many respects determined postwar history itself is slipping into history. Not everything in the 35 years of its existence has, let us acknowledge, been smooth or simple. However, as the ministers and generals noted in their speeches at the meeting, few people would deny today that the Warsaw Pact and its military organization have played a considerable role in ensuring West-East military-strategic parity and achieving military-political balance in Europe. Let us give credit where it is due.

But times are changing—antagonism and confrontation are being replaced by partnership and cooperation. The enormous changes in the Soviet Union, the countries of East Europe, Europe, and the world as a whole have determined the fate of the military blocs and created the foundation of a new pan-European security system.

True, understandable questions may arise with the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact military organization—will the Soviet Union's defense capability be weakened with the withdrawal of Soviet troops east of their former "forward positions." I think that with our country's switch to a defensive doctrine and the principle of sensible sufficiency, in conditions where missile-carrying submarines and ground-launched ballistic missiles have long made the very concept of "forward position" nominal, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact military structures will not have a substantial impact on the country's defense capability but will enable considerable savings in resources to be made.

The foundations of the pan-European security system are still only being laid, but already voices are heard concerning the necessity and possibility of building the new Europe on the basis of NATO.

"It seems to us that to take the bloc route in building the new Europe would be a manifestation of old thinking," V. Churkin, member of the Soviet delegation at the meeting in Budapest and chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Information Administration, told your correspondent in conversation at the end of the talks, "therefore, I think, conceiving it in terms of NATO is not the most fruitful method. And attempts to create other exclusive structures, even outside NATO, are not the optimal way to achieve the best result."

"As far as relations with NATO are concerned," V. Churkin went on, "we think that the organization could respond to the Warsaw Pact initiative in disbanding its military organization. But, on the other hand, we do treat with respect the views voiced in the West regarding NATO's role in ensuring the security of its countries, given the well-known document signed in Paris on

relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which states that the organizations are no longer hostile to each other. If, however, some people want to restrict the construction site of the new Europe to the western borders of the USSR," V. Churkin concluded, "such a stance is, to be frank, very, very shortsighted."

Yes, today, on the threshold of the new non-bloc Europe, only the general outlines have been determined so far. There are still quite a few development options available, and it is important that the countries of Europe choose the optimal one which takes account of the interests of all sides. The bilateral treaties under preparation between the Soviet Union and the countries of East Europe, which lay down the legal basis of the new relations, should undoubtedly play an important role here.

The activity of the Warsaw Pact political organization, which is capable of making its contribution to the completion of talks on further arms reduction in Europe and the creation of new security structures, as was stated at the press conference for journalists on the results of the present meeting, is not ceasing for the time being. Czechoslovakia has proposed that a PCC summit conference be held in Prague in early July this year and that the question of new forms of cooperation in the political sphere be examined then.

China

Defense Minister Yazov To Visit China 4 Mar

LD26G2085291 Moscow World Service in English 0800 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] The deputy general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Vladimir Ivashko, has begun a working visit to China. The main aim of the visit is to prepare the visit to Moscow by the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Jiang Zemin, which is planned for the end of this spring.

Meanwhile, according to a spokesman of the Soviet Embassy in Bejing, the Soviet defense minister, Marshal Dmitriy Yazov, is to arrive in China on 4 march. He is to hold talks on cooperation between the two countries in the military sphere.

Paper on Mutual Efforts To 'Renew Socialism'

PM2702220191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Feb 91 First Edition p 4

["Editorial Commentary:" "Not Teaching, But Learning"]

[Text] We live in an uneasy, fast-changing world. So it is all the more gratifying to realize that we are not alone in our difficult quest for ways to renew socialism. Our great neighbor—China—is committed to the same cause.

The years of unnatural alienation between the two socialist states—one unparalleled in terms of territory and the other in terms of population—have receded into the past. The normalization of Sino-Soviet relations is only beginning to bear fruit. But one result of it has become obvious straightaway: Each of the two neighboring peoples have sensed that they have a reliable, secure rear. An opportunity has emerged to cut back garrisons along the 7,500-km border and in the long term to fully demilitarize it. Thus Moscow and Beijing have removed a major seat of tension in the Far East and taken a real step toward military detente in the Asia-Pacific region.

Trade, economic, scientific, and technical ties have become the core of bilateral relations following normalization. The rapid growth in border and interregional trade, which now represent one-fifth of overall commodity turnover, is particularly characteristic. Inland areas of China, which have had less experience of the fruits of reform than the coastal provinces, have appreciated afresh the potential advantages of close proximity to the Soviet Union. This has made them natural business partners for the republics of Soviet Central Asia and the krays and oblasts of Siberia and the Far East. Since the world center of business activity is shifting to the Asia-Pacific region, Europe's interest in Asia will increase. This opens up before our countries the prospect of becoming, as it were, piers of a bridge between the Atlantic and Pacific basin. Construction has begun on a railroad main line that will link Moscow and Beijing via Alma-Ata and Urumchi—the shortest route from China to Europe, like the ancient Great Silk Road.

The opportunities for constructive USSR-PRC cooperation on the world arena have by no means been fully activated yet. Our approaches to key problems of the day have much in common. The concept of a new international political order which Beijing has put forward is close in essence to the fundamental principles of Soviet foreign policy and accords with the spirit of the new thinking. By taking concerted action, our states could do a great deal to avert a world nuclear catastrophe, restore peace and justice in the planet's "trouble spots," and strengthen trust and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Perestroyka in the USSR and the reforms in China have a common thrust: to reveal more fully the potential of socialism. While advancing toward this objective along untrodden paths, our peoples are interested in exchanging experience of their successes and failures. Soviet Communists will find much that is instructive in the material of the Seventh CPC Central Committee Plenum, which touched on questions that are extremely topical for us (how, for instance, to best demarcate central and local powers and how to combine market relations with state economic regulation). Practice shows that, despite the difference between local conditions, the process of socialist renewal in our countries often encounters similar difficulties. The motto of Sino-Soviet cooperation now is not to teach one another, but to learn from one another.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Commentary Examines Thai Coup, Ousted Premier

BK2802093891 Moscow in Thai to Thailand 1300 GMT 25 Feb 91

[Viktor Valentinov commentary]

[Text] On the morning of last Saturday, 23 February, Thai senior commanding military officers staged a successful coup to topple the government of General Chatchai Chunhawan. Gen. Chatchai was taken into custody at Don Muang Airport as he was waiting for a plane to take him to an audience with the king. The national administrative power was taken over by a military junta headed by Supreme Commander Gen. Sunthon Khongsomphong. Gen. Sunthon flew to meet the king in place of the prime minister. The king reportedly did not object to the power takeover. Gen. Sunthon became head of the National Peacekeeping Council, but AFP says the [words indistinct] of the junta was Gen. Suchinda Khraprayun, the Army commander.

The junta charged that the toppled government and Prime Minister Gen. Chatchai personally engaged in corruption and would not honor his words, nor [word indistinct] to the armed forces. There was absolutely no

opposition from the toppled government. Life continued as usual in Bangkok and people did not show any sign of panic. The king was believed to have already recognized the authority of the junta. The junta has pledged to transfer power to a civilian government within six months. Even former prime minister M.R. Khukrit Pramot condoned the junta's action, saying to reporters that the junta must have had appropriate reasons for staging the coup and that he did not think the coup would affect the democratic process in Thailand.

The coup was the 17th in Thailand after the 1932 revolution. Domestic issues are usually the motivation of this type of coup, and foreign policies are not affected. Whether or not this is the case with the latest coup remains to be seen, and many people want to have a clear answer to this matter. During Gen. Chatchai's tenure, Thailand made considerable contributions to the political situation in Southeast Asia. The ousted prime minister performed as the middleman in the meetings between the Khmer rivals in a search for an end to the civil war in Cambodia. He advanced several valuable proposals which were accepted by the rival Khmer factions. He was even bold enough to open negotiations with the Phnom Penh government. Before being toppled, Gen. Chatchai announced the intention to open an office of the Thai commercial attache in Phnom Penh, which corresponded with his regional strategy, announced soon after he came to power in 1988, of transforming Indochina from the battlefield into a marketplace. These initiatives have enhanced Thailand's prestige in the international arena. Whether or not this policy will be continued depends on many factors, including the attitude of other countries. So far only the attitude of the United States is known. That is, on 23 February the U.S. State Department announced that U.S. military and economic assistance to Thailand has been suspended on grounds that the democratically elected government had been toppled.

Near East & South Asia

Bessmertnykh Holds News Conference on Gulf

Opening Statement

LD2802141891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1300 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS corespondents Igor Peskov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow 28 Feb (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh held a news conference here today in connection with the cessation of military action in the Persian Gulf region. He said the following in his opening statement:

"Last night, several hours before the announcement by the President of the United States about the cessation of military action in the Persian Gulf zone, I held urgent consultations with James Baker, the U.S. secretary of state, on the issue of the further actions of the USSR, the United States, and other members of the coalition in the light of this new and significant twist in the development of the situation.

"Immediately after this I personally reported to President Mikhail Gorbachev on the situation taking shape, and I received specific instructions about our operational activities in relation to Baghdad, the UN Security Council, Washington, and also instructions on the contents of our further line in relation to the Persian Gulf and the Near East. Now, several primary tasks are emerging. First, it is essential to completely exclude the possibility of a renewal of any sort of military activity in the Persian Gulf zone. With this aim contacts are now being established between the military representatives of the sides, and for our part we are facilitating these in every way.

"Second, it is extremely important to hold a session of the UN Security Council at which the efficient and indepth examination of the issues regarding the final political settlement of the Iraq- Kuwait conflict would be started. We agree, and this has already been mentioned to Secretary of State Baker, to hold meetings of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council prior to the official session of the Council. We are proceeding from the fact that the task of this extremely important international body consists in creating reliable political and law-based prerequisites for the formal and final cessation of the war. Just as before the USSR will continue its active efforts to find solutions that would be just and acceptable to all sides.

"Third, a task arises for the international community to commence without delay an elaboration of the postwar arrangements in the region and to reach a consensus on it. Moreover, the setting up of a security system which not only would underline the recent events, but would also guarantee that military confrontations are in future prevented in this region, represents a most important element of this. The Soviet Union has been and continues to be actively in touch with the leading states of the region and also with the main European and Asian countries in order to arrive at a common approach to resolving this fundamental task.

"Naturally, we continue to maintain contacts with the U.S. side. In particular, we have agreed with the U.S. secretary of state to continue the exchange of views on this issue, including in connection with his trip around the region. We hope that it will be found possible to arrive at a broad area of coincidence of views with regard to positions of the USSR, the United States and other states.

Welcomes Kuwait Liberation

LD2802120191 Moscow TASS in English 1152 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—"It is essential to completely rule out the resumption of any hostilities in the Gulf," Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh told a news conference here today.

He decribed the task as one of the top priorities after the ceasefire. "With this aim, it is necessary to hold a meeting of the United Nations Security Council to begin the prompt and indepth consideration of a final political settlement of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict," Bessmertnykh said.

He said that the USSR welcomes the liberation of Kuwait.

Views Post-War Relations

LD2802150991 Moscow TASS in English 1443 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Leonid Timofeyev]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—Describing the Soviet viewpoint on the future structure of a security system in the Gulf, Soviet Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh told a news conference here today that it should be based "on the interests of Gulf countries".

The United Nations, the U.N. Security Council and its permanent members will have their say in its establishment. "It is important to find a consensus on the main parameters of a system" at this stage.

The minister added that "the USSR is convinced that there cannot be a reliable security system in the region if Iraq does not play an impressive role in it".

Bessmertnykh said that the Gulf crisis gave additional impetus for a more active search to settle the Middle East problem, the core of which is the Palestinian issue. He stressed that the Soviet approach to the problem "has not experienced any changes".

"We believe that the problem lies not in the lack of ideas concerning a settlement but in insufficient will, desire or readiness of some influential states to invest their political efforts in a search for adequate solutions," the minister said.

The time has now come, the minister continued, when all states, involved or somehow connected with the conflict, should make a "fresh" look at the stereotypes of their approaches and be more actively involved in a settlement of the problem.

Bessmertnykh noted that arms supplies to Iraq or other countries in the region deserve "the most serious attention". The Soviet Union does not intend to examine this question in a "unilateral and individual" way in the belief that this issue can be solved on the basis of a "collective decision on limiting arms supplies to that explosive region".

In his opinion, this problem can be fruitfully discussed when tackling the issues of a security system in the Gulf. He added that the problems of the proliferation and use of all destruction weapons in that region should be resolved within the same framework.

"The end of the armed conflict in the gulf is the result of collective efforts of all states, which participated in a search for settling the conflict," the minister said.

"Each country, which participated in the movement to settle the conflict, can claim the success of its policy but not a single state should assert that it alone ensured the success," Bessmertnykh stressed.

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh disagreed with the statement that the Soviet foreign policy in recent years "suffered a defeat from Americans". He said it was "wishful thinking" on the part of those who make such statements.

Commenting on Mikhail Gorbachev's statement in Minsk that Soviet-U.S. relations contained "a fragile component" the minister noted that these "relations had a firm basis for their development, although they were subject to occasional serious interference from subjective factors capable of causing damage. This was meant when the president spoke about fragility still present in Soviet-U.S. relations. [quotation marks as received]

Nevertheless, the minister noted, "Soviet-U.S. relations are pre-determining relations in the modern international situation and many processes in the world development will depend on the development of these relations".

Bessmertnykh expressed confidence that these relations will pass through a strip of struggle between objective and subjective circumstances and stand tests like the one they have withstood during the Iraqi-Kuwaiti crisis.

Asked whether contacts are expected to take place between the Soviet leadership and the Palestine Liberation Organisation within the process of solving the Middle East problem, the Soviet minister said that contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organisation have not been interrupted and will continue.

Bessmertnykh also said that the Soviet Union was planning to "most urgently reopen the Soviet Embassy in Kuwait".

As regards future relations between the Soviet Union and Iraq, the minister noted that "they have undergone serious changes during the present crisis". However, he stressed, our relations with the Iraqi state will continue to develop the same as those of other countries, but with account taken of the lessons of the conflict".

Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, asked if the Soviet Union was interested in "Saddam's survival", stressed: "We have to do with Iraq, its people and the Iraqi leaders who this people support. We believe that to predetermine our

attitude to one or another leader regardless of the sovereign right of the people of a country would be tantamount to intervening in internal affairs".

Ignatenko on 'Solid' Basis for U.S. Cooperation

LD2802134691 Moscow TASS in English 1231 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—"The way we acted, while searching for a peace settlement in the Gulf, proves that the Soviet Union and the United States have a solid and fruitful basis for bilateral cooperation," Soviet Presidential Spokesman Vitaliy Ignatenko told TASS.

"Today, Soviet-U.S. relations are based on confidence". Ties between the Soviet and U.S. Presidents are solid. They trust each other. They maintained unceasing contacts at all phases of the conflict. The heads of our foreign political institutions maintained similar ties," he said.

Ignatenko noted that a complicated period of post-war cooperation between the two countries begins. "Here we have heaps of problems, and the sooner the Soviet Union and the United States take up these problems, the sooner peace, stability and prosperity will be established in the region," he said.

"I am an optimist by nature, and I am optimistic about the prospects of Soviet-U.S. cooperation, including in the region, although I have already heard that the Soviet Union had nothing to do in the Middle East and it should not be let to the region," the spokesman said.

"The U.S. Secretary of State will soon leave for talks in the Middle East. We are sure we will meet him there, as our role there has been envisaged," he said.

Envoy to UN Details Soviet Stand on Gulf War

LD2802095191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0702 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations, 28 Feb (TASS)—The Soviet Union adhered and does adhere to a position of principle in the UN Security Council on the issue of conflict in the Persian Gulf, Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs and USSR permanent representative at the United Nations, told a TASS correspondent on Wednesday. Our country has done a good deal to halt military operations and prevent further bloodshed. The Soviet approach is made up of the USSR president's plan put forward earlier and of other Soviet ideas and proposals. Our initiatives also remain in force.

From the very beginning the USSR took part in drafting and adopting all the 12 resolutions of the Council relating to the conflict in the Persian Gulf, the Soviet ambassador recalled. We are aware of their fundamental importance and we stress the need for their practical implementation. Therefore, we have always come out in favor of the Iraqi Government complying with them in full.

The Soviet Government has been in contact with the Iraqi leadership, and from our side we have forcefully recommended the Iraqi leaders to make an immediate statement on their agreement to all 12 resolutions, Yu.M. Vorontsov added. Then we could start acting in full measure here, at the Security Council, striving to insure that this UN body adopt the decision on a cease-fire. Our recommendations are bearing fruit. The Iraqi leadership's position is undergoing changes, albeit too slowly, and this turns into great losses for the country. It is because of precisely this point that at the Security Council talks held on Wednesday, the Soviet delegation stressed time and again: literally not a single hour must be wasted because each hour spells a loss of life.

In the Soviet Union's view, the issue of creating a control mechanism for supervising the withdrawal of troops can be raised in the near future. On the whole, the events of the last few months in the Persian Gulf have again distinctly shown that the community of nations must undertake the most resolute efforts toward holding an international peace conference on the Near East within the shortest possible time. Only a forum of this kind will make it possible to guarantee long-lasting peace and security to the entire region.

Defense Aides Deny Intelligence Aid to Iraq

PM2702151791 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7, 19-25 Feb 91 p 18

[Unattributed "NT Investigation": "Is Moscow Helping Baghdad?"]

[Text] On February 4 THE WASHINGTON TIMES carried an article which (referring to U.S. intelligence sources), revealed that:

Soviet advisers in Iraq provide Saddam Husayn's military with information about the times U.S. spy satellites pass overhead, U.S. intelligence sources said.

The information provided by the Soviets is helping Iraq to hide the more than 100 mobile Scud missile-launchers that have evaded U.S. and allied air strikes.

The information on the Soviet action was gathered from what the sources described as an "extremely sensitive source," a term often used to describe communications intercepts. The Soviet Defense Ministry has denied that its advisers are helping the Iraqi military and a ministry statement last month said all the advisers left the country by Jan. 9.

But U.S. intelligence agencies estimate about 150 military advisers volunteered to remain in Iraq to service Soviet-made equipment.

There are also more than 40 Soviet diplomats posted at the embassy in Baghdad, including at least half that are believed to be KGB or GRU military intelligence officers.

Publicly, the Soviets have maintained a position that appears to support the allied coalition against Iraq. But Soviet military and intelligence hard-liners are believed to have been secretly supporting the Iraqi military with intelligence data and logistical support for advanced Soviet-made weapons in the Iraqi arsenal.

"The Soviets appear to be playing a double game," said U.S. intelligence official. "It's fair to say that with the resurgence of the hard-line military, which has long historical ties to Iraq, we're watching that very closely."

U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, quoting U.S. intelligence sources, also reported in the current edition that Soviet advisers were helping the Iraqi military with intelligence information.

Bush administration intelligence sources told THE WASHINGTON TIMES last month that Soviet advisers were providing Iraq with information used to target Scud missiles fired at Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Are there any grounds for this allegation?

We phoned the press centre of the Soviet Defence Ministry. Its spokesman, Col. Vladimir Nikanorov, said:

"I categorically refute this allegation. There are no Soviet military advisers in Iraq today. The last military specialist left the country before hostilities began—on January 9, 1991. Only staff members of the Soviet Embassy are still in Iraq."

Can the information about U.S. spy satellites be passed on? In the opinion of Aleksandr Zakharov, scientific secretary of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Space Research, it is "technically possible." He said that we could get more detailed information at the Flight Control centre.

Yuriy Kolesnikov, a member of the centre's press group, flatly refused to comment on THE WASHINGTON TIMES report, saying "the matter is dealt by the Defence Ministry."

Sergey Gorbunov, a press service officer of the space units at the Defence Ministry said:

I can neither confirm nor deny this information. Our organization is not concerned with the matter. We only launch and control vehicles supplied to us. But we are not the owners of these vehicles. What tasks the vehicles carry out and for whom they operate depends on whom they are subordinated to. The question of gathering information and of who receives it should be cleared up at the press service of the defence ministry.

Sergey Gorbunov expressed the opinion that the thread would finally lead to the Main Intelligence Department (GRU).

General Vladlen Mikhailov, chief of the Main Intelligence Department of the Armed Forces General Staff, said:

"I can't say anything about Soviet weapons or specialists, because my department is concerned with quite different tasks. As for space intelligence, I can say that in accordance with a decision of the government and the defence ministry, space intelligence data are not passed on to anyone. We did not pass on these data even to our former Warsaw Treaty allies. I should add, however, that Baghdad applied to us asking us to provide space intelligence data for it. But we categorically refused." We phoned General Yevgeniy Smirnov, chief of the tenth Main Department of the Armed Forces General Staff. His department deals with the delivery of armaments and sends military experts for work abroad.

"THE WASHINGTON TIMES report is absolute nonsense," Gen. Smirnov said. "The last Soviet specialist left Iraq on the night of January 9 to 10. No one even expressed a desire to remain there. It is not the first time that misinformation of this kind has appeared. We firmly and strictly adhere to the provisions of the Security Council resolution. We stopped our deliveries as soon as Iraq began its aggression against Kuwait."

[NEW TIMES] What's the difference between a military adviser and a military specialist?

[Smirnov] "An adviser gives advice on how to fight and use weapons and other military equipment. Therefore, he bears a certain responsibility. A specialist is responsible only for the technical maintenance of the military equipment and weapons supplied by our country, and nothing else. We have never had our advisers in Iraq, not even during its war with Iran. That's the whole point. Attempts are made to accuse us of what has never even been the case."

The attempts of our New York correspondent to obtain additional information from THE WASHINGTON TIMES, U.S. NEWS and WORLD REPORT, THE NEW YORK TIMES and other periodicals, as well as in the CIA and the Pentagon did not prove successful. In the meantime the question of the Soviet Union leaking the information gathered by satellites to Iraq was raised in the Senate foreign relations committee. Secretary of State James Baker said unequivocally that he knew nothing about these or similar facts.

Committee Urges Pressure To Halt Gulf Conflict

PM2702161391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Extracts from undated statement by "Committee for the Defense of Iraq:" "War Expansion Threat"]

[Text] The Committee for the Defense of Iraq, which was recently formed in our country, has made a statement which says, in particular, the following.

For a fourth time the U.S. President has rejected the peace proposals of countries involved in the Persian Gulf conflict, and proposals by Presidents Mitterrand, Rafsanjani, S. Husayn, and Gorbachev have been rejected. The framework of the UN Security Council decisions has been transgressed. Unprecedented economic and political pressure is being put on the U.S. allies and Iraq's allies. Threats of interference in Soviet Government affairs are constantly voiced in the U.S. press, including the stepping up of subversive actions in the Baltic region and Central Asia [as published] in the event of a change in "Gorbachev's position" on the Gulf crisis problems.

U.S. failures in military operations against Iraq have led to a rampant outburst of the tactics of state terrorism and genocide in relation to the peaceful population inside and outside the conflict zone.

Iraqi political emigres are being exiled from Egypt and Syria, and everywhere Iraqi citizens are being declared terrorists. Tens of thousands of Soviet people who are ready to go to Iraq on a humanitarian mission to give medical aid, deliver foodstuffs, and work in the country's enterprises without payment—have been deprived of this opportunity.

The public, united in the USSR Committee for the Defense of Iraq and supporting the people's efforts in the struggle against U.S. intervention in the Near East, states the following.

The situation in the region is developing in the direction of an expansion of the conflict zone and the start of another world war. The U.S. Administration is pursuing state terrorism in violation of all norms established by the Geneva conventions.

The declared aim of U.S. military actions—the liberation of Kuwait—is patently spurious. The main aim includes the complete elimination of Iraq's military potential, the destruction of its economic structures, and the restoration of U.S. control over the Near East's raw material resources.

Taking account of the fact that the region is mainly populated by Arabs (i.e. Semites), the actions against the people should be deemed a supreme manifestation of anti-Semitism.

The voice of human rights organizations and fighters for panhuman values in support of justice and the defense of peace goes virtually unheard, as if we were talking about second-class people not deserving of great attention from the Western Christian and other prophets.

The USSR Committee for the Defense of Iraq calls on all citizens capable of realistically appraising what is happening to come out in defense of the Near East's profusely bleeding civilian population and to carry out all possible actions in order to secure consistent actions to stop the conflict, lift the economic blockade, and send charitable missions to Iraq in accordance with the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies' charters, the statement says.

IZVESTIYA Reports Ignatenko 27 Feb Briefing

PM2702161591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by G. Alimov: "Conflict in Persian Gulf: Moscow Advocates Fulfillment of All UN Resolutions"]

[Text] At a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists 26 February Vitaliy Ignatenko, the USSR president's aide, once more confirmed this principled Soviet stance.

He stated that inasmuch as the Soviet Union took part in the adoption of the resolutions on Kuwait it supports this concept: Iraq should adopt for execution all 12 resolutions and not just Resolution No 660, which provides for the unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Speaking of Moscow's vision of the post-war structure in this region, V. Ignatenko noted that "we advocate a peaceful, safe, prosperous Near East, including the important country that is Iraq." Who will head that country and what state its administrative structure will be in are, in the opinion of the president's official representative, for the Iraqi people themselves to decide. And the Soviet Union has no intention of influencing the situation on any plane here.

[Question] Is the USSR prepared in the future to offer its services as mediator in concluding any peace agreements between the warring sides?

"Why a mediator?" was the reply. "The Soviet Union believes itself bound by the commitments which were adopted in the UN Security Council. Our role is not as mediator, it is active and principled. Naturally, each country has its own maneuvers, its own opportunities, and its own specific approaches. For instance, for our country one such additional opportunity is the base of our relations with Iraq, which enables us to have our own position there. Our country will react in the appropriate way to the development of the situation in that region."

[Question] Will Moscow be a member of the UN observation forces or the peacekeeping forces?

"In principle our country is opposed to sending troops to that region in any capacity," V. Ignatenko said. "But it is rather countries which were not involved in the Persian Gulf conflict which should take part in the UN observation forces, if they are created."

The president's official representative confirmed the Soviet position that "the initiation of ground operations was superfluous." Ground operations, V. Ignatenko said, could have waited. If we had been able to integrate all the proposals voiced by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev and

if the instruments of the Security Council had been used to the end, perhaps this ground action would not have been required. But do you not think, it was objected to V. Ignatenko, that military pressure helped what Iraq is doing now?

"Military pressure is of course a weighty argument," was the reply. "But an even weightier argument is people's lives. When Saddam Husayn agreed with the world community to withdraw his troops that should have been taken up and success should have been developed in that direction, and not in the military direction."

[Question] If the United States does not agree to a cease-fire what will the Soviet Union's reaction be?

In V. Ignatenko's opinion our country will work in agreement with the United States and with other UN Security Council members. He made it clear that Moscow does not intend to put any pressure on anyone. "That period of our diplomacy is already a long way behind us," he said. We can find the path toward a just world order at the table of the Security Council, in personal meetings between the leaders of the United States and the USSR, and between the U.S. State Department and the USSR Foreign Ministry. "Since this understanding is at the basis of our two countries' strategic course, that understanding will find an outlet in very specific deeds." V. Ignatenko voiced the conviction that such specific accords will also be found within the framework of the Security Council.

[Question] What was the cause of such an unexpected departure to Belorussia by M.S. Gorbachev?

V. Ignatenko answered this question from IZVESTIYA as follows: "As far as the president's trips are concerned, the definition of sudden or unexpected is not appropriate. These trips are planned, and this is one of them. It was a planned trip. But lack of time and important concerns did not allow Mikhail Sergeyevich to leave Moscow.

Navy Staff Says No Soviet Warships in Gulf

PM2802114791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Reader's letter and reply "obtained at" USSR Navy Main Staff under the "From Competent Sources" rubric: "There Are No Soviet Ships in the Gulf"]

[Text] The diagram in IZVESTIYA (reprinted from the weekly ASIAWEEK—Editorial Office) shows two Soviet warships as part of the multinational forces. Is that true?

[Signed] S. Sychev, Severomorsk

No. There are no USSR Navy warships or auxiliary vessels in the Persian Gulf, let alone the multinational forces; nor are we cooperating with them.

This reply was obtained at the USSR Navy Main Staff.

RSFSR Deputies Comment on Gulf Situation

LD2702164991 Moscow TASS in English 1554 GMT 27 Feb 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—The Gulf war should result not simply in the liberation of Kuwait but also in the creation of guarantees to preclude a new crisis in the region, Colonel General Dmitriy Volkogonov, people's deputy of the Russian Federation, told TASS.

The convocation of an international conference with this end in view would meet the interests of the Soviet Union and all members of the international communinty, he said.

Besides, such a conference "should not allow any one force to grow stronger in the region as a result of the war", Volkogonov added.

Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, people's deputy of Russia and deputy chairman of the republican parliament's Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Econonmic Relations, described the withdrawal of the Iraqi troops from Kuwait as "a great triumph of the international community".

However, "the problem of an overall settlement in the Middle East remains topical. It is perfectly clear that, along with the United States, the Soviet Union should also one of the two decisive forces in this settlement process," Ambartsumov told TASS.

Reportage Views Gulf Ground War, Cease-Fire

Commentary Greets Bush Cease-Fire

LD2802045991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0300 GMT 28 Feb 91

[Yuriy Isayev commentary]

[Excerpts] [Isayev] I would like to start this section with a very happy piece of news which undoubtedly has been awaited not only in the Soviet Union, but in all countries. An hour ago, at 0500 Moscow time, President George Bush made a televised address to the nation and announced Kuwait's liberation and the completion of the war. Kuwait is free, the Iraqi Army has been defeated, and our military goals have been fulfilled. Kuwait belongs to the Kuwaitis again, they control their own destiny. This is what President Bush said in his televised address to the nation today. Also, the President announced that at midnight sharp in Washington—which is 0800 in Moscow—the multinational coalition forces will suspend military operations, and it will depend on Iraq whether or not the cease-fire becomes permanent. I think this is number one news report for all the media.

You know, when ground operations started, the world community, on the whole, was apprehensive about the

consequences. That apprehension was quite justified, since Iraq had ...emical and bacteriological weapons, and the situation was unpredictable. That is precisely why the Soviet Union made certain efforts—our president's initiatives, and so on—but, you know, after the offensive had started, on the whole, it developed so precipitously. We could see that swiftness on our television screens. Over three days the multinational forces have captured more than 50,000 Iraqis. You know, this resembled scenes from an operetta. [passage omitted]

On the whole, one could say that the war has become unpopular in Iraq itself.

[Announcer] Something that cannot, perhaps, be said about other countries of the Arab East.

[Isayev] Unfortunately, you know, this anti-American surge was developing beyond the Iraqi boundaries, especially of late, and now the question, what next, is emerging. The main thing is that the multinational forces have not gone into Iraq and do not see their goal in eliminating Saddam Husayn's regime. In my view, the people themselves should decide what to do with its ruler. [passage omitted]

In this case, the case of a self-styled dictator in the Near East, the world community has, at last, joined forces and shown the dictator his place. It is very gladdening that in this specific case, the Soviet Union acted as one with the world community.

Failure To Oppose Attack Deplored

PM2702171791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

["Observer's Opinion" by Yuriy Gvozdev: "Enough of the Half-Truth"]

[Text] So, the bloodshed on the shores of the Persian Gulf has assumed a still larger scale owing to the ground operations launched by U.S. troops and their allies in the anti-Iraq coalition. What is most strange is that this has happened precisely when, thanks to the persistent peacemaking efforts of the USSR and other states, an accord had already been reached with Baghdad on the withdrawal of its troops from Kuwait in accordance with the UN Security Council decisions. A real opportunity for achieving a peaceful outcome to the conflict and avoiding new casualties and destruction has deliberately been turned down. The inertia of the old thinking based on force has, unfortunately, gained the upper hand. The death machine installed by the West is being revved up. The number of combat air sorties is growing. All around there is electronics and the high-tech "culture" of human destruction. Some people are rubbing their hands with pleasure: We are working really well. But where are our fighters for peace? Why such timidity?

Yes, our pacifist nightingales have become timid. But some of them say with satisfaction: He deserves it, that Husayn, because he himself is guilty. But what about the millions of Iraqis? Is it not a primitive approach to reduce everything to Husayn's seizure of Kuwait? Yes, all this is reprehensible. But still earlier quite a lot of "work" had been done by Britain, which had spent a long time redrawing Arab territories in the Persian Gulf zone in accordance with its own imperial self-will, laying the foundations in advance for hotbeds of future conflicts and dissension. During my time in Yemen I saw for myself how craftily it did this, seeking to keep the country split into small principalities headed by feudal lords obedient to itself. Things went so far that an attempt was made to turn the port city of Aden into a kind of "state" and its residents into a special people. Why should we stubbornly close our eyes to this too?

"Kuwait," the Venezuelan magazine SIK [name as transliterated] pointed out, "was one example of the way British colonialism disfigured Iraq's geography, leaving it virtually without access to the sea... In the process of decolonization the 'protectors' kindled conflicts in the region, dividing still recently united peoples and territories by means of artificial borders..."

No, I am not justifying Iraq's actions against Kuwait. They are reprehensible. But I am opposed to the half-truth. And, of course, I am categorically opposed to arrogant judgments, which mean violence against millions of people.

At the same time certain programs on Central Television are striking. Photographs of U.S. and other pilots captured in Iraq were shown several times. And the commentary: See how they were beaten up, they have black eyes! Washington is indignant: This is immoral! Perhaps, in accordance with international conventions, they should not have been beaten up. The Iraqis behaved badly, very badly, and gave an inhospitable welcome to people who might have just killed hundreds and thousands of their compatriots, burned them alive in houses blazing like bonfires. It is quite likely that the children's bodies included sons and daughters of those who had captured these emissaries of the "civilized world." Some people in the West have calculated that the number of casualties among the peaceful population of this ancient country is already approaching one-third of a million. Or should we take no notice of such trifles? On the other hand, how sensitive to our problems in the Baltic region, for example, are those who have been organizing bloody reprisals in Ulster or Panama for umpteen years. How sensitive!

In my view, there was no need, above all, to give in to malicious vindictiveness and open the way to war by referring to the need to "chastise" Saddam. Not to mention the fact that certain "judges" among the permanent members of the Security Council cannot themselves lay claim to legal decency... Or will they continue to interpret the new political thinking from the viewpoint of aspirants to the role of world sheriffs, and will the value of mercy and humanity be measured by the price of shares in the New York, London, and Tokyo stock exchanges? The process of the frenzied, merciless

destruction of Iraq is taking place before the eyes of the whole world, and at the same time you hear embellishments: Husayn is guilty, because he provoked the conflict! But such "arguments" do not sound very convincing either to me or to many other people. Was it really necessary to make haste to adopt the UN Security Council resolution giving the United States and its allies the right to such mass murder? Was such a—I would say—strange step really ventured upon by innocent babes who did not know what they were doing and what the consequences would be?

No, it is no longer Husayn who is guilty here but those who, seated comfortably in armchairs, raised their hands for the destruction of people, for an ecological catastrophe, for an economic disaster to a number of countries because of the rise in oil prices. And, again, for U.S. imperial interests, which have nothing in common with panhuman values, and for superprofits for their military-industrial complex. Why not speak honestly, clearly, and loudly about all this? Fear that they will not grant credit? That they will take offense? Calculations with regard to obtaining a new loan from monarchs in the Persian Gulf zone? Will such a position not entail far greater losses for us?

Called One of 'Most Just Wars'

LD2802131991 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 28 Feb 91

[Mikhail Mayorov commentary]

[Text] Humanity was just getting out of the cold war when Iraq crossed the Kuwaiti border on 2 August last year. Saddam Husayn must have thought his invasion would go unpunished. But for the first time the world community did not split into two camps in its assessment of what had happened. It showed exceptional unity in confronting the aggression.

The 12 resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council put a collective demand before Iraq. But, more important, humanity had achieved a consensus in denouncing aggression and demonstrating respect for international law. Here the positions of some 30 different states had to be brought together. But no agreement would have been possible if not for the understanding reached by Moscow and Washington.

The war in the Gulf did not bury the hopes for a new world order, as some people had thought it would. It only sharpened the outlines of a new worldwide political structure. The Soviet Union and the United States demonstrated common goals, even when quite natural subtle differences appeared in their approaches. Neither the United States, nor the Soviet Union, assumed there could only be a military solution. Practically at all stages of the crisis, from the pause of goodwill to the Gorbachev plan advanced on the eve of the ground offensive diplomacy had a chance to work. Even if it proved impossible to stop the war machine the direct dialogue between Moscow and Baghdad did help bring a finale that was not as tragic and bloody as it could have been.

Not only Moscow, other capitals too, both Western and Arab, tried to ensure a peaceful outcome. There can hardly be talk of wasted efforts. Though war proved inevitable its escalation was forestalled thanks to the positions of Israel, Iran, and Turkey, and the universal concern over the scale and aims of the war made itself felt in the fact the multinational forces did not go beyond the United Nations' mandate.

Today we must congratulate all who took part in the anti-Iraqi confrontation. From the men in uniform to the diplomats who battled as fiercely at the negotiation table. Humanity has survived another war, one of the most just wars ever fought.

Need For 'New Iraq' Noted

LD2802162491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1330 GMT 28 Feb 91

[Igor Surgachev commentary]

[Excerpts] The war in the Gulf zone, which in essence continued for 42 days altogether, was an unusual and unqiue war. [passage omitted]

I think and I hope that a good lesson has been taught not only to Saddam Husayn but also to all lovers of military adventures, all potential violators of commonly-accepted norms of international life. [passage omitted]

The Iraqi regime and its leaders carry full responsibility for all of the tragic consequences of the war; for people's deaths and for the destruction, and moreover, not only in Kuwait. It is they who brought matters to a war that was hopeless for Iraq, not worrying in the least about what suffering and deprivation would befall their people. [passage omitted]

Having taken one sensible step in accepting the Soviet peace plan, they ignored, however, the ultimatum presented to them in the development of that plan by President Bush on behalf of the anti-Iraq coalition. Even under the threat of the start of a widescale ground war Baghdad continued tomaneuver and bluff and to trade in conditions acceptable to itself to solve the crisis. [passage omitted]

But in my view Iraq has not stopped being a threat to neighboring states, especially small and weak ones in the military sense. However, for prospects of estabolishing a new peaceful order in the region, perhaps another thing is more important: Saddam Husayn remains in power. Up to this point in time Iraqi propaganda is still branding countries of the anti-Iraq coalition as aggressors and proclaiming some kind of victory for Iran [as heard]. [passage omitted]

It seems that the Iraqi regime has not given up claims to Kuwait. In these conditions neither Kuwait, nor other countries in the region can feel fully secure, so that it is

too soon to even talk about preconditions for durable peace and stability. If Baghdad's line of behavior does not change a deep split will continue in the Arab world. In a word, the situation in the region of the Near and Middle East remains complex and it is difficult to predict developments. I think that without a change to the regime in Baghdad or its public and solemn pledge to respect the norms of international law and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of neighboring states, it will be impossible to create an effective system of collective security in the region, about the necessity of which our Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh spoke today at a press conference in Moscow. And in my view only a new Iraq that has resolutely broken off with adventurism and has condemned the criminal aggression against Kuwait can play a proper part in such a system. [passage omitted]

Arabic Beam on Cease-fire Efforts

LD2702184791 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Aleksey Zlatorunskiy commentary]

[Text] The Security Council met yesterday in emergency session, at the request of the USSR. The meeting, held behind closed doors, was devoted to one issue: settlement of the crisis in the Gulf. As reported by the media at UN headquarters, Soviet delegate Yuliy Vorontsov acquainted members of the Security Council with the content of the letter of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. This said that the Iraqi leadership had decided, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 660, to withdraw all its forces from Kuwait, that the order for this had been issued and that this would be carried out in a very brief period.

Aleksey Zlatorunskiy writes: I recall that Iraq accepted a few days ago the Soviet plan for a peaceful and political settlement of the Gulf crisis. The war could have ended had Washington and its allies, as is known, not rejected the Soviet plan, and had they not come forward with an alternative to it in the form of an ultimatum which had practically no chance of being accepted by Baghdad. As a result, the land battle, which has now killed many people and noticeably raised tension in the world, was launched.

In this difficult situation, the Soviet leadership has continued to exert speedy political and diplomatic efforts to prevent bloodshed, rightly considering that this course of events is in line with the interests of the whole international community, including the peoples of the anti-Iraq coalition.

Events have developed rapidly in recent days, and today Saddam Husayn addressed the nation on the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. General Peter de la Billiere, commander of the British forces in the Gulf, has confirmed that the Iraqi forces were indeed withdrawing from Kuwait. But since it became known that Iraq had agreed to immediately withdraw its forces from Kuwait and had indeed begun to do so, official spokesmen for the United States, Britain and some other countries started to present additional demands to Baghdad. They do not conceal their intention to continue the military operations, under various pretexts.

A spontaneous impression is being formed to the effect that there are people in the West who feel disappointment at the fact that the Soviet Union was able to turn the direction of the development of the crisis in the Gulf toward political settlement. In these circumstances, USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov, made a statement today in which he said that the USSR had asked its UN delegate to immediately demand an emergency session of the Security Council to adopt a resolution on cease-fire in the Gulf. It goes without saying that this resolution would open, in the current circumstances, a realistic road for normalizing the situation in the Gulf.

U.S. 'Ultimatum' to Saddam Cited

PM2802100791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "White House Ultimatum"]

[Text] The White House has demanded that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn "personally and publicly" declare his agreement to fulfill all the UN Security Council resolutions and also the provisions of the U.S. proposal of 22 February as a condition for ending the war in the Persian Gulf region. White House official spokesman Marlin Fitzwater voiced doubt as to the sincerity of Iraq's declared intention to withdraw the troops from Kuwait. "We have no grounds for believing that the Iraqi forces are pulling out," he declared late Monday evening. "In fact, Iraqi units are continuing to fight."

"The statement issued by Baghdad Monday says that Saddam Husayn's armed forces will retreat fighting," Fitzwater pointed out. "We will not attack unarmed retreating soldiers, but we will regard their retreat in combat formation as military operations." The White House spokesman emphasized that the only way Saddam Husayn can convince the multinational force of the seriousness of his intentions to halt the war is to "express personally and publicly agreement with the provisions of our 22 February proposal." "In connection with the fact that Baghdad's announcement refers to the Soviet initiative he must also personally and publicly declare clearly expressed agreement to fulfill all the corresponding UN Security Council resolutions, including in particular Resolution 662 calling on Iraq to renounce the annexation of Kuwait and Resolution 674 on Iraqi compensation for the damage caused to Kuwait and other countries," Fitzwater emphasized. At the present moment, the

White House spokesman pointed out, "we are continuing the war, and we have no reasons to change our plans."

Answering journalists' questions, he explained that the United States had made the decision to add the new demands for Saddam Husayn's personal and public agreement with the earlier advanced conditions for ending the war in connection with the fact that the Iraqi leader has repeatedly broken his promises in the past. "We are asking him to speak publicly and to announce his specific intentions to the whole world," the White House spokesman said.

Responding positively to the USSR's proposal to convene a closed UN Security Council session, Fitzwater emphasized: "We believe that the Soviet Union has been of assistance in this process... They tried to secure Saddam Husayn's withdrawal from Kuwait in accordance with the UN resolutions. In every discussion which President Gorbachev has had with us he has emphasized his adherence to the resolutions. A UN examination of this process is undoubtedly acceptable to us in any form."

U.S., Soviet Interests Viewed

PM2702140991 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7, 19-25 feb 91 pp 14-17

[Leonid Mlechin article: "Is Moscow on the Wrong Side?"]

[Excerpts] At a recent plenum of the Party's Central Committee, members expressed their irritation most openly. They cannot accept the fact that the Soviet Union has sided with Israel and the United States. This is primarily an emotional reaction. The President's words that the United States and the USSR are no longer enemies were understood by generals and high-placed officials as a diplomatic ruse, as a statement intended to play well with the world public. However, some of them find absolutely distasteful the prospect of being in one camp with Israel. No wonder that in our country Saddam Husayn is backed mainly by "professional" fighters against Zionism.

The new Foreign Minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, was compelled to defend Soviet foreign policy at the Central Committee plenum. He did that in half-apologetic tones: of course Moscow should have taken the side of its ally, that is, Iraq, but it was impossible to do so—the Soviet Union could not make such a choice.

Some uncertainty in the Foreign Minister's speech at the plenum indicates that six months after the occupation of Kuwait and one month after the war in the Gulf erupted, Soviet policy is not unanimous in its assessment of current events and that two opposite vies exist here side by side. [passage omitted]

A frank question should be asked: what are the national interests of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East? It is easy to formulate traditional U.S. interests.

First, a regular supply of oil not only to the United States, which is safely protected against interruptions, but also to its allies—West European countries and Japan. True, the reliability of oil supply does not depend very much on what regime comes to power, because all oil-producing states need dollars.

Second, the United States has always tried to keep the Soviet Union from establishing its own control over oil-producing states in the Middle East, suspecting that Moscow could incite them to action against the West.

Third, the United States needs stability in the region because revolutions, coups and wars could shatter peace in the Middle East and draw other countries into a conflict.

Fourth, the United States is interested in the prosperity of countries with which it has a special relationship, namely, with Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and Oman.

During the Carter presidency, Washington arrived at the conclusion that it should be prepared to rapidly deploy troops in the Persian Gulf if necessary. The Reagan administration stated that the Persian Gulf is of prime importance to the United States as a zone of its interests. Reagan said in 1981 that Washington would not allow Saudi Arabia to become another Iraq, that is, a radical anti-Western state. If the countries in the region are unable to defend themselves against aggression the United States will have to intervene in any conflict.

Naturally, ten years ago Washington could not predict that Saddam Husayn would attack its neighbours. At that time it was afraid of Soviet aggression, which seemed quite possible after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The programme of arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia was carried out by Washington even in defiance of Israel. Saudi Arabia and other countries of the region reconstructed their airfields and bases so that, if necessary, they could be used by the United States.

Washington's interests in saving Saudi Arabia and Kuwait coincided with the desire of the world community to check the aggressor. And what about the Soviet Union?

In the past Moscow tried to win over as many countries as possible, establishing its influence in the region and ousting Americans from it. After the Seven-Day War of 1967, Arab countries, shocked by the routing of their armies, applied to Moscow for aid. Massive arms deliveries, military advisers, economic aid and unreserved political support of the Arab world enhanced the Soviet Union's role in the region. But this period did not last long. Idelogical cooperation, on which Khrushchev counted, could not be established. The Islamic world

spurned Communist ideas. Communists were killed or thrown into prison. The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party shut their eyes to these facts. "Socialist-oriented" nations felt that Moscow's economic advice was leading them to a disaster while the Soviet Union needed dollars too.

This does not mean that mutual understanding disappeared because they still had such common enemies such as the United States, Israel and Western influence. The military sphere became the main connecting link. The Soviet Union provided Arab countries with arms, instructors and military advisers. In periods of crisis, it sent even pilots and anti-aircraft gunners to Egypt and Syria. [passage omitted]

There are allies for peace and for war. The Arab world needed the USSR as a counterweight to the United States, as a supplier of arms for the struggle against Israel. From the very outset, the Soviet Union has been an ally for war.

Backing the most radical Arab regimes, Moscow understood how widely the flames of Middle East war can spread. The Arab world was angry with Moscow precisely because even in Brezhnev's time it did not want to go with the radicals all the way. The Soviet-Egyptian relations deteriorated first when Sadat was not given all the weapons he asked for the Yom Kippur war in 1973. Soviet-Iraqi relations became cool after Moscow refused to support Baghdad's attack on iran.

In each case the Arabs demanded that Moscow intervene in Middle East conflicts directly. The policy of Gorbachev, who gave up attempts to compete with the United States on a global scale, has lessened the possibility of a new Arab-Israeli war.

It turned out that, generally speaking, the interests of the USSR and the United States in the Middle East do not contradict because both superpowers are interested in the maintenance of peace and stability there, in the settlement of all conflicts by political means.

Does this mean that the Soviet Union is destined to play the role of a second-rate power in the Middle East? The role and weight of a state are determined by its economic and diplomatic achievements. The Soviet Union can be on a par with the United States only in arms deliveries. It is unable to give assistance in economic development or act as a mediator in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Foreign policy always relies on domestic policy and must conform with the real interests and needs of the people. The pouring of arms into the Middle East, the instigation of confrontation, recruiting satellites, and pitting of one country against another bring no benefit to the people. Of course, certain political forces see nothing bad in an alliance with Saddam Husayn. But can our country benefit from its alliance with the dictator and reckless gambler who is prepared to destroy the world?

Gorbachev's Middle East policy has drawn nearer to the genuine interests of the people. It has become independent. In the last few years the Soviet position has been determined only in Moscow. not in Damascus, Tripoli or Baghdad.

If the latest outburst of sympathy for Saddam Husayn (demonstrated, for instance, by some members of the Party's Central Committee) is transformed into directives for diplomats, Soviet foreign policy will again lose its independence. Moscow's separate position will be hailed in Baghdad and probably in other capitals which will try to draw our country into an unseemly political game. The Soviet Union will only suffer from such a position.

"The aggressor only gains from a policy of appeasement. The world has understood this only by paying a heavy price for the Munich deal of 1938. Of course, the aggressor is wise enough to advance his demands in a seemingly reasonable form." These worrds, uttered by Iraq's Deputy Foreign Minister Nizar Hamdoun several years ago, can well be applied to Iraq itself. The appeasement of Saddam Husayn can lead to a disaster that will go beyond the bounds of the region.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Senegal Frees Soviet Trawler, Drops Charges

LD2502120691 Moscow TASS in English 1148 GMT 25 Feb 91

[Text] Riga February 25 TASS—Senegal has released the Soviet trawler Sekstan detained by its military ship last week, Latvian news agency correspondent David Gefter reports, referring to officials from the Association of Fishery in the western basin.

The trawler, chartered by the Soviet-Mauritanian joint venture Mavsov, was seized in the Mauritanian economic zone. However, its skipper was accused of violating Senegal's economic zone.

The skipper was cleared of all charges, following an investigation in Dakar.

Communique Signed To Promote Trade With Senegal

LD2702101991 Moscow World Service in English 1630 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] The Trade, Industrial, and Agricultural Chamber of Dakar and the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry have signed a communique on joint measures.

The Soviet trade attache in Senegal (Mikhail Kynyasev) expressed the hope that the visit of the Soviet delegation to Dakar would promote concrete plans and projects and would stimulate business contacts between the two countries.

West Europe

Nordic Council Rejects 'Interference' Charge

PM2802122191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, SIBINFORM, REUTER, UPI roundup: "Nordic Council's Position"]

[Text] At a session of the Nordic Council in Copenhagen the Danish, Finnish, Swedish, Norwegian, and Icelandic Governments rejected the Soviet Union's warnings of the inadmissibility of this organization's interfering in the USSR's internal affairs in connection with the session's examination of the Baltic question.

In particular, Danish Prime Minister Schluter described this warning as "quite inadmissible and unacceptable." "Statements of this kind have always been a sign that someone's arguments appear weak. If we are interfering, we are doing so on totally legitimate grounds," he said, justifying his viewpoint with references to the Paris Charter, which, according to him, gives CSCE member countries the right to point to problems in other states.

Finnish Prime Minister Holkeri rejected claims that Finland holds a different position from the other Nordic countries with regard to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. "We support their right to independence and advocate the peaceful resolution of the problem."

Icelandic Envoy on Recognizing Lithuania

PM2702144391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Olafur Egilsson, Icelandic ambassador to the Soviet Union, by A. Platkovskiy; no place or date given; part of feature under the heading "You Too, Reykjavik... Iceland Ready to Establish Diplomatic Relations with Lithuania"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Olafur Egilsson, Icelandic ambassador to the Soviet Union, answered some questions by our correspondent A. Platkovskiy.

[Platkovskiy] How has Iceland reacted to the USSR Foreign Ministry note and the ambassador's recall to Moscow?

[Egilsson] The first reaction followed immediately: Our country's political leaders have expressed a desire to meet representatives of the Soviet Government to discuss the situation.

[Platkovskiy] This must be the first "diplomatic conflict" in the history of Soviet-Icelandic relations...

[Egilsson] The leaders in Moscow and Reykjavik have taken different views on various political issues before now. This has not prevented fruitful cooperation in trade or cultural contacts, however. I hope that any differences in the two sides' approach to the "Baltic question" can be overcome.

[Platkovskiy] One could get the impression that the decision to establish diplomatic relations with Lithuania has been made under the emotional effect of the tragic events in Vilnius.

[Egilsson] But surely emotions are not out of place anyway? I can also tell you that this decision is based on Iceland's profound belief that peoples must have the right to self-determination. While emphasizing this, Iceland does nevertheless appreciate the need for talks between the Baltic republics' democratically elected authorities and the center.

[Platkovskiy] Are you not afraid that you might soon have to leave your comfortable residence on Khlebnyy Lane?

[Egilsson] This is precisely the time when diplomats have work to do. Settling the situation that has arisen largely depends on how the "Baltic question" is resolved. That is precisely why Jon Baldvin Hannibalsson, Iceland's minister of foreign affairs and trade, has proposed starting a bilateral dialogue. Our countries cooperate in many spheres and gain mutual benefit from this. The present differences—however important they may be—must not influence the normal development of friendly relations. In the final analysis, we still hope that events will develop in the right direction. [passage omitted]

Officials Discuss Nazi Victims' Compensation

LD2702140491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 2020 GMT 26 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Sergey Sosnovskiy]

[Excerpt] Bonn, 26 Feb (TASS)—USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yuliy Kvitsinskiy and Dieter Kastrup, state secretary at the FRG Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had a conversation in Bonn today.

They discussed the issue of compensation for Soviet citizens who suffered under Nazi persecution during the war. The sides agreed on the need to reach a humanitarian settlement that would agree on appropriate compensation, especially in the most tragic cases. The sides are examining the issue of compensation for Soviet citizens in the overall context of the new quality of bilateral relations, particularly in light of the November 1990 treaty between the USSR and the FRG on good-neighborliness, partnership, and cooperation.

It was settled that official talks on this issue will be held in March of this year. [passage omitted]

Troop Withdrawal From FRG Planned by Sea

PM2202122391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent's report: "Troop Withdrawal By Sea"]

[Text] Berlin, 20 Feb—The plan for the Soviet troop withdrawal from Germany will be adopted 5 March, FRG Government official Major General Hartmut Voertsch reported at a Potsdam news conference Tuesday.

In the 1991-1993 period, he said, it is planned to withdraw 30 percent of the personnel and equipment each year. It is planned that 150,000 servicemen and their family members will leave Germany in 1991 along with 30,000 pieces of military hardware, including tanks, artillery pieces, and aircraft.

The federal government is allocating 1 billion marks to cover the transportation costs associated with the Soviet troop withdrawal through the end of 1994.

Concerning the position adopted by the Polish side on Soviet transit shipments, H. Voertsch noted that the Soviet troop withdrawal will be carried out by sea.

FRG Minister's View of Baltics 'Tendentious'

PM2202113191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Colonel L. Klyusa "Rejoinder": "Following the Logic of Confrontation"]

[Text] I suppose today one need not be an expert to see that the chief and decisive factor in the assessment of the present military-political situation is the combat actions in the Persian Gulf. The flames of this war could scorch countries other than those involved in it. That is why the world community is so united in its assessment of the threat to the whole world emanating from this region. But FRG Defense Minister G. Stoltenberg appears to think otherwise. He claimed in the newspaper DIE WELT recently that the threat of military confrontation currently emanates... from the USSR. He bases his claim on the "abrupt shift" in Soviet domestic policy occasioned by the tragic events in the Soviet Baltic area.

Let us leave to the West German minister's conscience his supremely one-sided and tendentious approach to what is happening in the Baltic area. But it is worrying that the man who heads the military department in the Bonn cabinet should presume to discuss the domestic situation in the Soviet Union. And threaten the USSR with "foreign policy consequences," what is more. When such hints are dropped by, for example, a trade or culture minister, it is associated with certain actions. May one ask what these words mean when uttered by a defense minister?

The speed of the FRG military department's reaction to certain events in our country is also amazing. It is even quicker than the Bundeswehr's reaction to events in the Persian Gulf.

Perhaps this is the very reason for the industry displayed by the minister: To assume the main role in the North Atlantic alliance while the the senior NATO partner is distracted by the military actions against Iraq. Germany's domestic problems connected with the country's unification have been solved, so it can now demonstrate who's who in Europe. And, in urging the strengthening of the NATO bloc as the "proven means of preserving stability and peace on the European continent," make the transparent hint to France that it will have to return to the NATO military organization, just as it will have to reckon with the new role of a united Germany in it.

To give his appeals added cogency, the minister even resorts to scaremongering stories such as the alleged redeployment of a large quantity of armaments and military equipment to eastern parts of the USSR. Yet the FRG Defense Ministry must be well informed about the stationing there of some formations and units from the disbanded Central and Southern Groups of Forces.

The question is: Where is the logic in the FRG defense minister's arguments? Indeed, when assessing the present-day military-political situation in Europe one has to consider that the Soviet Union has adopted a defensive doctrine, that substantial reductions are taking place in armed forces, that the Warsaw Pact barely exists as a military organization, and that the USSR is resolutely lowering the level of military confrontation.

Does it follow from this that the NATO bloc must be strengthened? That its composition and structure should be restored to the level of the worst periods of the Cold War? Clearly, the USSR President had the possibility of an inappropriate reaction in mind when he said that it would be deplorable and dangerous if all that has been achieved in the international sphere in recent years were to be jeopardized as a result of a misinterpretation.

The USSR is entitled to expect the leaders of West European foreign policy departments generally to adopt a more sober approach to the assessment of USSR policy than was expressed by the FRG Defense Minister. In conditions where the all-European structures are not yet operating properly, constructive, new, joint efforts are needed in the quest for ways of rapidly eliminating potential surges of military-political tension, rather than intensifying them to a dangerous extent.

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet Officials Comment on Cease-Fire

'Great Victory' for Gorbachev

LD2802091391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0843 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Boris Zverev]

Moscow, 28 Feb (TASS)—USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoliy Lukyanov stated here today that "A major denouement has come" in the Persian Gulf. He stated this after informing participants in the session of the Soviet legislature about the cease-fire in that region.

He reported in particular that "Full confirmation has been received from the U.S. side on a cease-fire in the Persian Gulf" and also on the fact that Iraq has simultaneously recognized all UN resolutions.

Anatoliy Lukyanov stated that "there is no doubt that, apart from everything else, this is a great victory for the foreign policy initiative of our president".

Falin Views Gulf, Israeli Policy

LD2802135691 Moscow TASS in English 1237 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov:]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—"The ending of gulf hostilities gives the green light to the switching of the entire conflict to political rails, something the Soviet Union wanted from the very outset," member of the parliamentary International Affairs Committee, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Valentin Falin told journalists during an interval in the USSR Supreme Soviet session.

"i would have preferred this to happen yesterday, not today night, but all the same I am glad the bloodshed is over," he stressed. "The Soviet Union will contribute to the achievement of a balanced settlement, which will help finally restore peace and stability in the Middle East."

"I hope the United Nations, which has displayed its potential after Iraq's aggression against Kuwait, will play the leading role in the settlement," he added. "I think any decision, taken outside the international community and based on blocs, will not be viable. Contradictions will arise sooner or later. They will begin to tear such a settlement asunder."

Asked whether Saddam Husayn, if he remains in power, will pose a permanent threat to stability in the region, Falin stressed that "stability there has never depended, nor depends today, on one regime in one given country. It depends on a sum total of factors, and if we simplify the problem to the mere change of a regime in one country, we will never be able to resolve it."

Falin disagreed with the view of some analysts that the solution of the Palestinian problem would become even more difficult after the conflict, because the United States, feeling itself indebted to Israel for the latter's restraint, will not be able to prompt it to greater flexible in respect to the occupied territories.

"During this conflict Israel has shown that it is able to "act more warily and can be guided by more long-standing categories than it was so far believed by many people. And this gives us a certain measure of hope", Falin noted.

28 Feb Session Debates Cabinet Nominations

Approves Yazov as Defense Minister

LD2802160791 Moscow TASS in English 1548 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—"What happened in Kuwait and Iraq necessitates a review of the attitude to Army air defence and the country's entire air defence system," Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov said at the Soviet parliament today.

He replied to questions by legislators, who discussed his appointment to the post of defence minister in the new cabinet. The proposal on the appointment was submitted by the Soviet president.

The appointment was approved by 275 lawmakers to 24, with 53 abstentions.

Speaking about lessons to be learnt from the Gulf War, Yazov admitted that the Soviet air defence system "has weak spots". He said that the USSR "is analysing the use of their armed forces by the United States and other countries".

Yazov also expressed opinion that the Iraqi air defence system "failed in most cases", a great part of Iraqi Mirage and MIG-29 intercepter fighters flew to Iran or were in Iraqi southern areas or Kuwait, which were raided first". [quotation marks as received]

The minister said that he did not know a single case of Iraqi fighters destroying a single allied aircraft out of 93 downed. "They were downed by Army air defence weapons, mostly by Soviet-made Hilka air defence systems," Yazov said.

Endorses 11 Appointments

LD2802170291 Moscow TASS in English 1646 GMT 28 Feb 91

[By TASS Correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow February 28 TASS—The Soviet parliament today gave the president a go-ahead for the appointment of 11 cabinet members, including three deputy premiers—Lev Ryabev, Feodor Senko and Vladimir Scherbakov—and Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov and KGB Chief Vladimir Kryuchkov.

Lev Ryabev, 57, was a deputy Soviet prime minister, Feodor Senko, 54, was a deputy Belorussian premier and Vladimir Scherbakov, 41, headed the USSR State Committee for Labour and Social Affairs for the past two years. Dmitriy Yazov and Vladimir Kryuchkov, both 67, have been filling their present posts since 1987 and 1988 respectively.

Also today, the Soviet parliament endorsed the appointment of Vitaliy Konovalov as minister of the nuclear power engineering and industry, Grigoriy Gabrieliants as minister of geology, Yuriy Volmer as minister of the merchant marine, Nikolay Vorontsov as minister of the environment, Vladimir Brezhnev as minister of transport building and Yuriy Semenov as minister of power engineering and electrification.

All candidatures were first considered by parliamentary committees and commissions.

The Soviet parliament began to form the Cabinet of Ministers in January when it endorsed the appointment of Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov and four of his deputies and approved the appointment of Aleksandr Bessmertnykh as foreign minister and Boris Pugo as interior minister.

Today, the parliament approved in first reading the bill on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers which is orientated towards bringing the structure and functions of the executive close to the conditions of transition to a market. It also envisages a considerable cut in the number of ministries and assigns new functions to the remaining sectoral ministries. The new cabinet will also include market structures, such as the ministry of economics and prognosis and the anti-monopoly committee.

On Friday, the parliament is expected to continue the discussion of candidates for cabinet posts and consider in second reading a bill on currency regulations.

IZVESTIYA Publishes Cabinet Nominations

PM2802114391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Unattributed untitled report]

[Text] The following candidacies for USSR ministerial posts have been submitted to the union legislature deputies for ratification:

USSR deputy prime minister—Lev Dmitriyevich Ryabev, born 1933, currently deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Bureau for the Fuel and Energy Complex;

USSR deputy prime minister—Fedor Petrovich Senko, born 1936, currently deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers;

USSR deputy prime minister—Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov, born 1949, currently chairman of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems;

USSR minister of atomic power engineering and industry—Vitaliy Fedorovich Konovalov, born 1932, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of geology—Grigory Arkadyevich Gabrielyants, born 1934, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of culture and tourism—Nikolay Nikolayevich Gubenko, born 1941, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of the maritime fleet—Yuriy Mikhaylovich Volmer, born 1933, currently holding the same post;

USSR defense minister—Dmitriy Timofeyevich Yazov, born 1923, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of nature use and environmental conservation—Nikolay Nikolayevich Vorontsov, born 1934, currently chairman of the USSR State Committee for Environmental Protection;

USSR minister of railways—Nikolay Semenovich Konarev, born 1927, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of the radio industry—Vladimir Ivanovich Shimko, born 1938, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of communications—Gennadiy Georgiyevich Kudryavtsev, born 1941, currently USSR first deputy minister of communications;

USSR minister of agriculture—Vyacheslav Ivanovich Chernoivanov, born 1938, currently first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for Food and Procurements;

USSR minister of installation and special construction work—Aleksandr Ivanovich Mikhalchenko, born 1935, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of the shipbuilding industry—Igor Vladimirovich Koksanov, born 1928, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of trade—Kondrat Zigmundovich Terekh, born 1935, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of transport construction —Vladimir Arkadyevich Brezhnev, born 1931, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of finance—Vladimir Yefimovich Orlov, born 1936, currently USSR first deputy finance minister;

USSR minister of the electronics industry—Vladislav Grigoryevich Kolesnikov, born 1925, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of power and electrification—Yuriy Kuzmich Semenov, born 1932, currently holding the same post;

USSR minister of justice—Sergey Gennadyevich Lushchikov, born 1951, currently holding the same post;

chairman of the USSR KGB—Vladimir Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov, born 1924, currently holding the same post;

chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics—Vadim Nikitich Kirichenko, currently holding the same post.

Committees Jointly Discusses Pact Dissolution

Views 'New Realities'

PM2602151591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "In the Light of New Realities"]

[Text] A joint sitting of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee and the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions began 22 February in the Kremlin by congratulating servicemen legisaltors on Soviet Army Day.

A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the International Affairs Committee, stressed that it is legislators' task, within the framework of the USSR's foreign policy course, to examine questions associated with the transformation of the Warsaw Pact. Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, and Army General M.A. Moiseyev, USSR first deputy defense minister and chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, delivered a report on the coming extraordinary meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at the level of foreign and defense ministers.

An interested, trenchant discussion of the foreign and domestic problems that are arising in connection with the windup of the Warsaw Pact military structure took place from the standpoint of the need to safeguard the Soviet Union's state interests and the inviolability of its western borders. The positive role played by the Warsaw Pact, which acted during the cold war period as a reliable guarantor of the USSR's and its allies' security, was noted. People's deputies expressed support for the government line of transforming the pact's role under the contemporary, qualitatively new conditions of East-West partnership relations. It was stressed that this step on the part of the Warsaw Pact is designed to help further reduce military confrontation in Europe and move away from bloc to nonbloc security structures on the continent within the framework of the all-European process. At the same time legislators expressed concern that the West is still not taking adequate practical steps to transform NATO from a military-political into a predominantly political alliance.

The opinion prevailed at the sitting that vigorous efforts must be continued to preserve and further develop good-neighborly, friendly, and equitable relations and comprehensive cooperation between the USSR and other states in East Europe on a new basis in view of the historic interdependence of their political destinies.

Summing up the results of the discussion, A.S. Dzasokhov pointed out the importance of the upcoming extraordinary meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee in view of the new political realities in Europe, along with the opportuneness of raising this question at the two USSR Supreme Soviet committees' joint sitting.

IZVESTIYA Reports Sitting

PM2602123191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by legislative correspondent A. Sychev: "Deputies Favor Taking Realities Into Account"]

[Text] A joint session of the International Affairs Committee and the Committee for Defense and State Security Questions has been held at the USSR Supreme Soviet under the chairmanship of A. Dzasokhov.

The question planned for discussion—the upcoming extraordinary session of the Warsaw Pact states' Political Consultative Committee at the level of foreign and defense ministers—was supplemented by a report by Ye. Primakov on the situation in the Persian Gulf region.

USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Kvitsinskiy and USSR Armed Forces Chief of General Staff M. Moiseyev delivered reports on the preparations for the upcoming Political Consultative Committee conference to be held in Budapest 25 February.

Yu. Kvitsinskiy said, in particular, that the question of disbanding the Warsaw Pact Organization's military structure appears an urgent and politically sensible step under present conditions. The Warsaw Pact states have actively insisted on the acceleration of this process.

The perestroyka process will not affect the alliance as a political consultative organ. Only a few military documents will be annulled. Emphasis will subsequently be placed on bilateral agreements. Such talks have already started with Romania and Hungary. A corresponding draft of a new treaty will very soon be sent to Czechoslovakia.

In his report Chief of General Staff M. Moiseyev dwelt, in particular, on a number of negative consequences stemming from the rapid nature of the processes in East European countries for security on the continent. He also pointed to the need to get away from the bloc system

when holding talks on the further reduction of arms and armed forces—on which NATO still insists. According to Moiseyev, this could do considerable harm to the Soviet Union's economy and defense capability.

Deputies discussed foreign and domestic policy problems arising in connection with the curtailment of the Warsaw Pact's military structure. A. Sorokin, N. Neyland, A. Vezirov, F. Burlatskiy, and certain other deputies particularly emphasized the need to rigorously ensure the USSR's state interests and the inviolability of its western borders.

In their speeches Soviet legislators voiced concern at the fact that the West is still not taking adequate practical measures to reform NATO in keeping with the new spirit of relations among states.

People's deputies supported the Soviet Government's policy aimed at transforming the Warsaw Pact's role.

Deputies also advocated continuing the search for opportunities to preserve and develop good-neighborly, friendly, equitable relations and all-around cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other states of East Europe.

IZVESTIYA Reports 20 February Proceedings

PM2502144591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 Union Edition pp 1-2

[Report by legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "Difficult Search for Constructive Solutions"]

[Text] On Thursday 21 February the Union legislature's work proceeded in its committees and commissions.

The day before, Wednesday, V. Pavlov, the head of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, set forth in an hour-long report the approaches toward the organization of management in the country. (The speech is published in today's issue of IZVESTIYA).

The deputies agreed with the proposal of A. Lukyanov, who was in the chair, not to open a debate on this question. There were several reasons. Thus, the deputies received the draft law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers only the day before the sitting. In addition the country's president, who has the right of legislative initiative, has not yet made the final amendments to the Cabinet's structure. That is why the participants in the session adopted a resolution instructing the legislature committees and commissions to examine the draft of this law at their own sittings and to submit proposals for examination by the Supreme Soviet.

On the first day of the session the deputies held hearings at a closed sitting on the situation in South Ossetia. On 20 February the union legislators returned to this question. R. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities, submitted the completed draft resolution for approval. It was prepared by a commission which included, in particular, representatives of th most influential deputies groups—"Soyuz," the Communists, and the Interregional Deputies' Group.

R. Nishanov reported that the discussion of the resolution on the situation in the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast and measures to stabilize the situation in this region was very keen. Proposals were submitted, right up to the introduction of an emergency situation in this region. The final version of the resolution, R. Nishanov noted, is more balanced. It considers the sovereign rights and potential of the Georgian Republic.

But it turned out that even this version of the resolution has not eliminated all questions. Representatives of the Georgian and South Ossetian deputations voiced complaints. A number of deputies insisted on the need to submit a clear memorandum on the USSR president's introduction of an emergency situation in the zone of the conflict by the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops.

Here USSR Internal Affairs Minister B. Pugo took the floor. He reminded the Union legislators that the Supreme Soviets of the RSFSR and a number of other republics have decided that it is impermissible for the internal troops stationed on their territory to take part in the solution of interethnic conflicts in other republics. If the deputies insist and adopt the formulation connected with doing this with the aid of the internal troops, B. Pugo stressed, I would ask them without fail to write an appeal to the union republics' Supreme Soviets to give the relevant authorization to the introduction of troops. Otherwise in a few days you will all see soldiers' mothers outside our building.

Deputy S. Umalatova reacted instantly to this on the whole sensible remark:

"Why then do we need the internal troops, the USSR MVD, and the Supreme Soviet?"

The majority of deputies agreed with the need to take into account Georgia's sovereign rights and interests.

During the discussion of the clause of the resolution which defined the middlemen in talks between the opposing sides R. Nishanov suggested expanding the formula "with the mediation of the Soviet of Nationalities." He said: "There was an appeal from the Interregional Deputies' Group. It includes members of the Soviet of the Union, they should not be deprived of the right to take part." R. Nishanov suggested publishing the Interregional Deputies' Group appeal together with the resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet (the letter from S. Ryabchenko, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the Interregional Deputies' Group appeal are published in today's issue of IZVESTIYA on page four).

As a result of the prolonged discussion a document was adopted. (The Supreme Soviet resolution is published on page four).

The discussion begun in the morning of the television speech of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet chairman continued at the evening session. As was stipulated, in the interval between sittings a group of deputies prepared a draft resolution on this question. Its text was read out to the sitting's participants by Deputy A. Denisov.

At A. Lukyanov's suggestion the draft resolution was adopted as a basis by a majority of votes, after which its discussion began. Its outcome was the submission of a number of changes to the version initially proposed. The words "removal" and "abolition" were replaced with the words "resignation" and "replacement." It was also decided to remove from the document the phrase about the expediency of the USSR president's issuing an appeal to the Soviet people.

The final version of the resolution of the country's Supreme Soviet was adopted by a majority of votes. But the adoption was preceded by nearly 90 minutes of debate, which essentially became a continuation of the morning debate. During the debate the deputies mainly voiced their attitude toward the Russian leader's speech. But in contrast to the morning sitting, at which the speakers' assessments could with full justification be called homogenous, during the evening discussion positions were divided.

Thus, Deputy V. Shapovalenko stated his support for B. Yeltsin's speech, except for the section discussing the resignation of the USSR Ppesident. He also expressed perplexity over the fact that it was deemed possible to attack the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for his appeal to the Russian peoples when similar steps by the leaders of other union republics are not being subjected to such attacks. These attacks, the deputy believes, were organized by the center's leadership and supported by the party leadership. They are aimed at discrediting the Russian leader. If B. Yeltsin's proposal regarding the resignation of the USSR president is deemed unconstitutional, V. Shapovalenko asked, why did a similar proposal put forward at the start of the work of the fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies by Deputy S. Umalatova not receive the same assessment?

Answering this question, A. Denisov explained that Deputy S. Umalatova was speaking only of the resignation of the president. B. Yeltsin was speaking of handing over power to a collective organ—the Federation Council—and that, in A. Denisov's opinion, is unconstitutional.

We should not be in a hurry to take a decision, his colleague Deputy A. Zakharov urged. B. Yeltsin, he said, is the leader of Russia and has grown tired of living in the old way. The adoption of the proposed resolution, the deputy stressed, could aggravate the Russians' negative attitude toward the Union legislature.

Deputy V. Chernyak voiced the opinion that B. Yeltsin's position was being distorted in the course of the debate. The deputy noted that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman's speech contains no appeals for civil war or the violent overthrow of the existing system. Thus, the deputy believes, there are no grounds for speaking of anticonstitutional proposals.

In turn Deputies M. Surkov, A. Golyakov, and V. Yarin sharply denounced B. Yeltsin's speech.

Thus the resolution of the country's legislature—its official reaction to the speech by the USSR [as published] Supreme Soviet chairman—was adopted. The reaction to it on the part of the Federation Council and the Russian Supreme Soviet is extraordinarily important now.

Before adopting the resolution on B. Yeltsin's speech, the deputies completed their discussion of the session's order of work. The discussion was no briefer than the subsequent one. Not surprisingly, after all in addition to the already approved 53 questions of the session (initially, let us recall, there were 48 of them) several dozen more proposals had come in, the sitting participants were informed by I. Laptev, chairman of the Soviet of the Union. Eventually the deputies discussed about 30 questions proposed for inclusion on the agenda of the session. It was decided to hand over some of them for study to the committees and commissions and to carry over the discussion of others to the sixth session. There were also questions whose examination was not deemed compulsory.

They included Deputy Ye. Kogan's proposal. The pretext for the proposal was the note published in IZVESTIYA the day before—a reply to Deputy B. Aleksnis' speech at the session. This note, Ye. Kogan stated, does not acknowledge the right of the USSR Supreme Soviet to interfere in the newspaper's affairs. The deputy voiced the conviction that inasmuch as the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Presidium are the founders of IZVESTIYA it follows that if journalists are not geared toward the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium, the appropriate measures should be applied to the newspaper. And all those who do not fulfill it, Ye. Kogan stressed, should go to another newspaper—MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, for instance—and write everything they like there. But in IZVESTIYA they will write what the Supreme Soviet decides. The deputy urged that "the IZVESTIYA question be resolved once and for all."

This proposal gave rise to an objection from Deputy S. Ryabchenko. Describing the tone of the speech as unacceptable for the legislature, the deputy drew his colleagues' attention to the fact that the Law on the Press recently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet operates in the country and clearly designates the rights of the founder, publishers, and editorial collective. And people must act only in strict accordance with this law. According to the law, the fact that IZVESTIYA is the newspaper of the Soviets of people's deputies in no way makes it subordinate to the founder or publisher and does not give them the right to dictate their policy to the

editorial office. IZVESTIYA, S. Ryabchenko said, is guided by the Law on the Press and it fulfills its duties as the official organ of the Supreme Soviet by publishing official documents. In the deputy's opinion, the persecution of IZVESTIYA, which is what Deputy Ye. Kogan's proposed way of putting the question makes it become, is absolutely unacceptable. The strict observance of the Law on the Press, he stressed, should be compulsory for deputies. If someone believes a newspaper is breaking the law, these questions should be decided in court.

In turn A. Lukyanov informed the participants in the sitting that the conflict within the editorial office in IZVESTIYA reported by many mass media was examined at a Supreme Soviet Presidium sitting. The results will be reported to the deputies.

And so the agenda has been swelled by one more question. The deputies have to discuss the course of the fulfillment of the union budget. The session's portfolio has thus been finally formed. There are 54 questions on it. In other words, a huge volume of work lies ahead.

Political & Social

Gorbachev's Centrist Position Defended

LD2702193391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1423 GMT 27 Feb 91

[By political observer Sergey Kolesnikov]

[Text] Moscow, 27 Feb (TASS)—The claim that "Gorbachev has moved to the right" has become of late a kind of "common feature" in the commentaries made by some Western mass media in relation to the situation in the Soviet Union. As a rule the set of "crimes" is of a standard type: perestroyka is over, a "centrist" Gorbachev has turned into a "right." And this means the West should look for other more easygoing partners, put their stake in leaders of the republican or even local level who have expressed a readiness to render any service. Without belittling in any way the analytical capabilities of the foreign observers, I still would like to risk a guess on who stands behind these claims that have spread so widely. In most cases the system of arguments and, sometimes, the vitality of expressions have been directly borrowed from the political opponents of the Soviet president.

First of all, I would like to note the unprecedented influence of Soviet political terminology on the still-remaining concepts of "left" and "right"-wing forces. In a short period of time the new democratic politicians have succeeded in changing Western mentality to such a degree that those people who uphold perfectly respectable conservative and neo-conservative concepts are being called "left- wing" in the foreign press. And on the reverse side, the proponents of socialist views have been given the undeserved title of "right- wing" and "conservative."

However, let us turn from problems of terminology to the essence of the processes taking place in the country. What has happened in the sixth year of perestroyka? Clearly what has happened is what inevitably arises during the process of any reform when there is a search for a compromise between the interests of development and stability. The most difficult thing for any politician in this situation is not to take up a fixed position: Either preserve the status quo at all costs or let events take their course when the processes become unmanageable. Not to yield to the temptation of simple decisions where they simply do not exist—this is a task Gorbachev is striving to solve today.

There are no simple solutions to determining the fate of the Soviet Union and mutual relations between the republics. Having condemned the violence and attempts at anticonstitutional activities in the Baltic and other regions of the country, the president is insisting on the priority of law and commonsense in solving the intricate problems of interethnic relations. Among other things, it is a matter of democratic mechanism, such as a referendum.

There are no simple solutions in the economy either. The breakdown of economic relations and the consumer market and the stepping up of social tension, this is what is putting the brake on economic reform and not a mythical "retreat" from a market policy by the president. Yesterday in Minsk, Gorbachev described the rejection of economic reform as the biggest mistake which we could possibly make.

And naturally there are not and cannot be simple solutions in ensuring stability and law and order. In a situation where crime is growing and economic chaos is intensifying there is a great temptation to resort to "simple" means of enforcing order with force. The Soviet president is, however, striving to resolve these problems, too—solely in constitutional, legal ways, standing up to serious pressure exerted by the radical adherents of the "iron fist."

"Simple" solutions are contraindicated in international affairs as well. This is why attempts to rigidly "bind" the Soviet Union to one single method of resolving international problems, to couple, figuratively speaking, its policy to the military echelon moving in just one direction, are marred by onesidedness.

Regarding the colors of the political spectrum in Soviet society, when they talk about "Gorbachev's shift to the right," they do not as a rule take into account a decisive circumstance. No "shift" has occurred in the position of the president. Just as he was, so has he also remained on the positions of perestroyka, or the radical political and economic reforms. What has happened then? The former so-called "left-wing" flank of the perestroyka coalition has simply disappeared, vanished into thin air virtually without a trace. Its adherents of yesterday have stated completely different aims from those they proclaimed a year or two ago. This is the main danger today for those

who define their attitude toward the Soviet president is that they do not notice the most important differences between supporters of the hard line course and Gorbachev. He is precisely the one who was and remains the guarantor of the country's democratic development.

Politburo's Shenin Defends Gorbachev

PM2802095191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Resolute Condemnation"]

[Text] O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has condemned the "unforgivable attacks on the constitutionally elected head of state." He felt certain that such actions will "continue to meet with a rebuff from the majority of our society."

A TASS correspondent put this question to O.S. Shenin: "What do you think of the increasing attacks on the USSR president?"

O.S. Shenin said, in particular:

"In recent days a noisy campaign has been unleashed to discredit M.S. Gorbachev, USSR president and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, a campaign triggered by the speech on Central Television by the chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet.

"As I see it, the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet expressed unwavering support for the USSR president, his program to stabilize the country's position, and the policy of preserving the USSR as a federation of equal and sovereign republics. The president's efforts are supported by soviets of people's deputies at every level, and millions of Soviet citizens. Only those intent upon destroying the Union and satisfying their own political ambitions refuse to accept the nation's will, its clearly expressed aspiration for peace and accord in a Soviet state, and the desire to live and work in peace and to look to the future with confidence. Time and again efforts are made to foist the views and ideas of a small group of people onto at least a part of the population, to fuel confrontation within society, and to bring out destructive instincts.

"Such actions warrant resolute condemnation. It is unacceptable for forces with no constructive program of their own to obstruct the constitutional organs of power and the USSR president's efforts to implement measures meeting the interests of the entire nation and all the country's inhabitants. I believe that the unforgivable attacks on the constitutionally elected head of state will continue to meet with a rebuff from the majority of our society."

Yeltsin's Attacks On Gorbachev Criticized

PM2702155591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

["My Opinion" article by Anatoliy Karpychev: "Attack on the President"]

[Text] All is not well in our state. People have the feeling that something not very pretty is brewing, exactly what one can only guess, when listening to the seething passions. Indeed, how can one not listen when living people are doing the talking, well known people who are far from stupid. One is threatening starvation, another is threatening a February-March state of emergency, a third is threatening a civil war involving the use of nuclear weapons. You will agree that people must be given back the peace they have lost. But how? Is there a choice of ways and means? I believe there is. But what we do not need, in my view, is the choice made by B.N. Yeltsin, when he demanded the USSR president's resignation. According to the Western press, his choice means a declaration of "very real war" on the president.

Let us not be naive: This war did not begin yesterday. During the periods of calm we had entertained hopes that the fatherland's interests would triumph over emotions, but, alas, it was not to be. At the latest RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet session this was as clear as can be. So B.N. Yeltsin said nothing new in his television statement. He adopted a tougher stance. "I have made that choice and I will not deviate from that path." I confess it occurred to me that a Western politician in his place would not have entered into conflict with the Constitution, demanding the replacement of legally elected supreme bodies of power and the resignation of the president, but would have submitted his own resignation. He chose war.

We are all making a choice today. We are making it at a very difficult time, again and again assuming responsibility for the country's destiny, for its future. This choice presupposes an awareness of what people want in their own home—peace or war? The people made their main, historic choice in 1985—in favor of perestroyka, democracy, glasnost, and new thinking. Evidently, some people thought that after that life would fine and dandy, that the joyous spring breeze would blow for the rest of their lives. There is no butter in the stores and the spring breeze has turned raw. This happens in politics. Again the question arises: Where are we going and with whom? With Gorbachev, on the path of reforms and glasnost, respect for human rights, and order in the country or with those who constitute the opposition to the president, who have declared war on him, although they say they want the same as the president: democracy, reforms, glasnost.

Try and work out who wants happiness for the people and who is playing tricks on them. It is difficult to make a choice, especially as empty shelves in stores, endless lines, coupons, and discontent make a significant adjustment to the question of popular support for leaders and

to their standing. The political opposition decided to work on this, by declaring war on the president.

One is reminded of some lines from letters from abroad. "Please help your president, he is having a tough time. Be patient, do not curse him. He started the great cause of perestroyka." They are asking us to understand our president. To be patient...

People are impatient...

It is all tangled in a single knot: the fate of the Union, the approaching referendum, the tragedy in the Baltic area, the democrats' declining authority... Then comes the statement by the members of the MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI founding council, entitled "The Crime of a Regime Which Does Not Want to Quit the Scene." PRAVDA reported it. It was this item that declared war on the president. The authors wanted the "regime to quit the scene."

Those who made the statement, parting company with the president for ideological and political reasons, were not simply wasting words... It was war indeed.

We know USSR People's Deputy Svyatoslav Nikolayevich Fedorov, the ophthalmologist, well. He is among the founders and authors of the statement. Recently the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS asked him to comment on the USSR president's decree on combating economic sabotage. Here is Fedorov's reply: "The decree quite clearly shows Gorbachev to be a man who does not trust his own people, has no faith in their strength, does not regard our people as talented, honest, and conscientious, and does not think that they can develop and work miracles. Indeed, it appears that he thinks we are stupid, lazy, thievish, and completely untalented. This is offensive."

It is offensive to me too: Why go and heap this slander on someone—be he the president, an engineer, a doctor, or whoever.

He goes on: "We gave Gorbachev power not for him to feed us, but for us to feed him. So that he depended on us, not vice versa."

Such revelations are enough to put one off one's food and one wants to say: "Esteemed Svyatoslav Nikolayevich, no one needs to be fed." The president is earning his own daily bread. Whatever else, he has not forgotten how to work.

You think that's all? Nothing of the sort. Yet another people's deputy—Telman Gdlyan—has brought an "action" against the USSR president in the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA. A monstrous action, I would say. The gist of it is as follows: B.N. Yeltsin's life is in danger, he could be physically eliminated, so the "democratic forces who support the Russian leader will have to make the country's president personally responsible for Yeltsin's life." "When this crime is committed we will urge the people to rise up and overthrow the party and state military junta headed by Gorbachev."

Can you hear what is happening in our state?

You might ask why I took the president's side?

Because it was not he who declared war on Boris Yeltsin. It is not he who suspects people of being "thieves." It is not he who talks about physical violence against political opponents. And it is not the USSR president who is responsible for the fact that the times are so ruthlessly highlighting who's who. That Yeltsin's authority has taken a knock, that he is no longer as popular as he was at the time of the election of USSR people's deputies.

I have been told that one has to understand Yeltsin, because he clearly still bears a grudge following his dismissal from the Politburo. But the people now are not in the mood for such reminiscences. They are not in the mood for Yeltsin's appeals for help to the United Nations in connection with the tragic events in the Baltic area. There are enough problems. War with the president is the last straw.

This overt war was needed, and is being waged, to shed all responsibility for the bitter experiences of ordinary people. It is no accident that the CPSU and the Communists are the number one target in this war. The tactics are expressed in the following slogan: The worse the better. The worse, naturally, for Gorbachev and the better for his opponents.

I must say at this point that we are not the only ones making a choice, the West is too. It sometimes does the president a disservice by having people who have made a profession out of attacking Gorbachev pay private visits. They usually invite the same old people, including founders of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI. Who exactly? G. Popov, S. Stankevich, G. Starovoytov. Now we have former model KGB General Kalugin. Private visits have been paid by Prunskiene, Landsbergis...

The most vigorous domestic and "foreign" critics of Gorbachev are essentially the same people. Here is a "specimen" attack on the president. I quote from an Italian newspaper...

"The people outstripped Gorbachev and left him behind. Then Gorbachev took fright and, fearful of losing his personal power, started to strengthen the structures of the right wing (CPSU, KGB, Army). The purpose was as follows: lead the country to the brink of collapse and wait until the people are fatigued by hunger, poverty, and chaos and are ready to accept dictatorship. Now he has cast off his mask and everyone has seen his true face."

"But one is also alarmed by certain aspects of Yeltsin's behavior, which look too authoritative. Who can guarantee that he will not perform an about-face, in the direction of totalitarianism?" came the question.

"You Western journalists are not observant enough. You cannot tell a devil from an angel," was the reply.

There is one thing I simply cannot understand: If one ascribes to Gorbachev a deliberate desire to lead the country to collapse and then establish a dictatorship, one might well ask: Why? He could have inherited power from the previous general secretary, made no changes to its structure—and he would have had a dictatorship.

The Western press was bound to react to B.N. Yeltsin's television appearance. Assessments of his choice vary. Judge for yourselves.

By demanding the USSR president's resignation, the chairman of the Russian parliament finally closed behind him all the doors leading to mutual understanding. Thus, there now begins, one month before the referendum on the preservation of the Soviet Union, the deciding round of the power struggle between the two politicians. (That was the German DPA Agency).

Journalists are calling the criticism of Gorbachev unprecedented and are trying to understand why Yeltsin made that choice. He made it without a thought for the fact that the president "is in the maelstrom of a last attempt to stop the war in the Persian Gulf." The impression is, Italian newspaper AVANTI! writes, that the Russian leader, preoccupied with domestic political problems, has either lost the "statesmanlike approach" in the foreign policy sphere or is trying to take the "foreign policy card" off Gorbachev, to deprive him of his last trump card—the West's trust.

I do not rule it out. Representatives of the interregional group have long been trying to "enlighten the West" "concerning the true" state of affairs in the USSR, insisting that it must not support M.S. Gorbachev.

Some take on board statements by officials who have grown fond of private visits. But not all. London's THE TIMES writes:

"Although B. Yeltsin's task is to portray the Soviet president as a failure, the Soviet leader's intelligent policy in the settlement of the Kuwait crisis without doubt nullifies these efforts."

The newspaper further states: "Diplomatic circles in the West are of the view that Gorbachev remains the best choice to back. He has a reputation as a pragmatist in international affairs. As for B. Yeltsin, he may be popular in the eyes of the West, but he is a narrow-minded Russian nationalist. Despite the fact that he has distanced himself from the 'Pamyat' extremist movement, the leader of the Russian parliament remains a dark figure, who could unleash anarchy in the country."

Paris newspaper LE MONDE: "By declaring war on Mikhail Gorbachev in such a blunt manner, Boris Yeltsin, whose popularity is declining in proportion to the mounting chaos in the country, is playing a risky game: He is already the target of those forces who have launched a campaign to discredit the Russian government."

The war against the USSR president has no right to remain someone's personal business, not even Yeltsin's. Particularly as the people do not want it.

The state of war cannot last indefinitely. That is yet another conclusion.

And another question: How could it have come about, dear comnrades, that the most unprotected person in the declared war is the USSR president? The mind boggles.

Shevardnadze Holds News Conference 20 Feb

PM2502114591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Maksim Yusin: "E. Shevardnadze Creates Foreign Policy Association"]

[Text] Moscow—The constituent meeting of the Foreign Policy Association—a nongovernment public organization of which E. Shevardnadze has been elected president—was held in Moscow 20 February.

The founders of the association are the Soviet Peace Fund, the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace, the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the USSR Academy of Sciences, the Moscow City Soviet, the Leningrad City Soviet, the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, the ministries of civil aviation, communications, and the aviation industry, the Chamber of Trade and Industry, IAN, TASS, INTERFAX, NOVOYE VREMYA, ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, the United States and Canada Institute, the Europe Institute, the Institute of General History, and other organizations. The board has been joined by Gavriil Popov, Anatoliy Sobchak, and a number of well known diplomats. The organization's headquarters are in a private residence on Yelizarova Street, not far from Kursk Station. This building, which formerly housed the Chad Embassy, has been provided by one of the founders—the Main Administration of the Diplomatic Corps.

Speaking of the aims of the association, E. Shevardnadze said that it is not setting itself against the Foreign Ministry and other departments. But "we shall not keep quiet where we see a deviation from the new political thinking," he said. "Now that Soviet foreign policy is being constantly pressured by the 'Soyuz' group and other conservative forces, it must be 'propped up' from the left to prevent a slide to the right," your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told by Sergey Tarasenko, a member of the board of the association and one of Shevardnadze's closest assistants.

After the completion of the constituent meeting Shevardnadze held a news conference—his first public appearance since he resigned from the post of foreign minister. Touching on USSR policy in the Persian Gulf, Shevardnadze said that he considers it irreproachable. He said that back before military operations began (approximately 10-11 January) the Foreign Ministry

submitted "to the appropriate authorities" a proposal to come out with peace initiatives that in many ways coincided with the Soviet Union's recent proposals. But the idea did not get through at the time.

Answering a question about the possibility of a dictatorship in the USSR, against which Shevardnadze warned in his dramatic speech in December at the Congress of People's Deputies, the former minister said: "Unless we succeed in lifting the social tension and stabilizing the situation, a dictatorship is feasible."

Government, Trade Unions To Conclude 'Agreement'

PM2802103591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Talks Between the Cabinet of Ministers and the General Confederation of Trade Unions Council"]

[Text] The USSR General Confederation of Trade Unions [VKP] Press Center has announced that, in line with the wishes of USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov and VKP Chairman V.P. Shcherbakov, official talks to conclude an agreement between the Cabinet of Ministers and the VKP for 1991 have begun.

The talks are being conducted by I.I. Prostyakov, first deputy chairman of the Bureau for Social Development, and A.M. Yakovlev, deputy chairman of the VKP.

Moscow Rallies Considered Detrimental

PM2702114891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
26 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report by Victor Shirokov under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "The Voice of Reason"]

[Text] For three days running—22, 23, 24 February—the capital's Manezh Square was filled with thousands upon thousands of people. There have been rallies and counterrallies, banners "for" and "against," slogans and "antislogans," a feverish and excessive seething of passion, fiery speeches, and explosive appeals...

If the energy displayed by the human lava meandering along Moscow's squares and streets could be harnessed for productive and useful activities, then no doubt today's empty and hollow stores would contain essential items. No doubt the ominous stress created by universal shortages would decrease markedly. But what use is conjecture? One thing is clear—the rally "syndrome" afflicting our sick society does nothing for national prosperity. It is destructive, and brings us no closer to revitalizing the economy.

It is terrible to look into the faces of people burning with righteous indignation. The "hatred minutes" proclaimed by many orators bring the audience to fever pitch, putting them into a state of near fanaticism. In such a state, the crowd is prepared to commit any madness, and wreak all kinds of havoc and destruction. But you know, nowhere and at no time has malice initiated constructive action. It always harms society.

What brings people onto the squares? Of course there are objective reasons. The desperate food shortages, the exorbitant market prices, the lack of basic items, the country's uncertain future, the inability to predict tomorrow—all of this is magnified by the incessant power struggle and categorical ultimatums which fly from camp to camp like blazing canon balls. It's enough to make anybody dizzy. However, the people are also driven to rally fever by certain self-seeking figures, whose aims comprise the open destabilization of the atmosphere and the ultimate collapse of state structures. In their eyes, the worse things get the better—they have more chance of catching their golden fish in murky waters. Golden being the operative word—the shady mafiosi are happily warming their hands on secret and overt speculation. And by way of a decoy, they are using the CPSU as the target for people's indignation.

No, I am not intent on rejecting all rallies outright. For example, the people who went to Manezh Square 23 February tried to express sound and constructive ideas on the unification of the people and the Army and their eternal and rightful inseparability. They spoke in favor of the strength and integrity of the Union of our peoples and nations. And this impulse can be understood and accepted. Then the very next day, somebody had to call the people onto the streets merely to demonstrate opposition to anything and everything and to stoke up the atmosphere, and to bring it to a level of intolerable tension. They succeeded. Only it would seem to be a Pyrrhic victory—this frenzied wave of hatred is likely to turn against them tomorrow.

Today's difficult times demand of us precise and logical decisions, swift and positive action, not skirmishes and squabbles. Tomorrow is in our hands, but its foundations are laid today, and the rally "mines" serve merely to blow up these foundations. Let's listen to the voice of reason, stop, and look around us: Are we on the road to nowhere?

Nishanov Views Referendum's Legal Aspects

PM2802092591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
26 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Interview with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, by legislative observer V. Shchepotkin; place and date not given: "Not to Infringe Human Rights"]

[Text] The referendum on preserving a renewed Union scheduled for 17 March is provoking contradictory assessments. The majority of citizens of many republics, as can be judged from polls by sociologists, favor both the holding of the referendum and the preservation of the Union. But other points of view are also being voiced, up to and including a ban on the referendum.

R. Nishanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, answers questions by IZVESTIYA's legislative observer V. Shchepotkin on how this accords with legal norms.

[Shchepotkin] Rafik Nishanovich, in one of the central newspapers a group of academics has called into question the juridical lawfulness of holding the referendum. In particular they claim that the question being submitted to Union referendum—should a republic be in the Union or not?—is within the competence of the republics. Is this so, or not?

[Nishanov] It is impossible to agree with such a formulation. The referendum, as a form of direct expression of the people's will, of direct appeal to the citizens of the country, is one of the most democratic constitutional institutions making up, along with the representative system, the mechanism of people's power. The possibility of holding a referendum is provided for in Article 5 of the USSR Constitution, proclaiming that "the most important questions of state life are submitted to nationwide discussion, and can also be put to a nationwide vote (referendum)." On this basis, the Fourth Congress of USSR Deputies, relying on its constitutional status stipulated by Article 108 of the country's Basic Law, decided to hold a USSR referendum on this fateful, supremely important question—the preservation of a renewed USSR as a federation of equal sovereign republics. The question being submitted to nationwide vote is addressed directly to USSR citizens having the right to vote. It would hardly be correct to query the lawfulness of the supreme organ of power in the country appealing directly toward its citizens. After all, the question of whether there should or should not be a Union of republics should be decided by the peoples united voluntarily and on the basis of equal rights and living in it. I believe that this question should not be confused with the question of "Should a republic be, or not be in the Union," since we are not talking a referendum on the question of republics' secession from the USSR. There are other legal bases for the latter question, namely those provided by the USSR Law "On the Procedure for Deciding Questions Connected with the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR." The conclusion is: The holding of a referendum is based on constitutional norms, and the question submitted to nationwide vote falls within the competence of the USSR and is consequently lawful.

I have to say that the very suggestion that an appeal by the USSR organs of state power to the reason and will of Soviet people may be unlawful is amazing. If the peoples cannot be entrusted with the solution of questions, we should not talk about any sort of democracy. It is time to realize that democracy means power by the people themselves, and not just by various structures elected by various means.

[Shchepotkin] The Supreme Soviets of several republics have come out against holding the referendum on their territories. How should relations between these republics and the Union be built after this?

[Nishanov] It must be noted that the decision to hold the referendum is **mandatory** for all republics and all citizens of the USSR. It is well known that the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies reaffirmed in its resolution "On the General Concept of the New Union Treaty and the Procedure for Concluding It" that "the main condition for achieving agreement is that all state organs observe the USSR Constitution and Union laws currently in force until the new Union Treaty is signed, and prevent the adoption of decisions infringing the sovereign rights and legitimate interests of members of the federation." This is the decision by the supreme organ of power in the country, and the task facing us all is to rigorously observe it and aim for its fulfillment. The refusal by several republics to hold the referendum infringes citizens' constitutional rights to participate in the solution of questions affecting their legitimate interests. Hence they are unlawful, they contradict the principle of the rule-of-law state, and they are anticonstitutional. Opposition to the mandatory and imperative nature, as lawyers say, of the decision to hold the referendum must be perceived as disregard for all-Union laws and a gross violation of constitutional legality. However, irrespective of whether the referendum will or will not be held in this or that republic, we intend to build relations with these republics on the basis of strict observance of the USSR Constitution and laws currently in force, and to allow no deviations from their norms. It would not go amiss to recall that USSR people's deputies—including emissaries of the republics refusing to hold the USSR referendum—took part in the adoption of the decision to hold the USSR referendum.

[Shchepotkin] One of the questions raised at the 25 February session of the USSR Supreme Soviet was that, alongside the decision by some republics' Supreme Soviets not to participate in the referendum, appeals by citizens and decisions by some organs of state power are coming in from these same republics, to the effect that they want to participate in the referendum. What is to be done in this situation, Rafik Nishanovich?

[Nishanov] The referendum is being held on all the territory of the USSR. The task of holding it has been assigned to republican referendum commissions. However, if the official republic organs do not hold the referendum according to the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution adopted 25 February, then the oblast, rayon, and city soviets of people's deputies and the rayon soviets in the cities **are empowered to autonomously** form [electoral] precincts and districts and to establish district commissions for the USSR referendum, guided in this by the norms of the USSR laws on the referendum and on the election of USSR people's deputies. Voting precincts can be formed by labor collectives at enterprises, institutions, and organizations to enable members of these collectives, their families, and other citizens—deprived of the opportunity to vote at their places of residence—to participate in the referendum. People must be given

the opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to participate in the referendum; we need not just to talk about pluralism of opinions, but to actually do everything possible to ensure that not just one side expresses its views.

I wish to stress once again that no one can deprive people of their right to participate in the referendum. Citizens who are acutely worried about the Union must be guaranteed the opportunity to express their attitude to the question of preserving the Union of republics, regardless of where they live. Hence it is important that precincts and districts are set up promptly, that registers are compiled, and that all organizational measures for the vote are ensured. The referendum is something new for us and it must be carried out properly, with the strictest monitoring of the progress of the vote and the summing up of its results.

Committee Chairman Backs Constitution Court

PM2702125191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences: "Third Estate. Is This What the the Constitutional Oversight Committee Will Become?"]

[Text] Until recently it seemed to me, and I have already written and spoken about this repeatedly, that the name of the body fate has bound my colleagues and me—the Constitutional Oversight Committee—is simply unfortunate. A tribute to the traditions and the use of words during our authoritarian past, which ate into all the pores of life (and, alas, still in the present): We have "oversights" and "controls" everywhere. Here is another one—constitutional. And yet this is contrary to world experience: In countries where similar organs exist, in keeping with their nature, they are called "courts"—constitutional or supreme courts (as in the United States) or, more rarely, constitutional councils (as in France).

Only now I think that here it is, maybe, not just a matter of the customary use of the word. But, above all, of the fact that there is a pressing social need precisely to safeguard, to oversee compliance with the constitution and to quickly resolve the most important problems here, and the initial intention in this case was constructive and sensible. It was not for nothing that all my objections while working as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee were rejected by the commission to prepare the law on the committee. "What do you mean?" people on the commission said to me. "Now, during the formation of democratic institutions, it is still necessary to oversee compliance with constitutional principles."

And now, following the events in Lithuania, a well-known woman said in a brief newspaper report that our committee should have explained both to the Congress and to the president Lithuania's right to free secession from the Union. And the journalist, a good friend of our committee who well understands its present status, still let drop the words "it kept out of it..."

Is there reason in all this? Yes, there is. And considerable reason. In a rule-of-law democratic state there must definitely be a reliable state system capable of reacting quickly and effectively to any violation of the constitution. This is the mission of the supreme organs of power and government. In the FRG a special department has been created to safeguard the constitution, and for this it is endowed with a lofty independent status, strong legal powers, cadres, and services. You might think that we too have an analogous body (but it is called "oversight"!).

The name is one thing, but the committee is essentially—in terms of status, functions, and legal powers—no more than a constitutional court: It has the right to "oversee" only (only!) documents, and normative documents at that—laws and other acts containing juridical norms. It is with regard to them, only and exclusively with regard to them, that it may pass its conclusions (suspend laws and decrees; rule individual acts invalid, etc.), and no more than that. And the committee's legal powers are precisely those of examining questions on such a "documentary" plane: taking on the examination of a document, comparing it with the Constitution and other acts, involving experts, holding a public hearing on the matter, drawing up a draft conclusion, discussing and finalizing it, circulating the draft to all committee members and to other session participants no later than 15 days before the session, etc.—unhurried, thoughtful work, as befits an body with judicial functions.

The committee has no rights to "explain" anything to anyone, to examine facts relating to violations on the spot or by any other means, to investigate particular cases, or to react juridically to them. And if it were to embark on this kind of path it would, of course, itself be grossly violating the Constitution and the law. Because, if it were to engage in such arbitrary activity, it would be absolutely no different from certain local soviets which have announced their sovereignty and are beginning to legislate of their own free will; or from the self-proclaimed national (public) salvation committees which appropriate state power and place the armed forces under their control.

Where is the way out of the situation that has come about?

Several options are possible here.

The simplest of them is to galvanize the activities of the supreme organs of state power and management in safeguarding the constitution—which is work that they are, in general, doing now; maybe it would be expedient to form a special subdepartment acting on behalf, say, of the USSR President and the Federation Council; or a special, permanently functioning parliamentary commission with the necessary apparatus.

Another option, proposed by M.I. Piskotin, an eminent Soviet legal expert and my colleague on the committee (IZVESTIYA 26 January 1991), is to legislatively extend our committee's rights (although in this case it would be necessary to turn it into a powerful new organ with functions on various planes, substantially alter the substance of its work, strengthen its cadre composition, etc.).

One thing is clear: The problems demand an urgent and constructive solution. A solution to the point. So as to avoid a purely "verbal" option.

The word "oversight," which appears in the committee's name, is probably connected not only with the customary use of the word and with good intention. To all appearances we have here an echo of those sentiments of the times of Stalinist totalitarianism when the problems of "democracy" were exhaustively resolved merely by the incorporation of very promising words, declarations, and institutions in the Constitution and in other documents, merely by their formal composition. What? Safeguarding the constitution, overseeing it? The organ exists, an entire committee! And so we have now encountered the consequences of such a "verbal" option.

Now about another difficult question connected with the work of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

The committee has yet to generate a real constitutional court. And it is not only the case that its powers with regard to resolving matters and ensuring their implementation according to the law have proved to be weak (in the majority of cases the committee merely suspends a law, a decree, or another normative act; the question is essentially decided by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet; once again a postulate of the soviets' "absolute power"). But, in addition, the bulk of the laws from the hot spots of our existence, which need to be examined and assessed without delay and need to have decisions adopted, found themselves outside the committee's jurisdiction because, by decision of the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies, it does not have the right to examine the union republics' constitutions and laws until changes have been made to the USSR Constitution with regard to the national-state structure. An exception has been made only for constitutional and legislative provisions concerning citizens' basic rights and freedoms. But even with regard to these provisions—one more obstacle—the committee, according to the law, cannot institute proceedings on its own initiative. And so the committee is obliged to wait and see which questions concerning citizens' rights and freedoms in republic legislation the USSR President, the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, or other organs provided for by law will set before it.

How, in what way, has this happened?

Maybe the reader will recall that the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee was formed with difficulty. At the First Congress the Lithuanian deputation walked out of the sessions hall en masse in protest at the formation of the committee. Then a compromise was still reached: They decided first to elaborate the law on the committee and only then to form the committee.

It was in the process of the work on the draft law on the committee, mainly as a result of the stand taken by our colleagues—legal experts from the Baltic republics who introduced to the law much that was good—that it was necessary at the same time, constantly in the search for a compromise, to rule out any significant powers for the committee with regard to republic constitutions and laws; then these latter were, with the aforesaid exceptions, removed from the committee's jurisdiction at the concluding phase of preparing the draft, once again in the name of a compromise; and, as a result, the Baltic republics' deputations at the Second Congress suddenly came out altogether against the law (because it was "a muzzle on the republics," they said), and when the law was adopted and the committee was formed their representatives did not join it. Let all these metamorphoses remain on the conscience of our colleagues (in some ways it is possible to understand them, but I strenuously banish the thought that already at that time they were counting on future declarations of sovereignty, announcements of the "supremacy" of their own laws, etc.). In short, be that as it may, everyone must still know one of the reasons why the committee's powers have proved so toothless and narrow.

However, the creation of a constitutional court is no less important and urgent a matter than the formation of a reliable system to safeguard the Constitution.

It seems that everyone now agrees that the division of powers is a political and constitutional-organizational principle in the building of a rule-of-law state, which by its very substance blocks its development into a totalitarian state. Unfortunately, questions connected with realizing this great democratic, antitotalitarian principle frequently come up against the problem of delimiting powers between the first two "estates"—legislative and executive (although, as the experience of progressive democratic countries shows, a kind of diffusion and transfusions of functions and powers take place between them and increase). It is now becoming increasingly clear that the secret of the effective and efficient division of powers in the state is to constitute and sharply enhance the status of the "third" estate—the judiciary, including constitutional-judicial power.

It is good that the draft Union Treaty outlines the creation not of the Constitutional Oversight Committee but precisely of the USSR Constitutional Court. And the committee, in conjunction with its colleagues from the USSR Supreme Soviet and the republics, is now finalizing proposals on the functions and powers of this body (which, maybe for a transitional period, until the new constitution as a whole is adopted, is at present acquiring the status of a "Constitutional Council" with functions and powers aimed at ensuring the Union Treaty and defending human rights).

At the same time account must be taken of the fact that the draft Union Treaty also provides for other all-union judicial organs—the Supreme Court and the Higher Court of Arbitration.

In this connection here is another supposition.

If the real entry of sovereign republics into the Union Treaty begins with their economic unification (and this, in my view, is the optimum way), then the Higher Court of Arbitration will inevitably be the natural beginning, the starting point for the creation of an integral all-union judicial system. In the course of the development of the Union and the buildup in it of more profound legal and political-state components it will inevitably also absorb the functions of constitutional justice and in the final analysis, it may be assumed, together with the Constitutional Court (Council) will evolve into a unified Supreme Court of the Union. The experience of the EC and its court in Luxembourg, which according to my observations has played a decisive role in European integration, attests to the law-governed nature of this kind of process.

What then, one wonders, are the work results of the present USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee? It is not an organ designed, according to the law, to safeguard the Constitution against specific violations in everyday life. And its powers with regard to examining republic laws are still quite limited. And the Constitution with which it must comply, despite many additions and amendments, is still obsolete. You cannot describe as a very great achievement the suspension of one of the USSR President's decrees and the repeal of a number of union republics' normative documents which violate citizens' basic rights and freedoms (although the adoption of conclusions on the said questions, which sometimes demanded considerable professional and even moral-civic effort, is, perhaps, a portentous phenomenon: A judicial-constitutional estate, albeit still not a strong one, has emerged).

And yet, without going into very great exaggerations, I will venture to say that the committee has taken up a major, significant matter concerning the state of and the development prospects for Soviet legislation. And it has probably even done so unexpectedly, by virtue of the logic of the work itself and, maybe, the logic of the development of the legal system as a whole and the need to transform it and build it in accordance with the principles of a real rule-of-law state.

Because the committee, both in accordance with the Constitution and, to no less a degree, in accordance with its real purpose in the state, is called upon to assert in society the supremacy of law and of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

And so, even when examining individual and, at times, apparently particular questions, its work leads to substantial transformations in the system of legislation in conformity with the requirements of the supremacy of law. And here is one of the unexpected effects of this: In the process of preparing for a hearing on the question of the constitutionality of registration the USSR Council of Ministers, anticipating events, itself repealed up to 30 of its own resolutions which discriminated against individual citizens.

One must suppose that the statement which the committee has just adopted on including servicemen to ensure public order is still more noteworthy in the respect under consideration. It was also passed in connection with the preparations for a hearing on a specific matter—the normative acts which established the procedure for joint patrolling in cities and the involvement of servicemen in it. In some respects the statement even covers the aforementioned specific matter and enshrines the committee's position on fundamental questions of legislation, which, it may be hoped, will have a substantial influence on it. Because the statement, proceeding from the USSR Constitution, formulates important (who knows, maybe the most important in the present critical situation) and fundamental legal provisions—on the need for a proper legislative basis in this sphere and, moreover, one which rules out the use of servicemen for purposes not envisaged by the USSR Constitution or in accordance with decisions made by any public organs or state organs not empowered to do so.

Here there is another, most important aspect of the committee's work. Proceeding from the possibility envisaged in the law of basing its conclusions on human rights documents in international law, the committee on its own initiative examined a number of cardinal questions of Soviet legislation in order, by interpreting constitutional points from the viewpoint of internationally recognized human rights, to bring a number of sections of legislation into line with the Constitution and fundamental human rights. These are questions of registration, restrictions on certain categories of citizens; having recourse to the courts on labor matters, the limiting of consumers' rights, the possibility of extrajudicially recognizing guilt in committing a criminally indictable act, the functioning of preventive labor treatment centers, and what is evidently the most important question—the validity of normative acts concerning citizens' rights, freedoms, and duties in those cases where these acts have not been published (are "closed").

But even this is not the main point. Because the committee itself does not have the right to make particular amendments to legislation (it has only the right of legislative initiative). The committee only resolves a question in principle—whether or not a certain legal statute or an entire legal institution is constitutional and whether or not it conforms with human rights (thus, the committee reckoned that the licensing system of registration does not conform with human rights). Then there must be normal legislative work, as a result of which the whole package of existing problems here is resolved (there proved to be very many such problems in the sphere of, again, registration, and it will take the legislator several years to examine them all).

But still the committee's resolving of questions in principle and its defining of legal starting positions appears very important. Like symbols, they delineate the outline of the legislative system from a very important quarter. An outline defined by internationally recognized human rights. Consequently, the committee proves to be the organ which, in cooperation with the legislative establishment, introduces internationally recognized human rights into the existing legal system in practice and establishes a kind of "measure" for these questions, and so its work is aimed at raising and elevating Soviet law, as legislative organs already do, to the level of the standards of modern legal systems and advanced demands based on fundamental rights and human freedoms.

However important the steps now being taken by the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee may be, it must be clearly realized that the points which have just been noted are not the chief thing expressing its purpose and its mission of being the "third estate" in the state, effective and equidimensional with the other "estates." What is needed for this—and needed, I believe, without delay—is reforms which, in addition to shaping an efficient system to safeguard the constitution, would lead to the creation of real constitutional-judicial power. And, of course, a new constitution is needed; a constitution for a rule-of-law, civil society asserting the great values of civilization; a constitution which will only ensure the necessary legal status for the establishments and institutions mentioned in these notes by way of formulating the question.

Views Dangers of Power Struggle

PM2702151591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Feb 91 Second Edition p 3

["Topical Interview" with S.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, by correspondent Viktor Shirokov: "'A Field Of Lawlessness Could Appear'"]

[Text] Our correspondent put a question to S.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee:

[Shirokov] Sergey Sergeyevich, the current situation is so complex and contradictory and so beset by various statements and counterstatements by politicians and by declarations and counterdeclarations that it is sometimes difficult for the unsophisticated layman to understand what is happening and how legal particular political moves are. What is your view?

[Alekseyev] I will say right away that as chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Committee I have no right to encroach on the sphere of political relations. I cannot have such prerogatives; but as an academic I can express my own opinion.

A political power struggle is a terrible, destructive thing. Unfortunately, no society can avoid it. But one must try to ensure that the struggle takes place within a civilized framework, on a constitutional basis.

In implementing the truly historic transition from a totalitarian system to a democratic, civil society, we have complicated this process ourselves and, moreover, we have made many mistakes. Now, in a critical situation, where one would expect society to be acquiring a sense of self-preservation, a fierce power struggle suddenly flares up. For the sake of self-preservation it is necessary to renounce bitter political confrontation and unite so that stability and constructive ideas can triumph.

Following the events in Lithuania, as a citizen and as a professional lawyer I stated unequivocally that the self-appointed committees were not entitled to appropriate power and have control of the armed forces. It is unconstitutional. The recent statement by the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee was quite clear about this. In the same way, there are no constitutional grounds for calling for the transfer of power from a legally elected head of state to any organ whatsoever, even the Federation Council.

In this case one might get what I call a field of lawlessness—a field of coercion where dictatorship and arbitrary seizure of power and property become ensconced. We talk today about "law wars." It is an unfortunate expression, in my view. What we have is not a war or laws, but the destruction of the rule of law. They are phenomena that fall into the same category: a field of lawlessness, the destruction of the rule of law, the collapse of society. Whenever the law is disregarded you get tyranny and lawlessness.

Courts are the universally proven force on which law rests. A powerful and independent judicial authority is the paramount condition of a rule-of-law state. Our justice system still lacks a real constitutional court able to provide substantive explanations and adopt decisive measures in an unconstitutional situation.

Official Reviews Death Penalty Proposals

LD2602230691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0729 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 26 Feb (TASS)—Twenty four thousand, four hundred and twenty two people were sentenced to death in the Soviet Union from 1962 to 1989. This amounts to 6 percent of the number of those convicted, to whom legally this measure of penalty could be applied, USSR Deputy Justice Minister Vladimir Gubarev writes in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA today.

According to the statistics, 2,355 were granted pardons. Under judicial supervision procedures, [word indistinct] of those convicted, had their death penalties replaced by imprisonment during this period. Thus, for approximately every sixth or seventh person, capital punishment was replaced by imprisonment in corrective labor establishments.

The same statistical data bear witness to the fact that, during the last five years, the death penalty in the USSR for more dangerous crimes began to be used more sparingly, even for such crimes as murder with intent under aggravating circumstances. So, if from 1962 to 1966, 23.5 percent of those convicted were sentenced to be shot, then from 1987 to 1989 it was ten percent. At the same time, if the entire 1962-1989 period is considered, then it will become clear, that persons who committed murder with intent under aggravating circumstances amount to about 95 percent of those sentenced to death.

According to Vladimir Gubarev, there are two attitudes toward the death penalty in the country today: "One is for complete abolition of the death penalty, the other is for a sharp reduction of its application. To minimize the number of articles in the criminal code, envisaging such sanctions, a proposal is being introduced to carry this out in two stages—at first to leave it in one or two articles, then, as the crime situation in the country improves, to totally abolish it."

Ivashko Tours Auto Assembly Plant

LD1402221991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 14 Feb 91

[Report by correspondents A. Zhuk and Y. Zapolskiy in Minsk; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, met the workers of the Minsk auto works.

[Correspondent] Clearly, there was no shortage of questions at this meeting. If one should point out the main ones, they will be these: What will be done to ensure the normal work of a working collective how to protect people from the market's elements; what the new Union should be like and, of course, what position should the party organizations take on these issue?

[Begin Ivashko recording] We shall give our lives and our work to preserve the Union. Of course, I mean the renewed Union, because one should respect each nation. And each nation is the owner of its land and each nation is the creator of its own culture. The sovereignty of the republics—this is all correct and the direction is right. But are a strong Union and the sovereignty of the republics contradictory things? Not in the least. On the contrary, they are tightly interconnected.

We understand it this way: When the people are working, all questions of inter-ethnic conflicts are removed. Because when you, the Belorussian, I, the Ukrainian, he, the Russian are involved in the same process of making a motor car or something else—do we go into such details? Therefore, we support a single economic space, for all the people living in friendship, living by their work.

Of course, under these conditions one cannot do without observing the Constitution and all other laws and procedures which exist in any country. There is nothing new in this. No one has thought this up. If we can do this very quickly, there will be a decisive turn in the eocnomy, as well as in everything else. [end recording]

Editor Comments on Col. Alksnis Interview

PM2702155391 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No. 6, 10-17 Feb 91 p 7

["Editor's Note" on interview with Colonel Viktors Alksnis: "Life-Ring or Millstone?"]

[Text] It is uncertain what Col. Alksnis, USSR people's deputy, is suggesting for Soviet society. In our opinion, it is more like a millstone than a life-ring. Nevertheless, Alksnis' proposal is gaining popularity and publicity. As we already know, it's no use trying to debate with Col. Alksnis, because he simply won't accept your point of view. However, let us at least look at the weakest points in his position.

First, he doesn't even try to distinguish between people's natural ethnic awareness and people's desire to preserve their national identity on the one hand and the pathological form of that striving we call "nationalism", on the other hand. Instead of national pride, our people are given national haughtiness. Claiming his allegiance to none of the existing social trends, none of the "...isms", Viktors Alksnis is actually marching up the blind alley of Stalinism which has always extolled a unity based on the social-class principle, as well as on the principle of state interests, and which has never given a damn about unity based on the principle of ethnic group. Besides, Stalinism rejected all importance of the individual personality and its impact.

Speaking about the current developments, Alksnis fully ignores the most important aspect: people's unwillingness to once again accept blueprints insistently forced upon them from the outside. The people of the Baltics have special reasons to fear outside directives: we Russians can only blame our own government for the tragic mistakes we have suffered, whereas the Baltics' mistakes were imposed on them by some other government.

Second, in his support for the market idea, Alksnis nevertheless overlooks one major flaw in his position: he denies the most active and democratically-minded portion of the population (who need the market most of all) access to the market system. It is a utopian and utterly dangerous belief that a market system can be built by force of arms, since neither our top military brass nor the captains of the military-industrial complex can be either politically or economically interested in the success of the market.

Third, a programme to eliminate all political parties in the name of freeing authorities from politics and ideologies is itself clearly a politically engaged programme, since it envisages punishment for free-thinking and for

expression of individual or opposing political views, and it bans opponents' opinions (even those of one's own aunt). Such a regime would promote and multiply that which we once had in full measure—total control exercised by one party, the party in power. And it really doesn't matter what it is called: the CPSU, or the Party of National Salvation.

Besides, what is the difference between the all-powerful committee of national salvation proposed here and the existing powers delegated to the President? Does it mean that the aim is to replace key figures? But it will largely be a replacement of the people currently involved with the presidential decision-making for anonymous figures, and society will not have any guarantee that the latter will be more reliable and wholely committed to the cause of social progress.

And finally, to arrange the country's political life according to military standards is only too understandable for a military man who just recently entered our political life. Of more importance, however, is the question as to who, among this country's still largely unknown society, is prepared to accept this militarized system as a life-ring?

Kravchenko Phone-In Program Criticized

PM2702143591 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 6, 10-17 Feb 91 p 4

[N. Loginova article: "Censors Have It Out With the People"]

[Text] On Wednesday January 30, Gosteleradio [USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] Chairman L. Kravchenko and his two deputies P. Reshtov and A. Tupikin appeared live in a phone-in programme hosted by Sergey Lomakin.

Many home-made posters at the January march in defence of democracy coupled Kravchenko's name with the words "Shame" and "Down with". People had come to realize that television should be a communication medium, not a piece of furniture which shows pretty colours and lies.

The TV leadership decided to have it out with the people, at long last. What the people asked was clear enough. The answers were far less so.

Where did you get all those outdated films and primitive plays from? Why do you treat the people like sheep? What is the motive behind stifling the nation intellectually?

Kravchenko's answer was simple and innocent: "Do you think films are made for sheep? And the theatre?" (Remember the old joke: "I would have given my wife a book for a present, but she already has one".)

A group of people in the arts have decided to boycott television. What do the bosses think about that? Kravchenko answered with a smirk: "Why did Elem Klimov, having signed the boycott, agree to appear on Molchanov's show Before and After Midnight?" Period. Not a word about the nature of conflict.

Reshetov and Tupikin dodged questions just as skilfully. Who closed down the Vzglyad programme? Said reshetov: "They closed themselves down to make their position clear." The Vzglyad team must have fallen off their chairs at such audacity.

What is your appraisal of Radio Russia (the afternoon broadcast half the nation used to listen to in order to learn the truth)? Said Tupikin: "The listeners here complain that it was too much like the foreign 'voices'." All three referred to "letters from the public", seemingly unaware of the echo of 1937 which such a reference carries.

On the contrary, today's censors regard themselves as dissidents or even the patrons of dissidents! Recall the oft-repeated cries to expel Kravchenko from the Journalists' Union and repeal his Deputy status. Tupikin defended his boss with real feeling: "Expelling...recalling...These words remind me of the 1937 slogans!"

Indeed a censor's mentality is an enigma as great as a cosmic black hole. In tsarist times, too, some publications were closed down because they showed "fewer positive aspects than negative ones". A century later we still hear the familiar: "The important thing is to keep a sense of PROPORTION in the news". When, oh when, will there appear intelligent and civilized people at the top? when will the present-day henchmen go to roost?

The final of the phone-in programme looked especially cynical. Said Tupikin: "Here is a letter reproaching us with lack of patriotic programmes. We'll note that down, comrades". Said Reshetov: "Here is a telegram asking who has authorized us to decide for the people. It's you, comrades who have authorized us". Kravchenko lifted himself from his easy chair, his face aglow as he appealed to the public: "My dream is to win my people's trust". Curtain.

We thought they were making fools of us. No. Given a free hand, they immediately began dragging television down to their own standards. We thought that broadcasting lies signified lack of responsibility to the people. No, it signified the impunity of fools.

I felt sorry for the programme's host Lomakin. Only a short time ago he used to host Vzglyad. Today, he eagerly plays up to his bosses. We have lost an ally...

KGB Informants Detail Motives, Results

91UF0509A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 8

[Article by Yuriy Shchekochikhin: "I Am a Stool Pigeon—My Pseudonym Is Korchagin... On Letters From Secret KGB Workers"]

[Text] I have perhaps always suspected their existence, even since childhood. I learned of them (and about them) in detail during the past two months—since I made an appeal in the pages of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA to secret KGB agents to remove the burden from their souls (if, of course, they feel it) so that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated in the future.

"What do you mean! Have you gone out of your mind!" I heard a young voice say on the telephone right after the appeal was published. "I am a KGB worker from Tver and I can officially tell you on behalf of our youth that no secret service in the world can do without a staff of secret agents." And in letters I have read about myself that I (I am quoting) "am helping the Mafia by doing this"; "am engaging in defamation, since the KGB organism does not require surgery—it is absolutely healthy"; "have been bought by the CIA," and, finally, that "Shchekochikhin has lost his conscience, he has lost his love for the state, for society, for his people, for his homeland."

Now I can explain why I did this, since—I anticipated this—the editorial mail did not contain a single response from secret agents who are involved in unmasking the Mafia or who have fought against the intelligence services of other countries.

The ones who wrote were those who knew—or suspected even before—about the immoral assignments they received from KGB operations workers. The ones who wrote—or came to the editorial offices in person—were the secret KGB agents who voluntarily (or by blackmail) were enlisted to cooperate not for the sake of state security but for the preservation of ideological dogmas, for elementary informing on coworkers and friends, and sometimes simply for its own sake, for the sake of gross output totals, and for reporting to their superiors.

Now, having more than 100 confessions from secret KGB agents (either in the form of letters or in the form of dictaphone recordings of conversations with them) I have come to the firm conviction: that the KGB—both yesterday and today—recruits people of various ages, nationalities, and professions not only and not so much to fight crimes for which punishment is stipulated by the Criminal Code, but more to monitor thoughts and philosophies; that informing on people has gripped our country like an octopus and it has crippled the lives of both the people who have been informed upon and those who have been made to inform on others. The testimonies of people recruited even at the end of the eighties show that the organization's work methods do not change and they show the truth we have not known up to know.

These are my remarks—my report about what I have read and heard during the past two months.

"I am signing my name 'T'—the first letter of the pseudonym assigned to me in 1934," **writes a former secret agent of the OGPU [United Main Political Administration] from Moscow.** "...In the autumn of 1933, while a student in the fourth course at a prestigious Leningrad VUZ [higher educational institution], I was called to the OGPU (at that time on Ulitsa Dzerzhinskogo, 2) and I filled out a detailed questionnaire, after which the following shortcomings were pointed out to me: I was the son of hereditary nobility, of non-Russian nationality, with relatives abroad with whom my mother corresponds, and many other things. They told me I had to prove my fidelity to Soviet power by regularly informing the bodiess about the moods and anti-Soviet statements of my friends and school fellows. I refused. Then they assured me that they would not let me finish school and they would even send me away from Leningrad.

"I was forced to agree. They showed me where I was to telephone each month—only from a pay phone; the address of the apartment where I was to appear as soon as I was summoned, and the pseudonym with which I was to sign my reports. I remember the telephone number to this day, 55 years later: Nekrasovskaya ATS [telephone exchange] 2-18-89... I have not revealed my shameful secret to anyone: Your newspaper is the first to know it."

Vladimir Vasilyevich Vlasov was recruited by the NKVD [People's Committee for Internal Affairs] in 1942:

"I was 17 years old. I was the secretary of the Komsomol [All- Union Leninist Communist Youth League] organization of the Ivanovo Secondary School No. 51. One time I was called to the Komsomol Raykom [Rayon Committee]. Novikov, the secretary of the Salinskiy Raykom, was sitting in his office with a middle-aged woman dressed in a plain suit: "They want to talk to you," and he went out, leaving the two of us alone.

"The woman introduced herself as a worker of the 'bodies' and said her name was Anna Ivanovna Maretskaya. 'We must unmask our enemies and you as a conscientious Komsomol member must help us in this.' She said that I was to eavesdrop on hostile conversations and report the people with unhealthy attitudes who were dissatisfied with and hostile to Soviet power. She asked whether I agreed to this. Of course, I, in a state of patriotic euphoria, agreed gladly. 'You will report everything to me in writing,' she said. 'Choose a pseudonym.' 'Korchagin,' I answered without thinking."

V.V. Vlasov goes on to recall:

"...One time she arrived later than usual. When she took off her coat I saw she was wearing a military blouse with insignia on the lapels. She took a pistol out of her purse and handed it to me. I felt a part of the 'bodies' and in my mind I vowed to do everything I was instructed to do... Maretskaya asked if I knew a student at our school by the name of Gayek. I answered in the affirmative. Zoya was in the second class, she had long braids, and a lively, boyish nature. 'And do you know her father?' No, I did not know Zoya's father, who was an engineer. 'We are very much interested in the engineer Gayek,' said Anna Ivanovna, 'try to get acquainted with him.'"

He got to know him and became a constant visitor to Zoya's home. And on the day he was sent to the front he was called in to the NKVD.

"There they had me read the 'material' compiled on the engineer Gayek. I read the dry, official jargon and in some places I recognized my own expressions. I read with a sense of having done my duty... I learned about the fate of the engineer when I was spending some time at home after my second injury: He had been arrested soon after my departure and the family had been exiled...."

"There were many like us... Our accursed life made us dumb cogs and they put us wherever they needed us and did with us whatever they wanted to"—this is how Vlasov ends his letter.

B.G. was recruited at the beginning of Khrushchev's "thaw," in 1956:

"...At first I thought I was being called in because of my extensive correspondence with people abroad and they considered me a spy, but it turns out that it was the other way around: They asked me to help them unmask enemies of the system. I did not like enemies and I agreed to help expose them. They indicated certain workers to me and told me to ask them provoking questions about the authorities, kolkhozes [collective farms], and so forth. But there was no way I could see them as enemies of the people and I told my boss from the KGB, Ivan Aleksandrovich, about this: 'Oh, how they disguise themselves!'... I felt that I was already trapped and that I was doing a vile thing but there was no way to turn back... Sometimes my boss brought money, 50-100 rubles [R] (old denominations) and I gave him a receipt. And it was as though I was obligated to earn this money... A long, serious illness interrupted my relations with the KGB, although at first my boss even came to the hospital demanding a report on the dying 'anti-Soviet elements'... After that they left me alone..."

B.G. ends his letter like this:

"Only now, 30 years later, in this letter am I asking forgiveness from my friends and acquaintances on whom I informed and who possibly had unpleasantness in their lives because of me. You who never did me any harm please forgive me now, no longer a student but a pensioner..."

R.T. was recruited back in the seventies:

"I too am a KGB agent but I do not intend to reveal my full identity yet. Why? My recruitment was prepared for by our entire system and it was inevitable. The fact is that I am an officer but—I am also a Jew. I always wanted there to be real internationalism in our country but I constantly felt that I did not know who I was... In spite of the fact that in school I studied the secret disciplines along with everyone else, I was not sent to work in my specialty but to the most unprestigious unit and the lowest position. But one time I got away and started talking with an officer of a special department. He was polite to me and promised me interesting work, particularly the exposure of youth organizations with Nazi orientations that were beginning to appear in the arena at that time... The result of this conversation was my declaration that I agreed to work under a pseudonym. We began to meet frequently and I understood that I had fallen into a trap. My new masters were interested not in Nazi organizations but mainly in my Jewish friends and co-workers. After a number of notes beginning with the words 'a source reports' I understood that I was being turned into an ordinary stool pigeon and I was terrified: There was no way back..."

And, finally, one of the numerous testimonies from our perestroyka age. **The 28-year-old Slavomir Adamovich from Belorussia, a literary scholar,** was recruited to cooperate because he was a member of the informal organization Talaka:

"Once or twice they brought me to a secret rendezvous under the Alesya Store in Minsk... It seems that at this rendezvous I had signed a secrecy pledge and the first legend had been created. Yes, I made a compromise. Yes, it was a base, slavish feeling—fear... I began to balance on the brink beyond which lay—treason. I began to play a game with them, composing legends about things that did not exist in real life, acting as though I were following their advice... I too had a pseudonym—Petra (which is Peter in Russian). I met with my "case officer" Vyacheslav Andreyevich Shevchuk frequently in his white Zhiguli next to the Plant imeni Kirov... He kept trying to set me, a recent proletarian, against the intelligentsia I knew in Talaka. You see—he would say to me—how you have lived, worked hard, and achieved everything on your own (he had in mind published poems, admission to the university) but those nationalists in Talaka have everything done for them... These were loathsome attacks which, incidentally, are used even today to criticize the intelligentsia, in that same POLITICHESKIY SOBESEDNIK which is published in Minsk and is undoubtedly sponsored by the KGB... It was then that I became convinced that anti-Semitism was their unspoken policy, for with each meeting with my "case officer" they suggested to me the idea that the Jews were to blame for everything. The "comrade" even brought the so-called 'White Book' and insistently advised that I read it.

"In 1987 an informal literary-social group Tuteyshiya (Locals) announced its existence. In the autumn members of this group held their first function in Minsk 'Dzyady' (Day of Prayer for the Dead). This time not only the KGB but also the party took an interest. They began to look for ways and means of neutralizing this new group. For example, a worker of the university party organization, Citizen Prokasheva, suggested in an open text that in order to counter the 'Locals' I create a pseudoliterary organization which would be controlled by the party and the KGB. I had no intention of doing anything of the kind, of course. Throughout my entire game with the KGB I remained alone—I could not

consult with anyone... A poet with whom I was acquainted gave me to understand that he too was being tailed..."

The "game," deception, fabrications, and disinformation are discussed in the letters of many past and present secret service workers. I thought perhaps they had found this a way of making money.

From a conversation in the editorial office with a Muscovite who is a school physical education teacher:

"Did they pay you for informing on people?" "Only once, when they gave me R30 and then the operations officer asked for five." "Did you expose a spy? Did you help find the 'Godfather'?" "Of course not, I simply reported what I had seen and that one of my co- workers was reading Nabokov's 'Lolita.'"

Such trivia is found in the letters from time to time: a saying, an anecdote, a joke, a suspect book... Imagine what all this hubbub was about! Meetings of conspirators! Secrecy pledges! Rendezvous! Lord, who are they...the consumers and collectors of this information? Why do they need this endless network of agents?!

"Why," **a rank-and-file informer, Valentin, who was recruited at the beginning of the eighties,** "do many secret informers 'generate disinformation'? Because only someone very naive fails to see that all the work of our 'case officers' is nothing but a sham, imitation work! But, believe me, all they do is convey that same nonsense which we give them and transfer it from office to office...with zero effect... My conscience is clear; nobody has suffered from my disinformation, and the fact that they swallowed it and are continuing to swallow it only goes to show that they are totally unqualified."

Or here is the opinion of a current KGB agent, signed Mikhail:

"I was ready to work for them if their aims were decent. But it turned out that nobody was prepared to regard me as a full-fledged partner: They used me. That was degrading.

"Gradually I came to understand the main thing: Many people are being observed in our country. The KGB network is fairly large—not only in the large cities but also in the regional centers. Immense amounts of money are spent to maintain the apparatus. I was led to certain people whom I was to persuade to take me into their confidence and then regularly report the content of our conversations. These sheets (frequently without any real content) are filed somewhere. And all this bureaucracy is also a part of the KGB!"

Let us return to the preceding letter—Valentin's:

"I would have considered it cowardly not to respond to your letter although I could have remained silent. But it is difficult to put up with this situation. Through introducing its agents into various informal organizations today the KGB keeps track of their establishment and, as much as possible, works to undermine them if the course they have selected smacks of nonconformity. In the Ukraine this pertains primarily to the Society imeni T.G. Shevchenko and the Rukh movement... They also tried to use me as an informer on the activity of these organizations but when I got to know these people better and saw the justness of many of their demands, I decided not to act contrary to my conscience... If we want to build a rule-of-law state, if we want a civil peace, we must halt the battle against nonconformity, not degrade citizens by tailing them, and give them the opportunity to act according to their conscience and convictions..."

And Valentin ends his letter with the following conclusion:

"I am not sorry that I worked for the KGB, and if I was deceived, it was real. Without this organization I would have proceeded further in the direction of those views which I partially expressed in my confession..."

Yes, yes, I thought, when in the next letter they again tried to prove to me the need for a secret agency or special services to fight crime; I am not a child and I understand and accept all the arguments "for" it. But how does one justify, say, the actions of the KGB discussed by a **rural teacher from Tataria, Andrey Yevgenyevich Filimonov:**

"In the autumn of 1988 I became a member of the Naberezhnyye Chelny political club imeni N.I. Bukharin. In the spring of 1989 our rayon KGB worker came to me and said: Since the KGB is interested in the success of perestroyka and the development of cooperation, and the 'Bukharin people' spend time abroad and meet with foreign entrepreneurs, could I now convey to him the content of these meetings and thus contribute...to the development of cooperation in the USSR. This was so obviously phony that it dawned on me right away, but I became confused and continued to listen. And then—he named the place of our meetings so that 'unnoticed' we could, and so forth. I felt degraded..."

Why, I wondered, is this word "degradation" used so frequently in these confessions? After all, everything these unknown KGB operatives did they did "for the good" of the country, society, and the people (so they thought). Why do they leave such a bitter taste in the mouths of so many agents or candidate agents? Did they not teach them any manners? Was it their overall low level of qualifications? Or (most likely) was it that the average mass of them were immoral, selfish, and semiliterate? And for them a person is nothing but another "number" on a list of agents? A "number" without a face, honor, or any kind of feelings?

I must admit that I was especially interested in searching through the confessions for the reasons why people become secret agents. And, of course, I found them. Frequently it was a direct interest in this kind of work:

"If I had not cooperated with them I would not have been able to get a job in the Khana firm which was

building a videotape recorder plant in Voronezh," writes **M. Yaroslavtsev (code name Feliks).**

"At that time I had not solved the problem of an apartment and I could not place my daughter in a kindergarten. The KGB workers hinted that they would help with the apartment. I asked them to place my daughter in a KGB kindergarten located nearby. But he only laughed," writes V. Aleshchenko from Kiev, whom they tried to recruit in 1977.

A journalist and deputy of the Artemovo City Soviet B.V. Krivolapov, a former KGB agent, discusses how his recruitment took place in 1980 when he was working as a waiter in a restaurant in Novokuznetsk:

"...They took a signed agreement from me saying that I would cooperate and would not divulge any secrets. I had to sign the information or reports with a pseudonym. Not particularly straining my little brain, I called myself Pushkin. Then I was asked what I understood to be a traditional question:

"'Do you have any requests of us?'

"'I do,' I said gladly, anticipating a landslide of privileges. 'I want to work in the Novokuznetskiy restaurant.'

"The department chief looked at Vitaliy Albertovich significantly and then quickly slipped into the bedroom where, from all appearances, he found a telephone. He returned in two minutes and told me that the director of the hotel restaurant was waiting for me... And on that very day I was transferred to a new job."

Yes, in the testimonies there was evidence of various services (gifts) the KGB rendered to its secret agents working in such a sensitive ideological area. But much more frequently I read about ruined lives and the unrelenting torment of conscience.

A Lvov resident recalls how during the war she was ordered to keep track of her friend, a German woman who had been exiled from Povolzhye:

"On New Year's Eve I was sent to Novosibirsk to scare up some gifts for the school children's tree. I told Eleonora Genrikhovna about this. Her face lit up: 'I beg of you. Take a package to my children...' (They were in a camp). I agreed but I had to report to the NKVD about the package. On the eve of my departure at midnight they ordered me to bring the package to the NKVD for inspection... It was unusually dark that night. When not only the people but also the dogs were all asleep I, like a master spy from the movies, turned up my collar and set out for the NKVD... They opened the parcel and spread the contents out on the table (the window blinds were pulled down tightly). In the parcel were: about three kilograms of raw potatoes, black rusks, mended and remended clean underwear, two pairs of warm socks, and a sack of sugar. There were about 350-400 grams of sugar. They sniffed and poked through all the potatoes and rusks, felt all the seams in the sacks, and ordered me to wrap up the parcel. And they handed the sack of sugar to me. Terrified, I jumped back: 'Why?... I do not need it!' 'Then we will give this sugar to the children's home,' and they laughed. I knew that there was no children's home in our rayon... 'Return the sugar...' I said, feeling cold all over. 'Eleonora Genrikhovna will think I took it...' 'Fascists do not deserve sugar,' the boss cut me off...

"I found the camp quickly but I could not find Eleonora Genrikhovna's children and I got the package to them through other people... She was very disappointed that I had not seen her children. About about two weeks after my return she told me with indescribable contempt (apparently she had received a letter from her children): "I do not want to have any more to do with you"... So because of these scum bags I still ended up a thief in her eyes... And only now, at age 78, can I talk about how vilely I was treated by the Chekists whom I hate for the death of my relatives, for my shame, and for my fear of them..."

This was from those same times that are cursed by everyone. But here is a more recent testimony. **A former actor of the Moscow Academic Theater of the Arts, Aleksey Golovin, was recruited after the 20th Party Congress:**

"Major of State Security Bulanov, in spite of the Khrushchevian thaw, had mastered techniques from Stalin's times: 'Everything is still the way it was... We must know everything. About everyone...' I was already given a code name with which I was to sign my reports. What could I do? Spit in the major's face? During our evening meetings the major delved more deeply and broadly into the tasks set for me by state security with respect to figures in the theater... I understood that, having fallen into the trap of the devil, I would become a filament of a spider web entangling all of our art, all of our society, all of our life... They no longer requested 'jobs' from me, they demanded them from me—both Major Bulanov himself and those unseen people who were behind him. And the only possible solution began to dawn on me...

"In the dining room which used to be under the studio of the Central Children's Theater, Oleg Yefremov, at that time an actor of the Central Children's Theater, came up to me and told me that he intended to create his own theater: 'The studio director is giving me a large hall. We will rehearse at night... I want to begin with Rozov's play "Eternally Living." Do agree...' I breathed a heavy sigh. Yefremov was waiting for an answer. Fear surged through me. Could we create a theater together? I had never dreamed of such a thing even as a child. But the damned web would extend beyond me and to any other theater. No, they would not leave me alone... I refused. And soon after that I submitted my resignation and left the Moscow Academic Theater of the Arts. I abandoned the theater forever..."

And another admission—of a recent graduate of the journalism faculty of Moscow State University, Aleksey Lukyanov:

"I had a friend, we met back when we were in the Army. His name was Borya. He was a hippie and they repeatedly threw him in the psycho ward. He was interested in literature and this is what brought us together. We happened to meet again. I immediately understood that they were after him. I knew his secret—Borya had an acquaintance who helped him make xeroxes of Nabokov and Solzhenitsyn (of what was previously called anti-Soviet literature). One time I mentioned Borya to an friend of mine. I told him about the xeroxes. Nobody dragged it out of me. My 'friend' suddenly asked me to repeat what I had said... I guessed why and for whom, but I went ahead and repeated it. The reason for what I did was fear (I had encountered the KGB before that)... When I left the auditorium after the lecture I understood that I had betrayed him. I never saw Borya again and never called him. I was ashamed. I do not know what happened to him... I was not a stool pigeon, I was just caught in the cogs of the wheel. And I paid for that..."

I have these letters here in front of me.

Almost every day another secret agent asks for a meeting.

I feel sorry for these people. I looked them in the eyes and heard their repentant stories, read their confessions, and came to a conclusion I can convey with complete confidence: No arguments to the effect that the state and the country need such secret agents for these purposes have any effect on me.

This is why I am concluding this survey with a fragment from a letter from a KGB veteran from Rovno, I.Ya. Priyazhnyuk:

"I wish to touch upon one more aspect of KGB activity which is fraught with danger for the country and the people, especially now, at a time that is critical for us.

"As a rule, the KGB gets information about processes taking place in society on the basis of reports from secret agents. After working for many years I know that many secret agents who were recruited with 'compromising materials' or who voluntarily expressed a desire to be informers, get used to the '30 pieces of silver.' To please the operations worker they give him whatever information he needs, sometimes completely false information. The career operative, just to stay afloat, is satisfied with this information. A kind of symbiosis is created whereby they derive advantage from one another."

"All this causes harm to society."

After this article I will obviously receive letters in which I am reproached for "breaking down," "destroying," "defaming," and so forth.

But I have before me already hundreds of testimonies to what political "secret agents" really are—people who simultaneously destroy the lives of others and are destroyed themselves. They have nothing to do with preserving the country's security.

'Free-Lance' Industrial Espionage Increasing

PM2502092191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 6

[Correspondent S. Shkayev article: "Use Me As a Spy; State Secrets in the Sights of Foreign Firms and Secret Services"]

[Text] He worked at an enterprise engaged in secret work. He was an excellent specialist. He often traveled on assignment to other installations and plants engaged in secret work. While he was carrying out his tasks, in passing and through idle curiosity he got to know about the installations and the content of secret operations, their strong and weak points. He was secretly proud of his professional memory and inclination to analysis: He not only remembered the information he was given, but he was also able to determine the tactical and technical characteristics of items even by their components. As a result he was not a specialist—he was a godsend.

Having moved his place of residence to Kurgan, he got a job at one of the cooperatives. He decided to get involved in business. To achieve an upturn in business he got into debt for a considerable sum, but he got his fingers burned and took to his heels. The militia announced an investigation.

"Since I had no way of obtaining the means to pay off my debt," he wrote in his confession, "I decided to get the money from foreigners in Moscow in exchange for information about military secrets I had at my disposal. You see, my financial position was grave—debt, drinking sessions, women..."

Needless to say, he did not know the aces of the spying and conspiracy world, and for that reason he acted with the effrontery and carelessness of an amateur. That is to say he simply called up foreign embassies and said openly to the person who picked up the receiver: I want to sell espionage information that is of interest to the military. After this he arranged a meeting in Gorkiy Park, having described his appearance in detail and given a brief account of secrets about an item he could sell on the cheap for about 5,000 to 6,000 in convertible currency. Of course, fearing a provocation, nobody turned up to these meetings.

And after some time the suspicious citizen was arrested by the militia and sent off to Kurgan for investigation. He candidly confessed to everything at once, and also related his attempt to become a spy.

The situation which our homegrown James Bond got himself into is, it must be admitted, anecdotal. But it is hardly amusing. Behind this a phenomenon is clearly visible, growing recently but which also has an evident tendency to spread—free-lance espionage for foreign firms and secret services. Right now, when the spirit of shortsighted pragmatism is penetrating ever deeper into every pore of our society, isolated citizens are to be found who, as they say... KGB staffers whom we have

talked with are unanimous: The protection of secret information from self-interested encroachments has today acquired a particular urgency.

Nevertheless our homegrown apologists of Western democracy continue to try to prove that the national system of protecting secrets, as much in defense as in other sectors of the national economy, quite simply contradicts the rights and freedoms of the individual. The primary cause allegedly lies in the evil intentions of the KGB, which has erected and is vigilantly defending its own bastions of state secrecy. Let us recall how much of this sort of thing we are obliged to listen to at any kind of rally and informal gathering where they are enamored of fancy rhetoric...

Despite the noticeable warming of international relations, it is known that the scale of intelligence activity carried out by secret services against the USSR has not lessened. Only now this activity is directed not only at undermining ideological foundations but increasingly at supplementing economic and scientific-technical information. And on the espionage markets it is known that, the more generous the buyer, the more sellers there are. Our legislators have, it seems, not yet understood this current tendency in all its terrible reality. They say that the protection of secrets is an encroachment on freedom. But Western legislators have long been seriously concerned about this "freedom."

In the protection of their technological and commercial secrets, Western firms, for example, consider their own personnel to be their most vulnerable point. In some countries people who have access to documents stamped "Top Secret" are obliged to let the investigating authorities have constant access to their financial documents and give an account of their journeys abroad. The law enforcement bodies are permitted without additional penalties to reveal which citizens have telephone conversations with foreigners. Company managements consider it acceptable not only to check and recheck the work of their executive directors but also to look into their safes and desks from time to time and to study their personal computer memories...

And all this, let us note, is placed on a firm legal footing in these countries. Everything is statutorily worked through, consolidated, and brought to the attention of the population, who fully support the necessary existence of such a system of secret measures. However, our protection practice continues to be geared to Articles 64 and 65 of the obsolete RSFSR Criminal Code (treason and espionage).

In the words of V. Krupkin, commander of one of the USSR KGB Administration subunits: "In my view it is necessary to establish a flexible defense mechanism that would protect the country against damage from outside and guarantee greater freedom of information exchange inside the country. The experience of the USSR KGB could be extremely useful in drawing up legislative acts, let's say, on the protection of industrial and commercial secrecy, the idea was first introduced by the Law 'On USSR Enterprises.' We must not make do with half measures in this matter. Therefore I am firmly convinced that we need first of all to adopt the laws 'On State Secrecy,' 'On The Protection of Secret Information,' and 'On Intellectual Property.'"

Let us add to what has been said that the effect of antimonopoly legislation will soon create a serious competitive struggle for the consumer in our market as well, in which the familiar arsenal will be used. The victor in this struggle will be the one who takes appropriate care over a system of obtaining, accumulating and analyzing information about competitors and who stops his own secrets from leaking out. The regular unmasking by the Western secret services of spies who pass industrial and commercial secrets to their corporations may serve as classic examples. Our scandals, it is true, are currently a little pettier. Here are two classic examples...

Our specialist found himself on a lengthy official assignment abroad. Because he did not have a serious attitude to the work and because the specialists working at the foreign firm were well disposed toward him, he told his partners about the tasks and the nature of the Soviet firm's cooperation with them. Naturally, his partners were grateful to him for this. And so problems arose when it came to setting up a major contract.

Or: A labor collective pioneered an important innovation which promised to be extremely profitable. But one of the workers, on leaving the cooperative, took the documentation with him and sold it for a profit to another plant...

If something similar happened in the United States these miserable specialists would immediately be brought before a court—the aggrieved firms would prove on the basis of legislation currently in force that the subject of the firm's secret was not a generally known fact, and that certain resources had been spent on devising, introducing, and putting it into production. And inevitable retribution would ensue. But could the nature of such acts be determined somehow under our laws?

Let us look the truth in the eye: We do not have a realistic program for restructuring state secret measures in the country. Moreover, nobody except the USSR KGB is currently raising the alarm with regard to this matter. On the other hand, even today many of our ministries and departments, whose materials were once used to compile lists of state secrets, are even today still quite willing to remain under the protection of the seals of an imaginary secrecy that benefits them alone.

It seems that the leadership of the USSR KGB must also be reproached for not yet speaking out at the new level of glasnost and not presenting the public with full information about the damage Western secret services and talkative volunteers among our own citizens are inflicting on our country. Why up to now, despite the fact that the country is on the threshold of the market, has the experience of the state secrets bodies of the MVD

[Ministry of Internal Affairs], Gosbank [State Bank], other departments, and foreign firms and secret services not been studied in detail?

Today the establishment of joint enterprises is being stepped up, free enterprise zones are being set up, very soon a law on travel in and out of the country will be adopted. Yet there are no guarantees that other bearers of secrets who work at scientific research institutes, design bureaus, and secret enterprises will not want to get rich by selling secret information abroad. So without shelving the matter, should we perhaps today address the question appearing on the agenda tomorrow in its full and terrible magnitude?

Figures on Attempts To Cross Border Released

PM2702164591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 4

[O. Zayev report: "Border: One-Way Traffic"]

[Text] Petrozavodsk—The Soviet-Finnish border is 1,130 km long.

According to information from the Leningrad Military District Staff made public for the first time, over the past four years our border guards prevented 105 attempts to violate the state border—92 of them from the USSR into Finland, and just 13 in the reverse direction. During the same period three violators got across the border illegally.

Entry-Exit Legislation Prepared

91UN0955A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Feb 91 p 8

[Article by F. Ivanov: "Exiting the USSR: Should We Hurry?"]

[Text] **It is expected that the USSR Law on Entry and Exit will be adopted along with other priority draft laws submitted to the fifth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.**

A news conference held on 20 February by Chief of the Department of Migration of the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] **P. Rudev** addressed this topic. As he said, Goskomtrud specialists have become involved in developing the draft law only at the final stage. In the opinion of Petr Sergeyevich, the new law substantially expands the rights of Soviet citizens, affirming the right to migrate for the first time. The draft law contains complete instructions concerning procedures for obtaining passports for foreign travel and exiting the country. It abolishes the now mandatory invitation affidavits from abroad which, in the opinion of P. Rudev, will facilitate the departure of ethnic migrants for permanent residence. The law provides for a court appeal in the event a request to depart is turned down.

Nonetheless, in the opinion of P. Rudev, implementation of the new law will run into serious difficulties, first of all, due to the underdevelopment of transportation. International air and rail routes are overloaded even now. It is impossible to develop motor vehicle transportation due to the number of border crossings being limited. It is planned to authorize the operation of foreign transportation companies in the territory of the USSR to meet the needs of all those wishing to depart. As P. Rudev communicated, such instructions have already been prepared by the government.

Free currency exchange at market rates will probably be introduced in our country very soon. Only this measure will make it possible for all wishing to travel to obtain funds. USSR citizens will be able to purchase currency not only at the Bank for Foreign Economic Relations, but also at many other banks, including commercial.

Naturally, most of the questions concerned the departure of Soviet citizens for work abroad. As is known, the new law allows Soviet citizens to legally emigrate for gainful employment for the first time. However, in the opinion of P. Rudnev, a very small number of Soviet citizens will be able to take advantage of this opportunity now. On the eve of the adoption of the new laws, many Western countries are imposing restrictions on labor immigration and introducing harsher penalties, including criminal, for hiring foreign employees illegally. By now, prior to the adoption of the law, some countries have already notified the USSR that Soviet citizens leaving on tourist visas attempt to get jobs illegally. Several dozen USSR citizens are already serving prison terms in Austria, Cyprus, and Finland.

In the opinion of P. Rudev, illegal emigration is fraught with complications in relations with Western countries and stepped-up police measures. Signing bilateral and multilateral agreements in the field of labor law remains the only way to resolve these issues. Negotiations concerning this are already under way with Finland, Belgium, Germany, Sweden, and France.

The chief of the Migration Department believes that the situation should change by the turn of the century. A labor shortage resulting from a slump in the birth rate in the 1960's through 1980's will affect the migration policy of Western countries. In this case, Soviet citizens will have better opportunities to find work abroad. However, there is the apprehension that until then the Law on Entry and Exit will prompt Soviet citizens to thoughtlessly obtain passports for foreign travel, all the more so because the procedure itself will become extremely simple. However, the state cannot guarantee that every bearer of a passport for foreign travel will leave for a foreign destination. If we do not give thought right now to how the Soviet people are going to travel abroad, the Law on Entry and Exit will soon turn into instructions on obtaining a passport for foreign travel.

With regard to the issue of a multitude of commercial organizations engaged in brokerage in the course of

dispatching Soviet citizens to work abroad, P. Rudev communicated that, in the opinion of Goskomtrud specialists, most of these structures are not capable of functioning, and are not responsible for contracts signed with their help in any way. However, this is not to say that the new commercial organizations should be eliminated. In the opinion of P. Rudev, they should be controlled by the state and should receive licenses for such operations from the Goskomtrud.

Economic

Price Hikes Increase Social Tension

PM2702165391 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 1

[I. Demchenko article: "Price of New Prices"]

[Text] N. Ryzhkov's famous saying—You will remember this government—seems to have been prophetic. At any rate, we will not forget it that quickly. And not only because the new Cabinet of Ministers has begun to be formed from cadres of the former one, but also because the present state economic policy—and the financial policy in particular—is nothing but a continuation of the old one.

In particular, a reform of retail prices is once again being imposed on society—with somewhat changed emphases, it is true—according to the scenario prepared in 1988, twice examined by the USSR Supreme Soviet (May and September 1990) and twice rejected. In proclaiming the policy of transition to the market, the union government verbally presented the abandonment of "shock therapy" as its great social achievement. They persistently suggested to the population that they would "show concern for it," "protect its interests," and "compensate for all losses."

Meanwhile, the "creeping" price hike, became particularly noticeable last year, and had become one of the strongest factors in increasing social tension. A confidential report, prepared at the end of last year by experts of the USSR State Prices Committee on behalf of the union government and recently made public by the POSTFAKTUM agency, points out that the population is not ready for a price hike even if there is significant compensation for higher prices. The fate of K. Prunskiene's government attests to the force of the socioeconomic explosion which could occur in the event of higher prices.

However, sad though it may be, it should be recognized that the economic policy of the past four-five years, and particularly of the past six months, has resulted in a retail price hike becoming an absolutely inevitable factor. This seems obvious to everyone. Particularly important in this connection is the fact that, in presenting the union budget at the Fourth USSR Supreme Soviet Session while still USSR minister of finance, V. Pavlov specially emphasized that the union budget made no provision for expenditure on indexing the population's incomes and compensating for the losses caused by the retail price hike, as a price hike in itself was not envisaged. This can mean just one thing: Responsibility not only for the compensation for losses but also for the price hike, which has become inevitable as a result of the economically senseless and harmful actions of central organs, will rest with local organs.

Assurances of more or less full compensation for the population's losses caused by the price reform are no less harmful. The impetus of rising prices in conjunction with total scarcity, growing inflation, and the impracticality of the approach to price formation which is professed by the USSR State Prices Committee and enshrined in the present reform will lead to the development of a totally uncontrollable and ungovernable process which, after a while, no centralized restrictions will be able to halt. The prices set by the state for individual categories of commodities will simply rise by leaps and bounds—not gradually, as for the other categories. There is no other difference.

The very idea of compensation is absolutely senseless. An increase in wage rates and all other attempts to pay compensation through wages will at once affect production prime costs, and the growth in the latter will require either the introduction of subsidies or an increase in the product price. This is an endless spiral. As for attempts to give social support to persons on fixed incomes—invalids, pensioners, and students—and the introduction of child allowances, there will inevitably be a lagging behind the growth in prices, and compensation will be unable to make up for the real losses.

Since, as already stated, the price hike resulting from the state economic policy has moved from the category of questions for discussion into the practical sphere, all these and many other difficulties which certainly have not been described here face us in the very near future. Those who will have to set the new prices directly must not bear the responsibility for this. Many executive organs of power locally have made an effort to get on top of the situation, but the lack of real power and the impossibility of implementing an independent economic policy have prevented them from intervening in earnest in the development of events according to the union scenario.

Goods in Storage Awaiting Price Hikes

914A0455A Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by O. Osipov: "Prices: No Secrets, No Goods Either"]

[Text] Broad-scale price increases are approaching with the inexorability of a hurricane. And no secrets remain—the newspapers, including TRUD, have reported on the rise in prices and made their nonrosy predictions. Now we are hearing that stocks with the new prices have already arrived at stores.

A. Komin, first deputy chairman of the USSR State Price Committee, assures us that the new prices will be announced in good time all the same, with a week's notice, and this time compensation will be paid to people beforehand. "However," he noted, "you could announce it a month prior—the stores do not have anything anyway..." One cannot argue with him.

USSR Deputy Trade Minister S. Sarukhanov asserts that rumors to the effect that the trade system already knows absolutely all prices and that the stores have sealed envelopes to be opened at "x-hour" are groundless. Both of these individuals with whom I conversed noted that the question of prices "is finally being sorted out." But it is not without purpose that the shelves are empty—preparation is nearing completion for a more expensive life.

Such a conclusion may be reached by virtue of the reports coming in daily to TRUD that depots and warehouses everywhere are literally bursting with foodstuffs and consumer goods. One would have to be eminently naive to fail to understand that they are awaiting their time, i.e., the hour of new prices. And no matter how much one is told about economic sabotage, readers addressing our editorial staff just cannot understand who exactly is the chief "hoarder." Why is the "relentless war" that is being waged with the help of worker- inspectors and law enforcement organs unable to afford any abundance? Why is this becoming more and more mindful of a farce in which it is getting increasingly difficult to distinguish the obvious plunderer or profiteer from the zealous executor of instructions "from above"—to hold back goods until a "special directive" is issued?

And another substantive question is raised—how long will the goods held back last? After all, the fact of new prices in itself can in no way create an abundance. But to sharply reduce the purchasing powers of low- and average-pay segments of the population—this it can do. Here the government has envisaged something else as well, freezing salaries and savings bank accounts in the first quarter. And so the massive dumping of shortage items onto the shelves will hardly substantially diversify the menu or replenish the wardrobes of workers the authorities are so worried about. On the other hand, those same "shadow economy" people against whom the recent exchange of major currency denominations was chiefly directed, and who have lost precious little as a result, will be in a position to deny themselves nothing.

Thus one arrives at the sad conclusion that what precisely this "price hurricane" will put on the shelves is as yet unknown, but there is no doubt but that it will blow money out of our pockets.

Black Sea Merchant Fleet Being 'Written Off'

PM2802092191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 25 Feb 91

[Report by A. Vengruk and V. Zaytsev from Odessa; from the "Television News Service" newscast]

[Text] [Vengruk] Is is true that the steamship company has 3,000 unemployed seamen?

[L.V. Pavlenko, chief of the Black Sea Steamship Company Passenger Fleet] Yes, indeed. The problem of finding jobs for the seamen exists. There are a number of seamen for whom we cannot find ships at the moment because there is no fleet. The fleet is being written off. One-half of the passenger fleet no longer exists, hundreds more dry cargo ships will be laid up, there is no replacement, and it looks as though the enthusaistic cadets from the training ships will never stand on the bridge of a modern, Soviet-made ship. If the government is incapable now of replacing the fleet, of updating it or equipping it with modern, technically new ships, then it probably makes sense to go to a number of ministry leaders and say: Let's organize some kind of bank together to invest money here and buy some passenger ships.

All-Union Unemployment Fund Established

LD2702101891 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] Within the framework of preparations for a new economic direction and preparations for the market, an all-Union social fund for protection from unemployment has been set up. The first donation, approximately 2 million rubles, has been made by the founders. They are the labor collectives from the Ministry of the Coal Industry, the USSR Union of Composers, and several state establishments. The fund is currently working on three programs: assisting the activities of working people who have a family, assistance for the young, and a program based on assisting the professional rehabilitation of the disabled.

Shatalin Denounces Financial Policy

914A0467A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 7, 20 Feb 91 p 6

[Article by Academician S. Shatalin under the general heading "Operation 'One Hundred Fifty'" subtitled "The Ethics of an Economist and the Hippocratic Oath: The Point of View of a Scholar"—first paragraph is published in box central to article and referent item]

[Text]**Time has passed. The passions that raged three weeks ago around the exchange of the two largest bank notes have died down. The newspaper dedicated an entire page of print to those passions (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, No 4, 1991). Back then we promised to conduct and publish a deeper analysis of the operation that was conducted. We are fulfilling our promise.**

It was not for the sake of irony that I decided to comment on the prime minister's "one hundred fifty" assault on the domestic and international shadow economy. Although I will honestly say that the title of the article reminded me of a cartoon from the December issue of KROKODIL in which a fellow standing by the bed of a dying Soviet socialist economy informs the local Aesculapius, "It has a last request: It wants to say goodbye to someone named Shatalin."

All of this is not at all funny. I have written repeatedly on the connection between economics and ethics, and I was the first in our country to repeat the famous "Protestant Ethic" of M. Weber, who brilliantly proved that the Protestants, in whose religion work occupies a "divine" place, created capitalism. Is the absence of this divine beginning not one of the causes of the unending tragedy of our long-suffering country?

I believe Bismarck said that all people think they are experts in agriculture because each day they eat a potato. The communists have extended similar "knowledge of the subject" to the absurd: In our country everyone is an expert in agriculture, sports, culture, diplomacy, medicine, and, of course, economics.

But at least doctors take the Hippocratic Oath. But what oath did our prime minister, an economist by education, and incidentally a financial expert as well, take as he began the neurosurgical operation on our mortally ill economy using a rusty axe?

I have known Valentin Pavlov long and well, and I will immediately say that he is a skilled economist, although in the realm of pricing, monetary, and financial policy his horizon is severely limited by Marxist orthodoxy (price is an expression of the socially necessary expenditures of labor, usually averaged across the sector, etc. etc.), which does not allow one to adequately understand the true mechanisms of the functioning of a modern market economy. At the same time he is undoubtedly equipped with common sense. I repeat: Our prime minister is a professional. So why did he embark on an adventure, to put it mildly, which, according to him, he spent a whole year preparing? (My thanks to N.I. Ryzhkov who, for a year anyway, protected the people from the "economic marvel," honestly but unsuccessfully trying to raise retail prices in May 1990.) What he did could have been thought up in a matter of a minute over a glass of vodka, which, of course, no longer exists after we conducted the antialcohol reform, even more senseless from all, I repeat from all, points of view. Have we learned nothing?

So many of my colleagues, publicists, and columnists have written on the senselessness of the current reform that it is hardly worth putting any more salt on the wound of the prime minister. But I am an academician-secretary of the Department of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences and if not the wisest then at least the most "important" Soviet economist, not including, of course, the prime minister himself. If the prime minister will honestly admit all the senselessness of what he has done, I will publicly announce my own cooperation with the administration and call for the cooperation of all thinking economists. But only under the banner of professionalism and an oath to religiously observe economic ethics.

Thus I assert that operation "one hundred fifty" was not the result of good economic thinking but rather a gesture of political "recklessness."

And now we will dissect the reform with regard to a few of its main points, inasmuch in principle as everything is clear.

1. The prime minister said that he is inflicting if not a mortal then a decisive blow (like Bush to Husayn) to the shadow economy of the USSR and the West—this was his main strategic plan. Pavlov, Gerashchenko, chairman of the board of the USSR State Bank and a man whom I consider a serious professional, and Pekshev calculated the gain from the sudden operation at 10-15 billion rubles [R]. Now they report that R8 billion were not presented for exchange. This is fantastic accuracy—on the level of the prediction of the development of the USSR economy for 1991.

What does all this mean? The population's savings in savings banks on 1 January 1991 are calculated at R380.7 billion, there are R132.7 billion in the hands of the population, there are R20.5 billion in securities, and there are about R7 billion in the West in R100 and R5 notes (which I strongly doubt). The increase in the monetary income of the population, if we are to believe Goskomstat [State Committee for Statistics] (and in this case I believe it), comprised the fantastic sum of R94.5 billion, rubles which are absolutely inflationary. If someone had pronounced this figure back in 1988, when the economic catastrophe had already begun, I would have called such a forecaster an illiterate economist. But the ways of fate truly are inscrutable. The volume of the population's monetary income in 1990 was equal to R652.5 billion, out of which R447.4 was the fund of labor payments in the state sector and the cooperatives.

Goskomstat has declared that the volume of the gross national product decreased in 1990 by comparison with 1989 by two percent, but that is disinformation. In fact it was substantially more, inasmuch as Goskomstat did not use deflators. I am prepared to publicly refute all the calculations. But even if one believes Goskomstat, the volume of the gross national product last year comprised approximately R940-960 billion. I dare assert that no real, physical (in unchanged prices) increase in commodity circulation (including small-scale wholesale commodity and a portion of paid services) and in paid services occurred that corresponded to the increase in monetary income by R94.5 billion.

This is the "real" scale of the knockout blow to the country's shadow economy. Incidentally, in the 500 days program we described what the shadow economy is, and did it "professorially" splendidly. Our working concept

of the shadow economy, coordinated with Academician L.I. Abalkin, my "sworn enemy" on the subject of the transition to a market economy, included in it an additional value (income, excluding day-to-day material expenses) which was not subject to taxes and which we calculated at R80-120 billion. But it is time for all of us to understand a fundamental truth: Our whole economy is a shadow economy, an "economic madhouse," an "economic distorting mirror," an economic "party membership card," and an "administrative command" economy.

How have events developed? Recently I have continually been given my wages in R50 and R100 notes. Leaving on vacation I received a fabulous sum (they gave me another two months of pay as material aid), and by calling a number of associates in various professions and categories, I decided to confirm for myself what I already knew: The majority were receiving their wages in R50 and R100 bank notes. Prior to the New Year I was telephoned by a number of major "shadow economy operators" who still had tens of thousands of R50 and R100 notes on hand "for a rainy day." After all, everyone considers me the sponsor of "shadow economy operators." They asked me, "What is going to happen, Stanislav Sergeyevich?" My answer went approximately this way: Boys, I thought you were clever people, but you are asking idiotic questions. My reader, I ask you to believe me, I am an honest man and prior to 24 January I did not exchange even my own hard-earned rubles (although try to prove where they came from) that I received a well-deserved scolding from my wife. The operators are another matter; they, of course, did not wait. The Western "shadow economy operators" suffered the same "mortal blow," from which they will not recover before the end of the century: They lost $250 million—the price of one-half day of the Persian Gulf War. The Dow Jones Index changed by 0.00000...01. A trifle, but gratifying. Except that Western experts do not know whether it fell or climbed. Inasmuch as the program "liberalized" credit relations, it probably fell. Which, I repeat, no one noticed.

And now, I will very briefly mention other economic blows.

2. Pavlov's action completely undermined the population's faith in the government, which, of course, did not exist in the first place. As a currency, the ruble is finished. The entire "capital" which the population has been holding in the bank turned in an instant into "hot money" and a "hot potato." They have begun to buy up not only everything on the shelves of the stores but also money in denominations of 1, 2, 5, 15, and 20 kopeks and 1 ruble. The USSR's monetary system has quit functioning, and the idea of an economic union of republics fostered by me and "my team" has collapsed like a house of cards. And the Union treaty is like the utopia of Campanella.

3. The limitation on the withdrawal of savings to R500 per month will play havoc with the market entrepreneurial structure and reduce the increase in the volume of production of goods and services and, consequently, tax receipts for budgets at all levels. Hyperinflation is unavoidable, all the more because the planned reduction of the gross national product of the USSR in 1991 by comparison with 1990 is an illusion of first-year students in the journalistic department. It will be significantly larger! Entrepreneurship, especially in light of additional indicators with regard to economic sabotage, will begin to die an agonizing death. The market economy has been declared illegal. This administration detests it.

4. The "Pavlov" strike, which I estimate lasted about five days, meant a loss of at least R8 billion, plus expenses for the printing of the new bank notes. My God, it would have been better to run out of paper and, perhaps, end the printing of money.

5. Nothing, absolutely nothing, has been done to ensure that the increase in monetary income that is not backed by anything will not exceed the fantastic figure of R100 billion in 1991, and the real volume of the deficit of the state budget is R150 billion.

6. In this manner, I estimate the real loss from the "Pavlov- style" "shock therapy" at a total of R10 billion. The logic of events is stronger than the logic of circumstances. The cabinet will need to administratively increase retail prices several times, compensating for those expenses at least for themselves. Indexation, an increase in costs, and a superinflationary spiral are simply unavoidable. Of course, the jump in retail prices will wipe out the subsidies, and then what—will the economy become effective? Have you not had enough of turnover taxes and sales taxes? How one must despise one's people to justify such an economy!

7. While preparing the creation of the "eighth wonder of the world," was it really impossible to foresee and intelligibly describe practically all the events that might crop up in three days of events? One wise academic—and I, to my unusual good fortune, have met many of them—told me, "If one person knows something, then it is no longer a secret." Well, the prime minister knew his own "wonder."

8. The prime minister is insisting that the act was directed at bringing the stock of goods and the money in circulation into correspondence. I believe that the reader with any professional background, having examined the figures cited above and even having believed that the state's profit would be R10 billion, will laugh at that idea. Is there nothing left for us but laughter? If the government wishes to find a permanent solution to the problem of the deficit, it must completely rob the population, as Erhard did in Germany. But where are we to find an Erhard? And we are not Germany.

Incidentally, when you increase retail prices, comrade prime minister, do not forget that in the USSR there is

no positive elasticity of supply in accordance with price. Of course, so long as you do not raise prices by a factor of 1000.

As a basis for the reform that was conducted I heard references on the program "Vremya" to major authorities in the West, in particular to Dornbush [name as transliterated], the American professor of economics who really is a prominent specialist in the realm of monetary policy, particularly inflation. When I discussed the 500 days program with him, he told me that he would still supplement it with a partial monetary reform, citing the experience of Poland, Bolivia, and Brazil. But I convinced him that such "shock therapy" is absolutely impossible in this country, at least for the following reasons:

—The USSR is a multiethnic, multiregional country with different types of spiritual and cultural mentalities and different regions: What stimulates the Protestant leaves the Muslim absolutely indifferent, although in this case too we should not ignore the universal and exaggerate the particular;

—In the USSR the government does not have interethnic, popular trust; no one understands why sacrifices are needed, and no one believes that there will be benefits, at least for their children and grandchildren.

9. Now, after the reform that has been conducted, neo-Bolsheviks in the soviet executive committees, committees of poor peasants, and food-requisition detachments will begin to count on their abacus whether or not the member of the USSR Presidential Council, member of the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, and honorary chairman of the board of the professional Moscow soccer club "Spartak" worked out the "aforementioned" sum honestly or not. They will ask if would not be better to revive the old ways and create "troikas" and "special sittings" and be done with it. And why, Valentin Sergeyevich, train your guns on the old ladies, particularly those in Central Asia? Have you been there? Have you not had enough popular hate? Take an oath similar to the Hippocratic Oath, or leave immediately.

And the final point. Economists say that we have a lot of "extra" money. In fact everything is exactly the opposite—we have little money, little initial capital to conduct effective privatization.

The free distribution of property (apart from a portion of social goods and services) to the population is the latest temptation, neo- Bolshevism according to the "modernized" principle of "loot the plunder," social parasitism, the encouragement of plebeians, and the worst form of populism, which should be fought by every means. It will then be easy for the mafia to hit the stupefied populace over the head and rob it. Who then will deal with the mafia?

Moscow-Tokyo-Seoul-Tokyo-Moscow

Instead of an Afterword

I handed this article in to LITERATURNAYA GAZETA on 31 January while I was ill in Moscow, and that evening I flew off to Tokyo and Seoul, not only on business but also to receive some medical treatment. I did not change anything in the "Moscow" version of the text. In Tokyo I learned about the interview the prime minister gave to TRUD. I could not believe my eyes or my ears. Even the Japanese, who are not easily moved from their indifference, were nonplused. It is difficult to say what has caused more harm to our relations with the West (including Japan and South Korea): The unstable political, interethnic, and social situation in the USSR, our financial bankruptcy, the transactions that have not been paid for, the events in the Baltic region, or Pavlov's action and the evaluation by the prime minister of the prime minister's debut. What is that: Political cynicism, an absolute absence of ethics, or political and economic ignorance? I am no longer calling on V. Pavlov to take a Hippocratic Oath—he has not deserved it. Today I call upon him to offer the president of the USSR his resignation. For him it is the single real opportunity to help the president and halt the USSR's loss of economic independence. War is war. Remember? Just as in "Fanfan the Tulip" [Soviet film].

From the Editorial Board

These are two points of view. One reader may point to the unnecessarily emotional position of one author, someone else—to the too-rational position of the other. The editorial office considers its task to be one of reflecting the entire spectrum of opinions existing in society concerning vitally important economic problems.

Aeroflot Fares Increase To Cover Higher Costs

PM2802125791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 91 Union Edition p 3

[Interview with V. Kurilo, USSR deputy minister of civil aviation, by correspondent V. Belikov; place and date not given: "Air Tickets at New Prices"]

[Text] As already reported at the beginning of the year in IZVESTIYA (No. 1), the coming increase in the cost of transport services will also affect air fares. Prime Minister V. Pavlov specified in his speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet session that the new air fares will show an average 80-percent increase. IZVESTIYA's correspondent talks about this with V. Kurilo, deputy minister of civil aviation:

[Kurilo] Since the beginning of this year Aeroflot has been losing 8 million rubles [R] of its own money every day owing to the increased wholesale prices for fuel, aviation equipment and spares, and other kinds of material supplies—the Soviet airline went over to self-financing a long time ago. With the inevitable increase in seasonal movements around the country in the next few

weeks and the corresponding rise in expenditure, air transport will find itself on the brink of ruin...

This is a brief outline of the situation which, unfortunately, necessitates a move to new, higher air fares. Let me explain that this increase in the tariffs for journeys by air on intra-union routes will not raise the wages of aviators themselves by a single ruble or increase their enterprises' social development funds. In other words, the entire "hike" will go to cover increased expenditure on operating aircraft, helicopters, traffic control facilities, and ground structures.

[Belikov] Will the prices of tickets on all routes increase in equal measure?

[Kurilo] No. The new prices are being set in a differentiated manner, with due regard for the special features of transport services in various regions and the length of routes. A flight over an identical distance in the extreme north or the Far East, where local aviation is the only form of transportation, will cost less than a flight of the same length in central parts of the country, for example, where there is railroad and bus transport.

A general principle is also being adhered to—the greater the distance that has to be covered, the smaller, relatively speaking, is the increase over the previous fares. A Moscow-Leningrad air ticket, for example, which today costs R18, will cost R43, and the passenger will be required to pay R184 for a flight from Moscow to Yakutsk instead of the present R134. On the most popular resort routes—Moscow-Simferopol and Moscow-Sochi—the air fare will increase from R28-31 to R63-65.

[Belikov] Will the existing discounts and concessions for individual categories of passengers be retained in the new tariffs?

[Kurilo] They will, and in the same percentage ratios, but in respect of the new prices. The existing procedure for obtaining air tickets for official business trips will continue to operate.

In in our country the creation of independent airlines operating independently of Aeroflot, a situation is possible in which cheaper air fares will be introduced on certain routes served by such transport enterprises. Everything depends on the results of their economic activity under the conditions of the evolving air services market.

[Belikov] When is it proposed to go over to the new tariffs?

[Kurilo] This will happen simultaneously with the introduction of the whole range of new retail prices in the country. Air tickets for internal flights which have already been obtained by that time will be valid, and no supplement will be demanded. The cost of flights on Aeroflot's international routes is not affected by the planned introduction of increased tariffs.

Moscow's Foreign Currency Exchange Described

PM2802121391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[I. Zhagel report: "Foreign Exchange Market Opens in March"]

[Text] Preparatory work to open a foreign exchange market is now complete, and specialists from the USSR State Bank have agreed to give information on how this extremely important body will work in the market economy now being created in our country.

At first, the exchange will be a structural subdivision of the State Bank and share the same premises: 12 Neglinnaya Street. We think this kind of subordination is perfectly justified at present. After all, it will have to decide a great many complex practical issues, such as working out the procedure for calculating in rubles and hard currency, for example.

Who will be allowed into the exchange? Whereas enterprises participated directly in earlier currency auctions, only banks that belong to the exchange will be allowed to operate on the foreign exchange market. Obviously, they must have a license to carry out currency operations, a stable financial position, and qualified personnel.

As far as actual clients are concerned, they will apply to banks and empower them to take whatever action is necessary. This is perfectly logical—after all, in other countries no private individual or firm comes directly into the foreign exchange market: They use the services of qualified intermediaries.

Without doubt, one of the most interesting questions is: How will the exchange rate be established? Going back to currency auctions again, we must say that there everything was decided by the auction committee—the clients were not even present. Now, however, bank representatives will be directly responsible for determining the exchange rate. Depending on changes in the exchange rate, they can either put up more currency for sale or withdraw their applications to buy. When demand meets supply, so to speak, trading on the exchange ends and a single rate is established: This is known as the fixing and is used in all transactions that banks and exchange members enter into with their clients. It is proposed that trading initially take place twice a week.

Exchange operations also provide for certain mechanisms making it possible to protect the buying and selling rate against unexpected surges. For example, the USSR State Bank will institute currency intervention, for which purpose the government has allocated special sums of money. They are several times higher than the amounts set aside by the state for currency auctions.

According to A. Voytenkov, deputy chief of the USSR State Bank Currency Administration, the problem of stabilizing the currency market in our country is, generally speaking, a problem of developing foreign economic ties and the market as a whole.

Looking back to the recent past, there were two sharp drops in the ruble exchange rate at currency auctions. The first time was last May, when the government announced that it was raising prices and everyone hurried to put their money into something more stable than the ruble. The second time there was uproar on the currency market was in December, when news leaked out about the exchange of large-denomination banknotes. That is still continuing now.

There are hopes, nevertheless, that the situation will stabilize in the near future. Foreign exchange markets must play a role in this—albeit not a very great one at present. Only 10 banks are involved in organizing the first of these markets. However, considering that licenses to carry out currency operations have already been issued to 25 banks, this circle is going to broaden. The opening of the foreign exchange market is scheduled for the end of March.

Military

Shlyaga Interviewed on Army, Navy Day

91UM0408A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 23 Feb 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, by Nikolay Panyukov, RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA military commentator; place and date not given: "Reform on the March"]

[Text]*Whenever difficulties mount, whenever the Fatherland is in danger, the first ones to stand in its defense are the warriors of the Army and the Navy.*

This is the way it was at the time of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War... This is the way it was when it became necessary to enter the mortal battle with the "nuclear genie" of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station.

The Army saves, and the Army helps, while all the time remembering its main function: to maintain constant combat readiness.

The problems that are part of the daily life of our Army and Navy in these uneasy times are described in our correspondent's interview with Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the Main Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Panyukov] Nikolay Ivanovich, many our readers ask whether reform is underway in the Army?

[Shlyaga] Of course, the reform is already being implemented. And not just for a year or two... The starting point in the process of practical implementation of the current reform's practical tasks should be considered the adoption by our country of a new military defense doctrine in 1987.

Gradually, the very structure of the Army and the Navy is changing. The legislation on military matters is being substantially updated. First steps have been undertaken towards the implementation of the program of social security for members of the military and their families, as well as persons retired from military service.

And what about large-scale transformations in military economy? And the transformation of political organs into military-political organs? Are not all of these, and many others, symptoms of the reform already underway? Now we have on the agenda the signing of a number of new international agreements and the adoption of a new Union treaty... All of that, naturally, will influence the course of the reform, add new nuances to it.

[Panyukov] By the way, some readers of our newspaper are especially interested in the defense aspect of the new Union treaty. What can you say about it?

[Shlyaga] The issue of the fate of the USSR has been placed at the center of increasingly bitter political battles. Figuratively speaking, political parties and movements crossed their "swords and pens" over it. Contrary to common sense, some people chose to push centrifugal tendencies and to harriedly search for ways to make the adoption of the Union treaty more difficult, including the excuse of the need to strengthen the sovereignty of the Union republics. In doing that, they put the very notion of sovereignty upside down. They ignore the fact that in the environment of existing economic and political ties the existence of the Union of Republics does not nullify this sovereignty, but guarantees it. It is because only joint efforts by the republics can guarantee their safety that the main function in regard to the defense of the country should be, in my view, the prerogative of the center. It is necessary to clearly spell it out in the Union treaty.

[Panyukov] In this case, how should we treat persistent statements in some republics that they have a right to maintain their own armed forces? There are some people who would like to make this the main substance of the military reform.

[Shlyaga] What can I say in this regard? According to the existing USSR Constitution, the Union republics do not have such right. The building of the Armed Forces is the exclusive competence of the Union. Please note that the Ministry of Defense is an all- Union organization.

Going back to the beginning of your question, I would like to emphasize once again that the defense of the Union is too serious an aspect of the functioning of the state to build it along the axis of coordinates of republic sovereignty. At the same time, moving towards the renewal of the Union, it is, of course, necessary to increase the role of the republics in defense matters, taking into account their increased self-sufficiency. Today, however, it seems that the power organs of some Union republics are competing among themselves in the ignoble business of bringing the Armed Forces down.

Many of them, for all practical purposes, no longer fulfill their responsibility in preparing the youth for military service. They adopt laws and pass decisions that paralyze the draft, and create anticonstitutional military detachments. In some regions the authorities have taken antihumane actions towards the military and their families. In addition to restrictions in residence permits and health care, there are now demands to pay substantial monetary sums for school education of the children from military families, and the refusal—under the conditions of market economy, I must note—to issue ration cards and coupons for food products.

Lately, in particularly in the Baltic republics, it came to the point of threats to cut off electricity, water, and heat to the military and the military bases. Various political and public movements try increasingly often to get the Army and the Navy involved in political struggle.

[Panyukov] These are not simple problems...

[Shlyaga] Of course. But they can be solved if we use common sense and truly international interests, which require more and more the integration of efforts for the cause of national defense. In this respect—and I want especially to underscore this point—it is important and necessary to ensure the supremacy of the Union legislation on defense issues.

As to the formation of national military detachments, I will tell you straight: In addition to the potential danger of dragging us into the resolution of interethnic conflicts, we will face an enormous absolute increase in the material and financial expenditures.

According to existing data, the supply of one 1000-men strong regiment of the national forces in Armenia in 1990 cost 35 million rubles [R]. It takes over R7 billion to create one motor infantry division, if we take into account the repair facilities, storage, housing, and barracks, etc. The creation of a separate army, naturally, will require education of the national officers corps—the backbone of any armed forces. The professional training of just one officer in a military education institute now costs the state over R50,000.

[Panyukov] There is much talk about depoliticization and de-party-ization of the Army...

[Shlyaga] Tell those who do not understand it that there is no such thing as a depoliticized army. Only "play troops" can fall into this category. When it comes to a real army, it is hard to imagine it outside of politics. After all, in reality it exists as an attribute of politics.

As to de-party-ization, this is much simpler. The abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution affects the Army to the full extent. The Army is not the tool of the party. The Army is the tool of the people, the tool of the state.

As to my personal position on de-party-ization, I firmly believe that the Communists in the Army and the Navy are the golden reserve of its combat capability. They serve at the most responsible posts of the military organism, and they carry on their shoulders such burdens that others cannot even imagine. It is known to everybody that we only accept the best of the best in the CPSU ranks, no matter what some political turncoats say. Or those whom we, at some time, either have not accepted into the CPSU or have expelled them from its ranks. It is specifically the Communists who today cement the navy and army collectives, mobilizing them to carry out complicated tasks under incredibly hard conditions. As a member of the party Central Committee, I voted without hesitation to pass, at the recent joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission, the resolution "On Organization and Political Strengthening of the Party Organizations," which calls for resolute resistance to the ideas of depoliticization and de-party-ization, no matter where they emanate from.

I will especially emphasize that the CPSU structures in the Armed Forces will remain. This is in full compliance with the USSR Law "On Public Associations."

[Panyukov] In conclusion of this conversation—a question of a summarizing nature: What do you think will be the main result of the current military reform?

[Shlyaga] It will, without question, manifest itself in the continued strengthening of the defense capabilities of the country, in the creation of a legal mechanism for building the military, and in bringing the Armed Forces in proportion to the level of real military danger, and new political, economic, and social conditions.

The accomplishment of these tasks is important for our entire society. This is why, as never before, we need social stability in all regions, and constant attention to the reliability of our defense and security of our country. Whether it is on the weekdays or the holidays, the Army has always been and will be with the people; it only serves the people's interests.

Lushev Interviewed on Army, Navy Day

91UM0411A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 23 Feb 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Interview with General of the Army P.G. Lushev on his pre-Army and Navy Day tour by A. Orlov; place not given: "We Have Honor"]

[Text] The 18-year-old soldier was standing next to a general of the army for the first time. The boy was flustered. His gaze was fixed continuously on the big star on the shoulder boards. And the general was asking what his name was, where he hailed from, how long he had been serving and why he was without gloves in a fair February frost. The soldier justified himself and said something or other, pointing to an armored personnel carrier nearby.

The Rostock seaport "rumbled" and "sighed" all around. The arm of a gantry crane loomed over a Soviet transport ship. Equipment, accessories, and supplies and

munitions were being loaded. Motorized infantrymen were preparing to embark for home—the Union.

"Good, but don't be embarrassed, son," the general smiled. "You are a soldier. Prepare the equipment for the journey well.... I do not promise a quick rendezvous with your own home but you'll be returning to the Motherland very soon...."

General of the Army P.G. Lushev, hero of the Soviet Union, first deputy USSR defense minister and commander of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, was at this time visiting many garrisons of the Western Group of Forces. The most varied issues were tackled here. One could only wonder how many things could be accommodated in just three days.

He got down to work religiously, with a kind of peasant thoroughness. He did not let slip an opportunity to strike up a conversation with a person even on a chance meeting. He did not wait for someone to address him. He would himself enter the men's mess halls, the officer's quarters, the motor pools, and stores and call on servicemen's families.... Even in just a matter of hours in the seaport he had time not only to discuss in detail the progress of the shipment of cargo with the captain of the Soviet ship, meet with representatives of the military transport communications service, and ascertain the position of the port's board of directors regarding a possible increase in the equipment-loading tariffs, but also to have a comprehensive discussion in the "duty room" with the leader of the team of German longshoremen. He even inquired about minor details: what was holding up the work, could the handling of the freight be speeded up, how could things be organized more economically?

This tour of the Western Group of Forces took place right on the eve of Soviet Army and Navy Day. It was there that our interview began—on problems of the withdrawal of the forces, of the Army, of the attitude toward it in society.

[Orlov] Petr Georgiyevich, I have been watching you work and have at times, I confess, been puzzled: a multitude of concerns, and the first deputy defense minister is going into why a soldier does not have gloves. Or inquiring whether the daughter of an officer will take her finals here, in the group of forces....

[Lushev] Yes, to my great regret, I managed to get done on the trip far from all that I had intended. The people have a tremendous amount of work here, and one cannot be everywhere at once. We are withdrawing from our groups of forces—within a compressed timeframe—thousands of pieces of equipment and taking away hundreds of thousands of tons of accessories and supplies. It is hard to compare this operation with any other. With that involving, say, the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. There has altogether been nothing on this scale since the war. And there are no trifling matters in this work either. All this means people's fate, that of military and nonmilitary personnel. And, consequently, their morale and civic feelings.

Take if only the question of servicemen's families in the new locations. It is being resolved with great difficulty as yet. The Defense Ministry now has a clear idea of how much in the way of houses, quarters, schools, kindergarten, stores, and such has to be built to establish a more or less tolerable life for people. Merely common action is needed. This problem has been discussed repeatedly. The extremely limited possibilities of our military construction organizations are particularly worrying. Another aspect of the difficulties is the shortfall in the supply of construction materials by the civilian departments. As far, however, as the local soviets and assistance on their part is concerned, nor are many local authorities in any hurry to comply with the corresponding decisions of the USSR Council of Ministers.

We have had to balance in the groups of forces what of the construction materials available here we may take with us. The problems are, as you can see, woven into a single ball. So far it is the military itself which is dealing with them, in the main. An all- state program connected with the withdrawal of our forces from East Europe is needed.

And concerning these meetings and conversations with people.... How can we manage without them? There is more in each meeting than can be accommodated in a single report. Life cannot be fit into a report....

[Orlov] You have mentioned people's morale and civic feelings. There is a particular atmosphere here, in the groups of forces, most likely. We are leaving, quitting East Europe. Like retreating, seemingly. This could be psychologically distressing.

[Lushev] What is distressing, I believe, is not that we are leaving. We ultimately did not intend to remain here forever. Times change, the world changes. But, despite all these changes, our Army has no reason to wear sackcloth and ashes. It is not to blame for the fact that it is leaving. The Army has, I believe, accomplished its historic mission, accomplished it with honor. True, it is being sent off without flowers and will be met without music.... But the Soviet military abroad, and in the country itself, does not have the feeling that we are leaving as the vanquished. You yourself have most likely had a chance to see this.

[Orlov] The general's words reminded me of an episode which I happened to witness in Stendal, at a military base from which a motorized infantry unit was being withdrawn. I got into conversation with some young officers. And the talk got around to the route by which their unit would leave for home. The road first ran north of the FRG—to the ports of Rostock and Mukran [name as transliterated]. There they were to be loaded onto transport ships and ferries and from there by sea to Kaliningrad, Klaypeda, and Leningrad. From there they would make for the military district where they were to be stationed.

So, a roundabout route. It is by this route—with many transfers—that the Western Group of Forces is being withdrawn today. Although it is a stone's throw to the Soviet border by land, the troops are forced to make a detour of an extra 1,000 km. The reason for this situation is the position of Poland, whose government has imposed a ban on the transit through its territory of personnel and equipment of the Western Group of Forces. The official position of our neighbors is such: Not one Soviet military train from Germany will travel its railroad until an agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet Army units from Polish territory has been reached.

"In '45 our Army did not come west as an aggressor," one of those with whom I was speaking at the Stendal Garrison said. "The peoples of Europe have not forgotten, I believe, how many of our soldiers gave their lives for their liberation from fascism. Certain politicians have forgotten or are trying to forget this. We will find a way out of the situation, of course...."

I could not help but understand these officers. Their unit was formed at the time of the Great Patriotic War. It crossed half of Europe to Berlin. And one of its regiments, which is today also returning home, stormed the Reichstag in victorious '45. This is remembered, not forgotten....

"Yes, we cannot forget these pages of history," General of the Army Lushev said. "Just as the glory of our most valiant guards and decorated units cannot be lost either."

[Orlov] The Army is today experiencing difficult times. Its fate excites everyone, it would seem. But excites them differently. Some see it as the defender of our borders and note its devotion to its constitutional duty. Others see it as a reactionary state institution....

[Lushev] For me this is a very painful subject also. I am myself, after all, of the generation of those whose youth coincided with the war. And the Army was the personification of patriotism and a readiness to give one's life for the liberation of one's native land from the aggressors. It was with this that we went westward and believed and do not now doubt that we trod this path as liberators. In the postwar years our Army and Navy were the country's pride. This is preserved among the people now also. We recall the Chernobyl disaster. Who was there in the first, most difficult days? Or peoples' rescue following the earthquake in Armenia? Nor did the Army lose its honor in Afghanistan....

The attitude toward the Armed Forces today is, I would say, a "litmus test" by which it is possible to judge how a person perceives such concepts as duty, patriotism, and service to one's fatherland. There are very many who would like to play the "army card," but the Armed Forces will remain true to their constitutional duty. They are being attacked for this also. Defamation of the Army is, I believe, a futile undertaking. The people are opposed to this. They are already protesting it. It does not need to be explained to ordinary people to what end which forces are accusing the Army of all sins. Lenin's words, which, it would seem, the radicals have adopted, incidentally: Any class, aspiring to domination, cannot achieve this domination other than by having demoralized the army... are well known.

[Orlov] A minor detail. I set myself the goal during this time in Germany of tracking in the FRG's mass media what the attitude is toward the Soviet Army here. Biased or not? It was interesting to compare whose journalists—ours or others'—were finding more shortcomings in the Soviet Armed Forces. I can share the result: I came across no malevolent attacks on the Western Group of Forces or the USSR Armed Forces in general in any articles. Except for one. It did the rounds of many publications. Beneath an expose article on the "mass violations of human rights in the so-called Western Group of Forces" was the name of Lyamin. Yes, a compatriot of ours! A "defender of human rights lawyer from Moscow," as he introduced himself. A KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent accredited with the Western Group of Forces whom I know later told me: until this "lawyer-cum- defender" makes visits to the FRG from Russia, the German press has no reason to reproach the "Russian Army."

About the Russian Army, incidentally. I asked my interviewee the following question in this connection:

"Previously on 23 February it was customary to recall the combat path of our Armed Forces in detail. But today we are more often looking to the future. Many people see it, this future of the Army, as the existence of individual republic army formations. There has been talk of a Russian army also. Do you share this idea?

[Lushev] The past cannot be forgotten either. We are not some Joes of unknown ancestry. Unless we preserve our history, we can have no future either. As far, however, as national formations are concerned, I remember the war: When soldiers went on the attack, I venture to assure you that no one thought about the nationality of his neighbor on his right or his left. The main thing was how dependable the person next to you was. This is no new revelation, but we won the victory because all peoples of the country fought for it, for our common freedom. As a military man, as a citizen of the country, I cannot go against my conscience: pulling the Armed Forces apart into national apartments would inevitably lead to the great state of today becoming a third-rate province. So let us choose the kind of army we need. And statements about the need for the creation of a Russian army are profoundly mistaken.

[Orlov] Such confrontation in the state cannot, surely, fail to have an effect on military people also. Could this lead to something worse, to a split in the army, say?

[Lushev] I am sure this will not happen. You need to know the Army and sense its mood and concern at the situation in the country to understand that the Army is becoming increasingly cohesive. I feel an urge to say that

the Armed Forces are the healthiest part of our society, but I am afraid of unintentionally offending other people. A fitting view of the surrounding world has been returning to many people of late. And in order to understand the kind of moral pressure the Army is capable of confronting we should, perhaps, recall history once again. The very start of the Great Patriotic War. This was a surprise, whatever is written today. It was retreat. And, consequently, low spirits. There was the strongest moral pressure. There was disarray also. But was the fighting men's spirit broken? No. The national character of the Russian people and the other peoples of our country was reflected in it. We held out and became stronger.

Alas, some people continue not to understand this. Others, on the contrary, understand it only too well and are beginning to rearrange their tactics. I, as a person with a fair amount of experience, can sometimes see clearly how these tactics of the anti-Army campaign are changing. Today the middle and junior officer corps is being counterposed to the higher Army command personnel. Officers serving in the central machinery of the Defense Ministry, to those serving in the field. This is the plan. Very simple, as you can see. But there are fewer and fewer simpletons among our compatriots.

[Orlov] It would be incomprehensible if in conversation with you we failed to mention the Warsaw Pact. You, as commander of its Joint Armed Forces, did much to strengthen this alliance of friendly armies. But the Warsaw Pact's military structures are, apparently, living out their final days. What are your feelings in this connection?

[Lushev] We should not, most likely, be speaking about feelings. A decision was made at the Moscow meeting last year of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee on the transformation of this alliance from a military-political into a political-military alliance. Provision was made in this connection for a reconsideration of the missions and functions of its military structures and their reorganization. Now, however, representatives of a number of participants in the alliance are advocating the speediest disbandment of these structures. It has already been announced that there will be a special meeting of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee at foreign and defense minister level on 25 February in Budapest. It is planned to sign there a document terminating the military agreements concluded within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.

I would like to mention that in the 35-plus years of its existence the Warsaw Pact has made an appreciable contribution to strengthening peace in Europe. It is appropriate to recall that all the positive processes occurring today on the European continent are connected with it. Including the steps pertaining to the creation of a collective security system—they were initiated precisely by the Warsaw Pact.

As far as the military aspect is concerned, the cooperation of the Warsaw Pact participants in the military sphere enabled them to create armed forces furnished with the requisite arms and equipment and also to master in full modern forms and methods of conducting combat operations. Each state undoubtedly has a right to decide questions of its security independently. It may be recalled that France, which left NATO's military organization, once went this route. But to do this it had to switch just about fully to furnishing its Armed Forces with weapons of its own manufacture. There is hardly any East European state which is today capable of tackling these questions in this way.

So it seems to me that common sense remains common sense. Further relations in the military sphere among the East European countries should, I believe, switch to the sphere of bilateral relations. The experience of our cooperation accumulated in the Joint Armed Forces could come in useful here. I intend to speak, incidentally, at the special Political Consultative Committee meeting in Budapest: I shall thank my military colleagues from the armies of the East European countries for the path which we have worthily trod together....

[Orlov] I will return once again to the meetings during our tour. I spoke with the most diverse people. Including Germans, the majority of whom approve of both Germany's unification and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet forces. Gratitude to the USSR was invariably expressed in the conversations in this connection. Opinions were not divided in the discussions on another matter either: The USSR and Germany should no longer have historical contradictions. On the contrary, cooperation and common concern for the European home are essential. And this is what I heard also: uneasiness at the presence today in West Germany of American forces. East Germans expressed the concern: Will not the U.S. Army want to lay claim to deployment and development in the eastern areas?

"We are opposed to the American military presence, particularly when Soviet soldiers are leaving for home," 50-year-old worker Klaus Heege, told me. "It is time that we all started to live differently...."

In fact, it was about this that the discussion with the first deputy defense minister continued. I sought his view: What would the world be like in terms of military-political alliances? The more so in that NATO is persistently speaking about itself as a "stabilizing factor" and "guarantor of peace" in Europe....

[Lushev] I believe it appropriate to recall today that the Soviet Union was originally opposed to the creation of military blocs. And the Warsaw Pact was only signed six years after NATO was formed. This was a retaliatory measure. Article 11 of the Warsaw Pact points out, incidentally, that it will cease to have effect the day an all-European collective security treaty comes into force. The West also, it is believed, aspires to a system of collective security. It is clear from statements of the

NATO leadership and the decisions being adopted at its meetings that in the situation taking shape in Europe NATO has to explain the purpose of its continued existence. Whence the proposition concerning the guarantor of peace and stability on the European continent. Much is being said also about the need to preserve a "counterweight to the USSR's military potential" and about the danger of coming civil war in the Union. This is the overall picture. Measures aimed at upgrading the NATO military structures are also under way today under these covers....

In addition, it is no secret that the United States has always regarded Russia and the USSR as its geopolitical rival. And it is not inappropriate for us to recall this when it is a question of our country's defense capability. And the events in the Persian Gulf also show that the accomplishment of the tasks of preservation of peace by political means alone is, alas, not always possible today.

[Orlov] Petr Georgiyevich, judging from the editorial mailbag, people are excited by one further question: how to preserve what has been invested in the groups of forces?

[Lushev] We are trying to keep all material losses as few as possible. The military is no less concerned about this than the workers in our country. Everything possible will be saved: Some things have been sold for foreign currency, but much is already being taken out and returned to the country. All this is being specially monitored. There is one further point I would like to make. On how we comply with the terms of the agreement on the withdrawal of the forces we will be judged as to how serious a partner we are today. And we must pull our forces out of Europe, as befits us, in organized fashion.

[Orlov] A military base near Malvinkel [name as transliterated]. It was already half-empty when we drove up here. Equipment had gone, and the removal of accessories and supplies was being completed. But there were still people here.

A stairwell partitioned off by scaffolding. A few men were fiddling about with a radiator.

"What's the point? You are leaving, after all...," a warrant officer carrying an acetylene torch asked.

He said jokingly:

"So the Germans don't freeze. But, seriously, we will sell the building. We built it with our own hands, after all. And we should, in any case, leave in style...."

And there suddenly came to me something I had almost forgotten....

At the start of the 1980's the author of these lines was in Vietnam, visiting the locations from which not that long before American soldiers had departed. In Cam Ranh Bay, where there had previously been an American base, I noticed among the luxuriant green vegetation giant fuel tanks. Their sides resembled a sieve. My Vietnamese interpreter told me that the American military had not had time to dismantle these tanks and had before departure "done a job" on them with heavy-caliber machine guns.

Well, everyone arrives and departs in his own way....

"And the final question, Petr Georgiyevich. A great deal is being reassessed in our life currently. Much is being revised in the Army also. What, for all that, are its abiding spiritual values?"

[Lushev] It may seem pretentious, but what was for a long time beneath a bushel, as it were, is now coming to be revived in the Army, it seems to me. The main thing for a military man was, is, and always will be honor. And the purpose of his life was, is, and will be service of the Fatherland.

[Orlov] When I took my leave of the general, I congratulated him on behalf of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA readers on the impending holiday.

[Lushev] I also congratulate the newspaper's readers, today's fighting men, veterans of the Armed Forces and all who feel kinship with the Army and with our common holiday. Good feelings for all of them on this day and mental equilibrium for the future....

Baltic Republics

Baltic Officials Meet With Doguzhiyev in Moscow

LD2802103191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 28 Feb 91

[Text] Yesterday, Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, met in Moscow with V. Doguzhiyev, first deputy prime minister of the USSR. Issues related to interstate negotiations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Soviet Union were discussed. Egidijus Bickauskas, permanent representative of the Republic of Lithuania in Moscow, took part in the meeting. This is what he said to an ELTA correspondent:

[Begin recording] Our concern was to find out if the new Soviet delegation was a continuation of the former one, and if the agreements reached at previous meetings were still valid.

It was confirmed that the work already started will be continued by both sides; the agreements continue to be valid and the issues on which the expert groups were working remain unchanged.

We stressed that after the tragic events of 13 January, it is rather difficult to continue the negotiations, moreover, when military units continued to occupy our installations. There is a danger that discussions may turn into an argument over these issues, which are especially pressing for us.

It seems that V. Doguzhiyev understood our point and promised to clarify these. We hope that in this sense specific steps will be made before sitting down at the negotiation table. [end recording]

The same day E. Bickauskas and C. Stankevicius met Michel Vauzelle, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission at the French National Assembly. Possible measures for the reinforcement of Baltic statehood were discussed.

Representatives from the Latvian and Estonian Republics also took part in the meeting.

Union Referendum's Fate in Estonia Uncertain

PM2702162391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Leonid Levitskiy report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Estonian Polls Begin"]

[Text] Tallinn— Independence Day was solemnly marked in many of Estonia's cities on Sunday 24 February. A referendum poll was conducted in Sillamae, a city in the northeast. Eighty-three percent of the inhabitants took part in it, and 89 percent of participants voted in favor of Estonia being a member of the USSR.

As IZVESTIYA has already reported, Estonia is holding a referendum 3 March. The question of the restoration of state independence and autonomy will be submitted during it. In the opinion of the city soviets of Kohtla-Jarve, Narva, and Sillamae—cities densely populated by Russian speakers—the formula which has been proposed is insufficiently clear. They decided to conduct their own referendum poll in addition. The formula on the voting paper is unambiguous: "Do you want sovereign Estonia to remain in the USSR?" The inhabitants of Sillamae have replied first. They have replied convincingly.

The republic is preparing for 3 March. The People's Front, the movements and parties which support it, and state organs are urging the population to say "yes" to the restoration of autonomous statehood. The interregional soviet of deputies at all levels, the joint council of labor collectives, and the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee have called on their supporters to say "no."

The fate of the 17 March all-Union referendum is not altogether clear. The Supreme Soviet—and this has been bluntly declared—will not conduct it, but nevertheless it does not intend to prevent those citizens who wish to participate in it from doing so. But who will conduct the referendum? There is no answer.

Estonian Emigration to West Decreased in 1990

LD2602194191 Moscow TASS in English 1045 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] Tallinn February 26 TASS—Emigration from Estonia to the West decreased last year. The Estonian news agency reports, quoting the Republican Interior Ministry, that emigration sharply increased from 500 people in 1987 to 1,100 in 1988, after the issue of visas was facilitated.

The Interior Ministry explained the decrease in emigration in 1990, saying that the majority of those who wished to emigrate have already done so. It referred to Germans from Kazakhstan, the Volga region and southern Estonia. In addition, emigration to Israel was influenced by the Gulf war.

In addition to visiting their relatives abroad, people are searching for other ways to leave the country. In 1990, the number of marriages with Finnish citizens and emigration there doubled, compared with 1989.

The number of visits and business trips abroad is growing. There were 4,266 such visits in 1987. In 1990, the number reached 58,647, Estonian residents are making up to 90 per cent of visits to Finland and Sweden.

Latvia's Godmanis on Fiscal, Agrarian Policy

LD2702174891 Riga International Service in Latvian 2030 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Excerpts] Yesterday evening Latvian television organized a scheduled news conference for the chairman of the Council [of Ministers] of the Republic of Latvia, Ivars Godmanis. The leader of the government turned to

many relevant questions; however, he was mainly setting forth the government's program of activity for achieving economic independence. Here is an excerpt from the news conference:

[Begin Godmanis recording] First, then, forming an independent tax system: We have already formed that. The struggle for Latvia to work unequivocally according to this tax system and not according to the state tax system—about this we have achieved agreement in Moscow; well, to tell the truth, orally at the moment.

Second, the formation of an independent budget: this we have done for the first time since the war, war years. We have formed an independent budget, not as we had earlier, always letting the figures come from above, and then we strove to work out some way it could be either improved or changed to some extent there. Now we have our own budget and we are moving outward from our own budget.

Third, our independent price policy: We have, for food prices, clearly and lucidly declared our stance, even at the beginning of the year, and all compensations here, as far as we could, we have carried out and are carrying out. Even now you will be starting to feel prices starting to change, non-food prices, but that is an independent price policy, and it is very important how it is measured against the price reform which is imminently expected in the USSR.

The next thing left to us, that is, the next phase in our own financial system, is here proceeding in several stages—tidying up—and it has to be developed. We have our own banking system, which in the beginning may be with rubles; We will realize our own credit policy, our percentage policy, beginning, let us say, with the formation of a mortgage bank, which is very important; and even young farmers in the country who take land, to "white money" finally, among the means, to the establishment of our own particular currency at the end of this stage. There is no way we can control the state if we do not control the financial system. We are convinced of this. If we now and then change the 50 and 100 rubles and change the 10, 25, and three and one rubles—then it just goes on further. That is the most important thing that we have not done. [passage omitted] [end recording]

You heard a fragment from Ivars Godmanis' news conference. Continuing, the premier (?spoke) fairly extensively on the [word indistinct] agricultural program and prognosis for the development of the situation in rural Latvia. Ivars Godmanis continued:

[Begin Godmanis recording] We are all in the same boat. It is as if there is one boat, that is, the farmers' boat; for we well know that for the farmers, the farmers' movement, the future is unequivocal. We have no alternative. I can prove with figures that the kolkhoz system will give us nothing. No, let's not say nothing; that's dishonest. It will give us—it will give, but it will not lead us upward. In what way? How?

On the other hand, however, we who are sitting, who are standing on our land, the land of our (?fathers), we have one leg in one boat, the big producers' boat, which produces the biggest percentage of production. And now you understand, agrarian reform is coming up, the boats are separating from each other, and the situation is such that you can really start to feel the alarm, as the legs are drawn further apart and soon we (?will fall) into the water. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Riga 'Gray,' 'Indifferent' as Election Nears

LD2702151191 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0630 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] Yesterday our correspondent, Biruta Eglite, went to several poll commissions and polling stations of the rayons in Riga. In her words, the scene is multicolored.

First, there is the city as a whole. In Lithuania this day is looked forward to as a great festival, but in Riga it cannot be seen that some important event is approaching. The city is just as gray and indifferent as usual.

At the polling stations the work has piled up. A large part of Riga people still have not received ballot information, therefore they do not know where they have to vote. At a great many of the polling stations, the lists of the participants in the poll have not yet been precisely defined. People have not welcomed in their homes the assistants of the constituency commission who will precisely define the data on all the participants in the poll and will explain what is not yet clear. Lack of time cannot be given as a reason. This is only an unnecessary excuse this time. Any constituency commission has the right to have as many assistants as is necessary. A more significant reason is the counteractivity of ideological opponents, which can be felt in all the rayons of Riga. The only difference is that in some places it is more passive, as in Centra, Vidzeme, Ziemelu, and Latgale rayons. In other places it is more active, as in Zemgale and Kurzeme rayons. Leaflets with a text slandering the poll are being spread. Deputies of the Equal Rights faction are meeting the electors and are at times saying things entirely incomprehensible to a normal person, such as in free Latvia there will not be Russian schools, education will have to be dearly paid for, the non-citizens will be driven away from here altogether, and so on. The passive counteractivity is different. It appears entirely innocent. Those who lean toward Interfront and who are members of constituency commissions do not have time to spare for precisely defining the lists of the participants in the poll, the names of those who have died or gone away, those who will be included in the total number but who will not come to votes. All these names remain. The members of the commissions fulfill their duties carelessly or do not fulfill them at all, although initially they agreed to actively organize the poll.

At this moment we want to appeal to all the people of Riga not to wait for a special invitation. Find out for yourselves where your polling station is and go there. If you are not able to help in any other way, then at least

define precisely on the lists of the poll the names of your family members. It is important to do this by 3 March. The polling stations are open every day from 1500 to 2000. Do not forget that you may vote there in advance if you are not able to come on 3 March. Only active support by all of us for the poll will ensure a successful outcome.

Latvian Legislature 'Full' With Faction's Return

LD2702101791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1241 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] Riga, 26 Feb (TASS)—The plenary session of the Latvian Supreme Council is working today at full strength, reports LETA correspondent Tatyana Kovalskaya. Deputies from the Ravnopraviye [equal rights] faction have returned to the legislature's hall. There are 58 deputies in this faction. In all, there are only 201 deputies in the Latvian legislature.

During the tragic January events in the Latvian capital, the Ravnopraviye faction stated that they considered it impossible to continue their participation in the work of the Supreme Council and left it. The motives for taking such a step were named as the setting up of barricades and the decision of the legislature in this difficult situation to cooperate with various movements in the republic, including the Congress of Citizens [kongress grazhdan]—the organization with the most radical orientation. The Ravnopraviye faction called the alliance with the Congress of Citizens a legislative coup and demanded the abrogation of joint documents, proposing this as an indispensable condition for their return to the session.

Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Supreme Council, characterized the situation that arose after the departure of Ravnopraviye as a legislative crisis. An initiative from deputies of both factions with a centrist orientation helped in finding a way out of this. By their efforts, an interfactional bureau was set up incorporating five representatives from each faction. This conciliation structure should enable difficult situations to be overcome within the legislature itself. It should also be conducive to achieving a civilian accord within the republic and stability for the political process and democratization.

Interfactional Bureau Analyzes Events in Latvia

LD2702135991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 26 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Zaytsev]

[Text] Riga, 26 Feb (TASS)—After a month and a half break, deputies of the minority faction in the Supreme Council today met at the chamber of the republic's legislature. This is the first result of the activities of the interfactional bureau [mezhfraktsionnoye byuro] of the Supreme Council of Latvia, which was set up on Monday [25 February]. The bureau is composed of five deputies from the parliamentary majority and five from the opposition.

In a joint statement made known here today, the interfactional bureau gave its political evaluation of the January events in Latvia. The bureau considers that the January crisis arose and developed not only as a result of preconditions that had developed within the republic, but also as a result of those in the political life of the USSR as a whole.

As the statement notes, the Latvian committee of the citizens' congress [komitet kongressa grazhdan] did not assume a balanced stance, creating a basis for uncertainty and discontent in part of society by its program for resolving the civilian issue. The National Salvation Committee assisted in the development of the conflict by stating without any grounds that they had assumed complete authority.

The bureau notes in its statement that "during the January events, it was not so much national opposition that manifested itself as a political struggle against the idea of the republic's independence and the preservation of the federation." In the view of representatives of the factions, in the real multiparty conditions that are taking shape in Latvia, it is inadmissible for the Supreme Council to enter into a political alliance with any party at all, public-political, public, or other non-parliamentary organization. Only factions and individual deputies can pursue the policy of a party, public-political, or public organization within the Supreme Soviet.

In the view of the authors of the joint statement, which was signed by the leaders of the faction, Sergey Dimanis and Yanis Dinevich, all the contradictions that arise between the factions can only be resolved in joint parliamentary work. The creation of the bureau should compensate for the differences in the positions assumed by the sides.

One of the main tasks of the bureau is to be an analysis of the political situation, prediction of long-term policies, and the exchange of information between the factions. The bureau is to coordinate the proposals from the leadership of the factions, prioritizing the decrees and laws as they are to be worked on in commissions and examined at plenary session, and do the same with the proposals of the factions on improving the work of the Supreme Council.

Riga Committee Increases Water, Sewage Rates

914D0158A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by correspondent Vyacheslav Proskura: "Fleecing Riga-Style"]

[Text] The Riga gorispolkom [city executive committee] has introduced new rates for the use of the water and sewage systems. For the population the payment for

water remains the same as before but for the budget organizations (state institutions) it has been increased fivefold, and for cost accounting enterprises 12.5-fold! Incidentally, these rates are temporary and will be in effect until the city soviet meeting on this problem.

At the next session of the capital gorispolkom they also intend to approve a many-fold increase in rates for public transportation.

After the three- to fivefold increase in retail prices for bakery, dairy, and meat products since the beginning of the year and the 1.5 increase in the cost of electricity, this will be another new cost increase for Riga residents which will have repercussions throughout all of Latvia. It is possible that its dates will coincide with the doubling of prices for fish products, which was halted in January by an emergency decision of the Latvian Cabinet of Ministers "for at least three months" because of the mass protests by the population.

Independent sociological agencies explain the "catastrophic lack of vacationers" at the Riga seashore by the threefold increase in the cost of passes to sanitariums. In the health facilities of Jurmala there are now several times more service personnel than patients. For the workers at the health resort, which is popular throughout the Union, this situation threatens mass lay-offs of physicians, nurses, nannies, and so forth. There is even the threat of "cutting" the number of therapeutic health institutions themselves.

The local press and other means of propaganda, as before, are reproaching the center for "unbearable colonial extortion," which they also use to explain the growing avalanche of higher prices. Yet Latvian Finance Minister E. Silins stated a couple of days ago: The sum of the republic's transfers into the Union budget are less than they were before by a factor of 2.3.

The question follows logically: Are "Moscow's excessive appetites" to blame for everything? Perhaps the local commentators are right when they point out that during the past year administrative expenditures at all levels of the power structures increased 13-fold last year.

Landsbergis Addesses Media About Poll Results

PM2702162291 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 13 Feb 91 p 2

[M. Grazkalnis report: "90-10 in Favor of Independence—Notes From the News Conference"]

[Text] Such a result is unheard of in sporting history. No doubt I am not mistaken in saying that such a hand is rarely dealt in politics, either. Therefore, the jubilant and victorious mood which reigned on Monday at the legislature's plenary session where the final poll results were announced came as no surprise.

At the news conference which followed, I asked Lithuanian Supreme Soviet Chairman V. Landsbergis: "Can Gorbachev's position be expected to change or, at any rate, soften as a result of this resounding 'yes' to Lithuanian independence?

"I think," he said, smiling, "this question would be better asked elsewhere."

Unfortunately, I will probably never have such an opportunity. Likewise, it is unfortunate that Gorbachev missed the speeches at this evening's press conference by foreign observers from Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and many other countries, who had been invited to oversee the organization of the poll.

They visited hundreds of electoral precincts in various regions of Lithuania—in cities and villages, in regions with varying demographic structures—and talked with hundreds of people. They were meticulous in their supervision of the ballot procedure itself, the vote counting, and the transfer of information to the center.

The observers made a united statement to the journalists: "We confirm that the organization of the plebiscite was absolutely fair, and that it conformed with the demands of democracy. We expected to see many armed people, but what we saw was a dignified nation convinced that it is striving for a legitimate and just aim. This was indeed a free expression of the people's will, and we wish Lithuania a good journey into a free Europe."

"Is it possible that Lithuania will participate in the 17 March referendum?" the journalists asked.

"If USSR citizens residing in Lithuania want us to help them express their view on their country's future, then we will seek advice on our official position," V. Landsbergis replied. "With regard to Gorbachev's actual decree, I can only repeat that it is not binding in Lithuania."

[Unidentified questioner] "Given the plebiscite results, is it possible to speak of preparing a definite strategy of negotiation with Moscow?"

"Strategy does not change with every passing day and it is not so easily revised," V. Landsbergis said. "Our strategy is already sufficiently clear: To tackle those specific issues of vital importance that are capable of being settled. To maintain real dialogue, and to seek a certain degree—and perhaps more—of mutual understanding, and an acknowledgment of the genuine juridical problem. And then a solution.

"Our aim is a sovereign and independent Lithuania. We understand that in present conditions it is not so readily obtainable, but we are firmly convinced that we will succeed," V. Landsbergis stressed.

Lithuanian Council Approves New Cabinet Ministers

LD2602231191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 1550 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Text] A plenary sitting of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania started at 1000 today. The first item on the agenda was a debate on one of the main laws, a draft law on privitization. Vice premier Vytautas Pakalniskis reported.

After an interval, the deputies listened to a report by Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius on changes in some laws in connection with the structural changes in the government.

The session approved the following new members of the Cabinet of Ministers: Aleksandras Abisala, minister without portfolio for negotiations with neighboring republics and problems of information; Vilius Zidonis, minister of material resources; Elvira Janina Kunceviciene, minister of finance; Rimvydas Survila, minister of agriculture.

Supreme Council Sitting Hails Plebiscite Result

PM2702164191 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 13 Feb 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "At the Republic Supreme Council Session"]

[Text] On 11 February, after that remarkable event in Lithuania's history—the nationwide poll—deputies gathered in a business-like mood for a plenary sitting. The sitting was opened by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council.

At the morning sitting the deputies listened to an announcement by Bronislovas Kuzmickas, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, on the results of his trip to West Europe and North America. After summarizing the ideas aired at meetings with politicians from Western states, Bronislovas Kuzmickas noted that we are closer than ever to the possibility of Lithuania's recognition and the restoration of diplomatic relations with Western countries. Then, after discussion of the work agenda for this week, there was a recess. During the recess there were meetings of Supreme Council deputies, faction group sittings, and a sitting of the Economics Commission, as well as a joint meeting of faction representatives.

The evening session began at 1700 hours. It was attended by members of the Cabinet of Ministers, department leaders, local government representatives, and observers from foreign countries: Sweden, Belgium, Iceland, Poland, Armenia, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Rumania, a representative from the U.S. Consulate in Leningrad, a representative from the CSFR Embassy, and representatives of the Helsinki Group from Poland, the Armenian National Movement, the Russian Democratic Union, the Latvian Foreign Ministry, the Estonian Foreign Ministry, the Russian Foreign Ministry, and the Polish Society for Fellowship With Poles Abroad.

Then Juozas Bulavas, chairman of the Republic Electoral Commission, announced the results of the nationwide poll in the Lithuanian Republic. Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis made a statement entitled "The Lithuanian Plebiscite." Lithuania has expressed its view, he noted. But once again it will probably be obscured by lies and falsifications, and efforts will be undertaken to distort or hush it up. Whatever happens, nobody will be able to crush the Lithuanian nation's claim to independence. The people have done the greatest and most important thing possible for their homeland and their children, Vytautas Landsbergis concluded.

Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council, submitted a draft of the Lithuanian Republic Constitutional Law on the Lithuanian State. On the deputies' initiative this document was adopted by a roll-call vote.

Deputy Romas Gudaytis outlined a draft of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council Declaration on the International Rights of an Independent Lithuanian Republic. In the declaration adopted the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council appeals to all states, their parliaments, and governments to take due account of the results of the 9 February 1991 plebiscite, and asks for support in Lithuania's struggle for liberty and democracy.

Then guests representing the foreign delegations spoke.

The closing speech was made by Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis. On behalf of the Supreme Council he thanked all those in Lithuania who had done so much to ensure a trouble-free and organized plebiscite. On behalf of the government the chairman thanked the honorable foreign guests whose involvement in and supervision of the plebiscite had added a particularly important juridical dimension, and had also been a sign of friendship and international solidarity.

RSFSR

Legislators Explain Statement on Yeltsin

LD2702224791 Moscow TASS in English 2203 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—Errors in the handling of economic and legal issues by the Russian Federation parliament and a striving to clearly express their position and dissociate themselves from extreme forces in the republican parliament itself—were the principal motives of the statement issued by six out of eight leaders of the Russian parliament.

The statement, which, in particular, criticised parliament President Boris Yeltsin, was read out on February 21 and gave rise to widespread and non-uniform reactions in the Republic.

During their appearance on Soviet television today, Vladimir Isakov, chairman of the Council of the Republic, and Ramazan Abdulatipov, chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Russian Federation parliament, explained reasons that prompted them to sign the document.

According to the authors' concept, the statement was to avert a final split of society and help determine whether the Russian parliament should "proceed along the road of confrontation with the centre or tackle the entire package of urgent socio-economic problems."

Abdulatipov noted the fact that the statement bears the signatures of supporters of various political platforms. In this connection he refuted assertions that appeared in some media that the statement was prompted by the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party. He said the document was aimed at straightening matters out when the parliament over a period of many months has not been contributing to rectifying the state of affairs in the Republic.

Isakov, for his part, emphasised that none of the arguments set out in the political statement was disproved by opponents who unfoundedly accused the authors of the document of betrayal.

KGB Findings on Bugging Affair Questioned

PM2702123491 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Feb 91 p 1

[Comment "From the Editorial Office" under the general heading "In the USSR KGB"]

[Text] As always, the USSR KGB was the first to obtain the "hot" news, once again confirming the high reputation of its counterespionage service. Although it is usual for us to refer to the KGB as "competent bodies," it seemed to us that on this occasion it overstepped the bounds of its competence somewhat. A special deputies' commission is looking into the incident, and it would be logical to await its conclusions or evaluations. Therefore, we turned for information to A. Adrov, commission chairman and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy:

"The commission's findings are not yet ready. We might be able to give a preliminary report on Wednesday or Thursday, and if we decide not to carry out further experiments with the apparatus installed, then the commission's final conclusion will be submitted on Friday. It will probably not tally entirely with the conclusions which have been circulated by the KGB."

RSFSR Legislature Bugging Scandal Viewed

PM2702182191 Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 7, 19-25 Feb 91 pp 4-7

[Marina Shakina report: "'Presnyagate'"]

[Excerpts] Lovers of sensational revelations and historical analogies rejoice: this country has a Watergate of its own at long last! So many countries, so many Watergates. In the United States Richard Nixon had to resign after it was found out that his men had bugged the offices of the president's political rivals. The recent scandal in Hungary, dubbed Dunagate, when the telephone conversations of the opposition parties were listened to, touched off a storm of indignation and protests, dealing a hard blow on the then ruling Hungarian Socialist Party [HSP] and eventually resulting in the HSP's defeat in the elections. And what about the Soviet Union?

The alarm was sounded by the heads of the Security Department under the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation. Said deputy department head Yuri Goryakin: There were uncontrolled leaks of information about what was going on at the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the Russian Federation already in the early discussion stages. It was decided to check the rooms occupied by the KGB and the "government communications" switchboard. The trail led to Rooms 4-120 and 4-120a, which stayed closed practically all the time. Goryakin says the rooms belonged to the KGB. Deputy Nemtsov informed the Supreme Soviet about the two mysterious rooms at the February 7 evening sitting of the Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

"This Is a Regular Practice..."

NEW TIMES correspondent, Konstantin Isakov was apprehended by the police when he photographed the corridor where the two mysterious rooms are located. The correspondent was accused of "having broken the internal regulations of the House of Soviets." After a two-hour talk with several police officers responsible for the Russian Parliament's security and one secret service man who did not introduce himself, Isakov was instructed to have more respect for the building which houses the parliament of Russia. After that, the officers suggested that Isakov expose his film. The correspondent refused to do so, saying that he could not return to the editorial office with bringing nothing but rolls of exposed film. This argument was weighty enough and the journalist was released.

The correspondent also talked to a highly-placed official of the Council of Ministers of Russia who requested that his name not be identified.

"The telephones of all security-sensitive institutions, including the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation," are tapped," he said. "In particular all conversations with foreigners are tapped for reasons of security. Public places in such institutions are also bugged. This is a regular practice. If

the rooms with special equipment have been broken into, this means that the KGB, whose business is to protect state interests, is paralized, which is too bad." [passage omitted]

The Supreme Soviet of the USSR has recently adopted new criminal legislation which sanctions phone tapping as a means of combatting crime, without restricting the opportunities offered to the investigation, distinct from the laws of civilized countries. In this country, the law allows tapping of the phones of any citizens who may be implicated in a crime, not only the victim of or the suspect in the crime under investigation. Phone tapping in this country does not require either the knowledge and consent of the person whose conversations are listened to or a court warrant. Phone tapping can continue for six months without an interruption. The investigation does not need to inform the suspect about the tapping or to apologize for it if no results have been obtained and the suspicion has proved false. One day your phone may be tapped and you will not know anything about that. That is why reasonable people continue to avoid discussing anything important over the phone.

However, even the ultra-liberal use of phone tapping sanctioned by the new criminal law is no excuse for the "preventive" bugging of parliaments, flats of opposition leaders, phones of opposition parties, public figures and organizations, because political activity is no crime.

The only thing that may attract the public's attention to the scandal is the mention of Boris Yeltsin's name. The connection was stressed in all the papers: the rooms with the electronic equipment were situated just above Yeltsin's office and rumour has it that bugs have been detected in Yeltsin's flat too.

These suspicions fit ideally in the general picture of the maveric Yeltsin's relations with the Kremlin. After a series of odd coincidences, which are officially dubbed "accidents" and popularly regarded as attempts on his life, the phone tapping scandal will only boost Yeltsin's popularity.

Four years before World War One began, British counterintelligence revealed a German spy network...And let it live, watching it until the time came to destroy it. The network was eliminated during the very first days of the war and thus Germany lost all its sources of information at once. In Hungary, too, the details of Dunagate were made public on the very eve of the election campaign. The moment of revelation had been selected with utmost care.

Many observers belive the current scandal was carefully timed as well. Why should the Security Department have suddenly made so much fuss about two locked rooms on the fourth floor it had paid no attention to before? One analyst who is well-acquainted with the methods used by the secret services thinks that "the restrained official statement denying any KGB involvement in the affair demonstrates that this scandal is no serious trouble for that department. Once again the public was given a dummy scandal."

There are signs that "a war of scandals" is going to complement the war of laws. Among the recent scandals two are connected with the nouveauriche and MP, Artyom Tarasov, who accused Gorbachev of planning to sell the Kurile islands to Japan and was accused himself of illegal business transactions. Then the KGB cracked down on the planned illegal currency deals sanctions by Filshin, Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. Some political scientists believe that "Presnyagate" is the Russian Republic's retaliation for the Filshin affair.

There have been different speculations about "Presnyagate." Some people believe that the KGB's work could no possibly be so unsophisticated. If the KGB had really listened to conversations in Russian Parliament, this would never have been revealed. State-of- the-art electronic equipment makes it possible for professionals to perform any kind of spying without fear of being caught. Experts believe that phone tapping can be proved only if actual recordings are there. But then again, what if the KGB saves its professionalism and costly equipment for external foes, and does not take pains when it comes to monitoring domestic ones?

Most probably, the investigation which the Supreme Soviet started after some hesitation, will not produce any concrete results. No one seems to be interested in it. The sides are exchaning political blows, like water polo players do under water when the referee cannot see. As for the public, it has to be satisfied with watching what goes on on the surface.

RSFSR Resolution on Referendum Ballot Revoked

PM2802112391 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

["Resolution of the RSFSR Central Commission for Holding USSR and RSFSR Referenda 'On Revoking the Form of the Ballot in the RSFSR Referendum'"]

[Text] In accordance with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium Resolution No. 680-1 of 21 February 1991, the RSFSR Central Commission for Holding USSR and RSFSR Referenda resolves that:

The resolution of 15 February 1991 of the RSFSR Central Commission for Holding the USSR and RSFSR Referenda "On the Format of Ballots in the RSFSR Referendum" is to be revoked in connection with the approval of the pattern of the ballot on the question: "Do you deem it necessary to preserve the RSFSR as a unified federative multinational state within a renewed Union."

[Signed] V. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR Central Commission for Holding USSR and RSFSR Referenda

V. Prozorov, secretary of the RSFSR Central Commission for Holding USSR and RSFSR Referenda
26 February 1991

Russian Legislature Reviews TV, Radio, Militia

LD2702180991 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT 27 Feb 91

[By TASS legislative correspondents]

[Text] Moscow February 27 TASS—As a result of a keen discussion the Russian parliamentarians today resolved to instruct the republican government "to ensure the transfer of the second all- union television channel to the authority of the Russian Federation".

Deputies regard the founding of Russian news organisations as "a real step to secure the sovereignity of the republic". Today they discussed primarily the material and technical resources of Russian television and radio. The resolution emphasises the need to transfer part of the property of the all-union state television and radio broadcasting company to Russia's possession and to use it free of charge.

Russia's bill on militia, submitted to the parliament today, deals with basic problems of strenghtening law and order. The sponsors of the bill believe that the existing model of militia does not ensure a reliable protection of the public order or an effective fight against crime.

During the presentation of the bill, speakers emphasised "that militia agencies now have to perform duties that they should not perform, such as the issue of passports and the coordination of work to eliminate child neglect. Relieving militia of eight such functions would make it possible to release about 54,000 militiamen for public order maintenance work" proper.

The bill proclaims the founding of a criminal militia service and militia to maintain public order in Russia. Legality, humanism, respect for human rights, and openness have been defined as the main principles for militia activities.

Deputies began to discuss the bill.

Legislature Criticizes 1990 Economic Results

914A0462A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Decree of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the report of the chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers "Results of the Economic and Social Development of the RSFSR in 1990, the Functioning of the Republic Economy, the RSFSR Budget and Price Policy in the Current Year"—SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA headline]

[Text] Having received and discussed the report of Comrade I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, "Results of the Economic and Social Development of the RSFSR in 1990, the Functioning of the Republic Economy, the RSFSR Budget, and Price Policy in the Current Year," the RSFSR Supreme Soviet observes that the foundations of state sovereignty and the economic independence of the republic were laid in the past year. In accordance with the decisions of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, the legal conditions of the development of a multiple structure in the economy were formed.

At the same time the crisis in the RSFSR economy, as part of the crisis-afflicted economy of the USSR, has continued to deepen. The process of the disruption of business ties and the disintegration of the consumer market has intensified. The rate of inflation has increased, and the monetary system is close to collapse. There has been a decline in the amount of industrial and agricultural production and capital construction, the work of transport and communications and other sectors of the economy has deteriorated, national revenue has fallen and the population's living standard has declined.

Union structures of power and administration have by their actions in the sphere of pricing, financing, structural policy, and foreign economic relations intensified the crisis phenomena.

Under these conditions, the RSFSR Council of Ministers, the councils of ministers of the republics which are a part of the RSFSR, and the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies have failed to secure the pursuit of an efficient economic and social policy determined by legislative instruments and other decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers has not, within the limits of the opportunities available to it, adopted sufficient measures to increase the production of consumer goods, ensure the efficiency of the harvesting and processing of farm produce and improve food supplies to the population. The actions of the RSFSR Council of Ministers pertaining to the formation and support for business ties have proven ineffective. Some of its decisions have been adopted belatedly, and due supervision of compliance therewith has not been established. Fulfillment of the decisions of the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on questions of agrarian reform is not being secured quickly enough, and a number of regions are resisting citizens' legitimate attempts to obtain plots of land for the creation of peasant (tenant) farms, horticulture, and truck gardening. The decision of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies pertaining to the adjustment of the program of stabilization of the economy and transition to market relations in the RSFSR has not been fulfilled within the specified timeframe.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions have secured an insufficient legislative base for the efficient activity of the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet resolves:

1. To note that the RSFSR Council of Ministers has made incomplete use of the powers accorded it for stabilization of the economy of the RSFSR and transition to market relations.

2. That the RSFSR Council of Ministers will submit to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet:

not later than 15 March 1991 a program of measures pertaining to the transfer of the RSFSR economy to market relations;

by 15 April 1991, proposals pertaining to the creation of a renewed structure of management of the RSFSR economy adequate to the new functions and powers of the republic in the economic sphere and the tasks of the formation and development of market relations.

3. That the RSFSR Council of Ministers will, in accordance with the RSFSR "Social Development of the Countryside" Act, provide for the allocation of 15 percent of republic national revenue for development of the social sphere of the countryside and the infrastructure.

Present to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet prior to 1 April 1991 a report on the progress in fulfilling decisions of the Second (Special) Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies on agrarian issues and special food programs.

4. That in April 1991, the RSFSR Council of Ministers will present to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet a report on the progress in fulfilling programs to broaden the production of consumer goods and develop textile and light industry, power engineering, transport, and the construction complex.

5. In accordance with Article 8 of the RSFSR "Land Reform" Act, the RSFSR Council of Ministers will, prior to 1 March 1991, have drawn up regulations governing the procedure for granting to citizens plots of land for the construction of individual apartment houses and also for horticulture, truck gardening, and animal husbandry.

To accept the RSFSR Council of Ministers proposal concerning an increase in the size of the plots of land for this purpose to 0.15 of a hectare. That the actual size of the plots will be determined by the local soviets of people's deputies with regard for regional possibilities.

That the RSFSR State Committee for Land Reform and the local soviets of people's deputies will, prior to 15 April 1991, have provided for the allocation to citizens of the republic who so desire plots for horticulture, truck gardening, and animal husbandry. To receive prior to 1 May 1991 in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium reports from the RSFSR State Committee for Land Reform and the local soviets of people's deputies on the fulfillment of this commission.

6. That the RSFSR Council of Ministers will, prior to 15 April 1991, have reported to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the progress in fulfilling the commission of the Second (Special) Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies concerning an analysis of the economic efficiency of joint ventures, cooperatives, and other establishments created under the auspices of organs of state administration and public organizations for the exercise of foreign economic activity.

That the RSFSR Procuracy will ensure strict compliance on republic territory with the laws of the RSFSR.

7. That the RSFSR Council of Ministers will, in the formulation and realization of policy and specific measures in the sphere of pricing, be guided strictly by the decisions of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet which provide for a revision of prices in close connection with other measures pertaining to support for the transition to a full-fledged market and protection of the population's social interests.

8. That commissions of the chambers and committees of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet will accelerate discussion of the most important bills pertaining to the realization of the economic reform submitted by the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

RSFSR Referenda Chairman Interviewed

91UN0964A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR Central Union and Russian Referenda Commission, by TASS correspondent T. Zamyatina; place and date not given: "A Single Question Is Asked"]

[Text] The intensity of the political passions in connection with the coming nationwide poll on 17 March invests its organizers with particular responsibility.

TASS correspondent T. Zamyatina interviews V.I. Kazakov, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Central Union and Russian Referenda Commission, on the preparatory stage of this work.

[Zamyatina] Vasiliy Ivanovich, what work has been done since the adoption by the Union and Russian parliaments of the decisions on the holding of referenda? What recommendations have been formulated?

[Kazakov] The Central Commission has specified the number of districts for holding the referendum on the territory of the RSFSR; there are 88 of them. Some 100,000 polling stations have to be set up. Estimated expenditure to this end of the order of 103 million rubles [R], R53 million of which will be made available by the Union, the remainder being allocated from the RSFSR budget, has been approved. This is the monetary aspect.

Now, regarding paper requirements. Paper will be allocated from the center for the organization of the Union

poll. The "Soyuzblankizdat" is embarking on preparation of print runs of the requisite documentation.

The use of forms of the Union sample has been authorized for the Russian referendum—this applies to the lists of the participants in the poll and the checkoffs of those who have voted. But the ballots and forms of the precinct commissions of the RSFSR referendum will be printed locally, on the paper available to the local soviets, with its subsequent replacement by the republic government.

I would specify that both referenda—Union and Russian—will be held in identical precincts with the use of different ballots differing both in terms of the substance of the questions and the color of the paper.

[Zamyatina] Articles are appearing in the press which express a priori doubt as to the future tallying of the vote. It is known that the print run of ballot papers is to correspond to the number of participants in the poll plus five percent of reserve forms. This "reserve" and also the unused ballots afford grounds for unpleasant conjecture....

[Kazakov] A reserve of ballots is necessary. Supplementary lists of participants in the undertaking, who for objective reasons were not included on them ahead of time, will be compiled in the precincts, as a rule.

In addition, there were instances of fires and other unforeseen situations in the practice of the elections of people's deputies. Insurance here is essential.

As far as possible distortions of the results of the polls are concerned, current legislation provides for criminal or administrative proceedings to be instituted against the guilty parties.

[Zamyatina] Two questions were formulated for the RSFSR referendum originally. As far as I know, the session of the Russian Parliament removed one question?

[Kazakov] The point is that, on account of the variant readings in the telegrams of people's deputies, the Supreme Soviet Presidium did not confirm their signatures beneath the wording of the first question—concerning preservation of the RSFSR as a single federal multinational state within a renewed Union. In addition, people's deputies from the autonomous republics and okrugs were opposed to this question.

For this reason just one question is being put to the Russian referendum: "Do you consider necessary the introduction of the office of president of the RSFSR elected by public ballot?"

[Zamyatina] The RSFSR Referendum Act differs appreciably from the corresponding Union law. The signatures of just one-third of the republic's corps of deputies are sufficient for a poll of Russia's citizens. What do you think, is a situation in which we will be voting continuously possible?

[Kazakov] If it is considered that several factions took official shape at the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, it is easy to imagine that the agrarians and the industrialists and the communist bloc could be the sponsors of a poll of the citizens.

In addition to the great budget outlays, this situation is fraught with the danger of a "war" of referenda beginning in the wake of the "war" of laws.

In my view, following the tallying of the result of the poll of citizens of 17 March it is essential to return the RSFSR Referendum Act to the Russian Congress of People's Deputies for further work.

Politburo Views Tasks in Multiparty System

PM2602133991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "At the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo"]

[Excerpts] At a routine sitting the Politburo examined the question of the Barnaul City party organization's participation in the activity of workers' control committees. [passage omitted]

Having discussed the question of the tasks of Russia's communists in the conditions of shaping a multiparty system, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee Politburo adopted a relevant resolution.

It notes that the shaping of a multiparty system is taking place in circumstances of exacerbating conflict. An openly anticommunist opposition has formed, whose aim is to squeeze the CPSU out of the political arena and reject the socialist choice, and which is ready to go as far as the collapse of the Union state for the sake of establishing a new totalitarian regime camouflaged beneath "democratic" slogans.

A decisive rebuff must be given to anticommunist, extremist forces pushing the country onto the road of restoring capitalism and toward anarchy and civil confrontation. People must know the truth about the anti-people plans of the leaders of these forces and the fatal consequences of the policy they are forcibly introducing.

The RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Politburo called on party committees to more persistently conduct their work toward consolidating party ranks, and to establish cooperation with all the progressive forces of society in order to achieve nationwide accord and to preserve and renew Soviet Socialist Russia as part of the USSR. The duty of communists is to intensify party influence in the workers' movement and the trade union and youth organizations, giving them help and supporting all their constructive initiatives aimed at defending the interests of the working people, stabilizing the situation in the country, and extricating society from the crisis.

The switch of the center of political struggle to the soviets of people's deputies obliges party committees to give communist deputies constant aid and to assist the rallying of progressive forces in the soviets.

It is well known that the exacerbation of the political struggle in the country is coupled with the stepping up of manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, and separatism. Communists are called upon to achieve, through specific actions, equal conditions for the development of the peoples of Russia and of all national groups irrespective of where they live. Party committees are instructed to struggle more actively to strengthen the unity of the peoples of the Russian Federation, while boosting the RSFSR's links with other republics.

The results of the reports and elections campaign in RSFSR party organizations and other questions were discussed at the Politburo sitting.

CP Spokesman Warns on Broadcasting 'Pressure'

PM2702105791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6

["Rejoinder" by V. Markov, RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee Press Center staffer: "Freedom From What?"]

[Text] It is hardly necessary to reiterate the idea behind the USSR President's decree on transforming the former USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting. One important consequence is the fact that republic television and radio committees have gained autonomy.

Whereas the provisions of the decree are adequate for small republics, for such a vast republic as Russia the task of decentralizing television and radio is only just beginning to reveal its complexity. Can the creative, organizational, and technical work of many dozens of republic, kray, and oblast television and radio committees be made subordinate to strict management from a single central authority? Should they be "freed" from subordination to autonomous (and formerly autonomous) republic Supreme Soviets, oblast soviets, and kray soviets? Such a possibility exists in theory, and people want to implement it in Russia, despite its immense diversity of conditions (socioeconomic, ethnic, demographic, and so forth) and even its time zones. For instance, there is a desire to take into republic ownership all TV communications from Moscow to Russia's oblast centers. It seems that the All-Union Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VTRK) wants to monopolize all questions of the financing of local TV studios.

If this scheme is implemented, all the previous references to "domination by the center," administrative disregard of local conditions, and "pressure" on the creative initiative of TV and radio journalists will look in retrospect like grumbles when times were good. The "freedom" imposed by local soviets will inevitably turn into administrative dictatorship from a new center. This will affect not only technology and finances but also news policy, in which one-sidedness, as has already been demonstrated by the Russian Ministry of the Press and the Mass Media, could become the rule rather than the exception.

Krasnoyarsk Miners Appeal to Supreme Soviets

LD2702153191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] A miners' rally was held at the Berezovskiy-1 open cast mine in Krasnoyarsk kray today. An appeal to the USSR and Russian Supreme Soviets was adopted. In particular, support was voiced for the economic demands of the Donbass miners and for Russian sovereignty. The miners are demanding that urgent measures to be taken to privatize the trade sector, the light industry, public catering enterprises, and other industries. The miners believe it necessary to ensure the implementation of the law on the press and other mass media.

Supply Association Calls for Boycott of Ukraine

PM2202154991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by Ali Kazikhanov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "War Between Associations?"]

[Text] Nalchik—The council of the "Yedinstvo" territorial material and technical supply organs association, which met in Nalchik, made a proposal to three related organizations operating in Russia, to boycott the Ukraine.

"Yedinstvo" incorporates the material and technical supply main territorial administration organizations of republics, krays, and oblasts in the Northern Caucasus and the Nonchernozem Zone.

"What is happening today cannot be called a transition to market relations," "Yedinstvo" Vice President V. Kalashnikov told me. "It is painful to see the economic ties that had been formed over decades being destroyed. Moving away from the 'care' of the center, we are trying to preserve horizontal ties.

"However, contrary to the interrepublic agreement, Ukrainian enterprises have recently started refusing to conclude agreements for the supply of produce to Russia, using Ukrainian Council of Ministers directives as a pretext. Therefore we are forced to warn the USSR, Russian, and Ukrainian Governments that if the state of affairs does not change, we will take retaliatory measures against the neighboring republic."

"Yedinstvo's" message was supported by their colleagues from the following three Russian associations: "Povolzhye," "Sodruzhestvo," and "Ural-Sib."

Chelyabinsk Marchers Protest Nuclear Power Plant

LD2402225191 Moscow TASS in English 2203 GMT 24 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk February 25 TASS—Inhabitants of Chelyabinsk in the south Urals staged a march here on Sunday to protest the building of a nuclear power plant in the area.

The march, organized by local Green Association activists, was followed by public hearings on the advisability of building a nuclear power plant near the Mayak chemical plant, the first Soviet nuclear industrial installation.

Most speakers noted with alarm that the area has become a hazardous, and even unique storage facility of radioactive elements, without parallel in the world.

Technical reservoirs and lakes, whose level is constantly rising, contain more than 400 million cubic meters of liquid contaminated with radionuclides.

Specialists have suggested building a nuclear power plant here in order to evaporise masses of water and stabilise the level in reservoirs and lakes. Deputies to the regional council welcomed the proposal.

However, the Green Association radically opposed this approach to the solution of an acute ecological problem. It was supported by other movements and masses of inhabitants. They adopted an address to Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev on this score. The address says that 300,000 people have already signed the demand to ban the building of a nuclear power plant in the area and revoke the decision by the regional council about the possible resumption of construction works.

Chutkot Region Declares Greater Autonomy

PM2602105591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[SIBINFORM report: "Chukchi Leave Magadan Oblast"]

[Text] The Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug will henceforth be officially called the Chukotsk Soviet Autonomous Republic, and will withdraw from Magadan Oblast. A definitive decision on this was adopted at the February session of the Chukotka Soviet of People's deputies, SIBINFORM reports.

RSFSR Committee Head on Russian Foreign Policy

PM2802093991 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No. 6, 10 Feb 91 p 12

[Interview with Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, by correspondent Nataliya Izyumova; place, date not given: "Foreign Policy: The Russian Dimension"]

[Text] [Izyumova] Do relations with the republics of the USSR come within your committee's sphere of activity?

[Lukin] Yes. Interrepublic relations today are, on the one hand, part of our internal affairs and, on the other, part of international affairs. In connection with the events in Lithuania and Latvia the situation has been sharply complicated. Two lines have become apparent here. First, tough strong-arm pressure from the center, resulting in the exacerbation of all conflicts. The second path is the establishment of good-neighborly relations among the republics themselves. These horizontal ties are based on recognition of mutual sovereignty and common economic space, on the principle of observance of citizens' rights in accordance with international standards.

The Baltic events merely acted as a catalyst in the process of arranging ties. The chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet recently concluded treaties with Latvia and Estonia, in which all these principles are observed.

[Izyumova] How do you see Russia's foreign policy?

[Lukin] If we reach agreement with the majority of republics to create some structure to coordinate our foreign policy, that is one development option. If we do not succeed, that is another. In the first case—and I favor this option—Russia's foreign policy must consist of two main aspects: What we delegate to the center and what we do ourselves. The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] must undoubtedly be loyal to the international treaties concluded by the Union or, at any rate, to the main ones and those signed recently. I advocate delegating the problem of security to the Union, but Russia must participate in its realization. Russia must have its own representative in the Soviet delegation to a number of international organizations—the United Nations, for example. But the republic must participate independently in many international matters. Our foreign policy strategy is the rejection of a global strategy and its replacement by a rational-regional strategy. The second aim is to bring foreign policy closer to people's requirements—in contacts, training, exchanges.

[Izyumova] What are Russia's main foreign policy interests in the regional aspect?

[Lukin] In my view, they lie in two spheres. First, there is participation in building the new "European home," although our part of this home is doomed to be uncomfortable and neglected for a long time to come. The main area for Russia in Europe is, of course, Germany. It has now become closer to us in both the literal and the figurative sense. Here there are great prospects and many problems, as, for example, the question of the development of Kaliningrad Oblast, on which we are now working.

Another sphere of our activity is the Asia and Pacific region. China, Japan, America, all these world giants, are our immediate neighbors. Russia's aim here is to ensure

a reliable border for itself and the greatest possible business ties. The role of the Russian Foreign Ministry must be expressed in resolving specific questions—facilitating contacts among people, reciprocal visits, etc. We believe that our Foreign Ministry must also participate in Pacific regional organizations and in the holding of talks on unresolved territorial problems with China and Japan.

[Izyumova] As we know, the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies voted to appeal to the President to refrain from permitting USSR participation in the military conflict in the Persian Gulf. What is your stand on this question?

[Lukin] I was one of 161 RSFSR deputies to vote against the said appeal. No, I certainly do not advocate moving our tanks into the Persian Gulf. But this does not mean that we must not participate at all. The Poles have sent two auxiliary vessels there, and the Czechs an antichemical team. They have acted as responsible members of the community, operating in accordance with their resources and potential. Our appeal sends a bad signal to the high-handed dictator.

In my view, the government ought to send volunteers there—physicians and nurses, for example. In this way we would solve the problem of military intervention and, at the same time, participate with the whole world community in curbing the aggressor. As much as two months ago our committee advocated freezing the friendship treaty with Iraq and ending all ties with Iraq.

[Izyumova] What is Russia's position on the question of its citizens' immigration and emigration?

[Lukin] We would like to grant our citizens the maximum freedom. Of course, this will lead to a considerable "brain drain," but there is no alternative. I believe that we must take the path of the Chinese and give people the opportunity to work abroad and transfer money to here. We must create technopolises, so that skilled specialists can work six months abroad and six months here.

[Izyumova] It is known that depoliticization in the USSR Foreign Ministry is at a standstill, while the multiparty system is developing in the country. What is your approach to this problem?

[Lukin] The leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry has declared that all party matters are the private affair of people out of work time. The only criterion must be professionalism and honest serving of state interests. As for our committee, there are representatives of many parties on it.

[Izyumova] Russia intends to have its own representatives in union embassies and missions abroad. How realistic is this?

[Lukin] Representatives of the new wave, competent diplomats, are now working in many countries. At the same time the tendency to move representatives of the rocking party ship to the Foreign Ministry has not vanished into the past. Although this is not now being done so publicly and brazenly as before. Many embassies still have fewer professional diplomats than people from "other entrances," and the ratio tends toward 30:70 against the diplomats. This situation must be changed radically, and space must be freed, including space for representatives of the republics.

Media Committee Discusses New Radio, TV Company

LD2202165391 Moscow Radio Rossti Network in Russian 1300 GMT 19 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent Andrey Zuyev from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet]

[Text] In the Committee for Mass Media, the deputies discussed the consequences of the transformation of Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] into an All-Union State Radio and Television Broadcasting Company. To save time, I will call it VGTK.

The Ministry of Information and Press of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] has given its findings on the draft of this statute, where it says that a company is not a body of state administration, and for that reason cannot function with the rights of a central body of state administration of the USSR. The VGTK is an economic organization. Nevertheless, the statute makes a juridically unsound and essentially fruitless attempt to link the unlinkable: the status of a central body of state administration with the status of enterprise. For that reason this statute is woven through with contradictions between mutually exclusive points. The first unbiased legal expert examination unambiguously leads to the conclusion that it does no honor to Soviet legal theory or practice.

The statute defining the aims, tasks, functions, and powers of the central body of state administraiton does not in this case carry out its functional purpose: to establish clearly the status of the VGTK. This is not hard to prove, as Mikhail Aleksandrovich Fedotov, deputy minister of the press and mass media of the RSFSR, showed to all 19 pages of the draft statute on the All-Union State Radio and Television Broadcasting Company.

My time on the air is limited, so I will give just one example. The first point in the statute declares the VGTK to be the successor of USSR Gosteleradio, which is in contradiction to the actual decree of the president on the creation of the VGTK, as the decree does not dissolve the USSR Gosteleradio. So it declares the VGTK to be the legal successor of Gosteleradio, and defines it as a body of administration, but then in the next point, point two, the VGTK is defined as an economic person [subyekt]. One wonders how, if the VGTK is a central body of state administration, it can carry out economic and financial operations. If the VGTK really is an economic person, what has this to do with being a central body of state

administration, which by its very nature carries out not production and financial operations, but administrative ones?

[Announcer] Andrey, tell us, please—it is quite clear that there could be complaints about the juridical parameters of this document. But what relation, and what consequences, could this juridical structure have in specific and practical terms on our lives?

[Zuyev] In principle, as was noted by all the participants in this meeting, a monopolized monster is coming into being that takes upon itself virtually all rights. If some private radio station appears, then it will need to get a license from the chairman, from Kravchenko.

Stroyev Visits Orel Oblast, Meets With Workers

PM2802094291 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "In the Thick of Life"]

[Text] Orel, 26 Feb—During a visit to Orel Oblast 23-26 February, Ye.S. Stroyev, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, appealed to the people of the Orel region to continue working for the social revitalization of the countryside and to be more courageous in introducing the various forms of ownership. He visited a number of kolkhozes and industrial and consumer services enterprises. At meetings with workers, the CPSU Central Committee secretary answered topical questions on the country's political and economic position.

Polozkov Visits Ryazan Farm, Attends Obkom Plenum

PM2802100891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 27 Feb 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Tour of Ryazan Oblast"]

[Text] Ryazan, 26 Feb—How can we support the Russian peasant and give him confidence in tomorrow when market prices rise inexorably and shortages are worsening? For without a revival of the countryside there can be no talk of reviving Russia, either. I.K. Polozkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee, was called upon to answer these and other questions at a meeting with the workers from the "Yekimovskiy" Sovkhoz during a tour of Ryazan Oblast.

I. Polozkov inquired particularly about the progress of preparations for the spring sowings; he visited the livestock units, and familiarized himself with the work of the cheesemaking shop that operates on the farm. At a meeting in the Sovkhoz House of Culture, there was a lively discussion on the country's situation and the role and place of Russia's Communists in the search for effective ways to take the country out of the crisis.

The secretary took part in today's joint plenum of Ryazan CPSU Obkom [oblast committee] and the oblast party organization's Control and Auditing Commission. L.I. Khitrun's application to retire from his duties as obkom first secretary was discussed. He was commissioned almost unanimously to continue as head of the oblast party organization.

As was announced after the plenum at a press conference, the first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee intends to visit Novosibirsk Oblast in the next few days.

Moscow Soviet Head Denies Ration Card Rumors

LD2702193491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] Rumors are circulating in Moscow that ration cards will be introduced for some types of food from 1 March. But as stated to a NOVOSTI correspondent by Gavriil Popov, chairman of Moscow City Soviet, it is not a question of ration cards, but of ration coupons for sugar and tobacco in addition to the existing ones. According to him, it was proposed to introduce more ration coupons on meat, sausage items, groats, butter, and vodka. The introduction of ration coupons was actually to take place from 1 March, 1, but was postponed owing to the forthcoming price increases in the country, Popov said. The situation regarding demand may change substantially, and then there will be no need to introduce additional coupons.

Kuzbass Trades Coal for Food, Liquor, Cigarettes

PM2802111991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Feb 91 Union Edition p 2

[Article from IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX and SIBINFORM roundup: "Kuzbass Forced to Trade Coal for Consumer Goods"]

[Text] A contract between the oblast soviet and the Seabeko Grupp [name as transliterated] international trading firm has begun to be implemented in Kemerovo. Foodstuffs, cigarettes, and liquor worth $2 million will be supplied under this contract. The Kuzbass has offered its traditional rolled metal, cast iron, coal, and aluminum in exchange for the consumer goods.

The first five aircraft have already been unloaded at Kemerovo airport. It has been decided to distribute this consignment to children's boarding schools. The wine and cigarettes will be sold in commercial stores, SIBINFORM reports.

Moscow Soviet on Military Families' Welfare Appeal

PM2802113191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Statement by Moscow City Soviet Press Center: "The Moscow City Soviet's Instructions"]

[Text] In connection with the appeal by servicemen and members of their families to the Moscow City Soviet on registration in Moscow city, the allocation of housing, the renting of accommodation, and the resolution of other social welfare questions, S. Stankevich, first deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, has signed the following order:

1. Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] is instructed to examine, within a month and with the participation of the Moscow City Soviet Commission for Questions of Housing and Citizens' Registration and other interested organizations, questions connected with the registration in Moscow of servicemen and members of their families and the allocation of additional places in hostels for servicemen who are students at military institutions for their period of study, and questions relating to the possibility of allocating plots of land for USSR Defense Ministry construction organizations to construct homes for servicemen and granting allowances to citizens who sublet their houses to servicemen's families.

2. Moscow Gorispolkom is instructed to adopt a decision within a week on the issue of coupons for sugar, tobacco products, and other goods being distributed in accordance with temporary norms to all servicemen's families who are in Moscow.

Police Block Attempt To Occupy Chelyabinsk Runway

LD2702153191 Moscow TASS in English 1238 GMT 27 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Yevgeniy Tkachenko]

[Text] Chelyabinsk February 27 (TASS)—Local police on Tuesday night [26 February] averted an attempt by passengers incensed by flight delays to occupy the runway in Chelyabinsk Airport, South Urals.

The preventative action required a police cordon. A woman and two policemen were injured as a result of the incident.

According to a regional air unit spokesman, this was the first such situation in Chelyabinsk Airport during the last 30 years.

"Starting yesterday, we have had no fuel for any types of aircraft. Twenty-one long-range and local flights have been delayed. None of the 1,761 passengers have turned in tickets," he said.

"The situation is aggravated by the fact that Aeroflot continues to operate, and about a dozen aircraft are expected to land here soon," he said.

"Beginning in the second half of January, regular shipment of fuel has been suspended. We have reported the possible grave consequences to the Civil Aviation Ministry and other high bodies, including the Soviet president, but no measures have been taken," the spokesman said.

It is not clear what will be done to resolve the explosive situation. The hundreds of passengers stuck at the airport for an indefinite time, including women and children, do not have any opportunity to rest or eat.

Cooperatives working within the framework of Aeroflot offer their products for prices that are too high for most people. The reaction of hungry and tired people is hard to predict.

Western Republics

Gorbachev Continues Visit to Belorussia

Addresses Academy of Sciences

LD2702000791 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1845 GMT 26 Feb 91

[Speech by President Mikhail Gorbachev followed by questions from the floor; at the Belorussian Academy of Sciences in Minsk on 26 February—recorded]

[Text] [Gorbachev] Dear Comrades, with this visit to Belorussia I am carrying out a promise I made a long time ago, and which, unfortunately, I have been unable to fulfill, and therefore I felt awkward; I feel awkward. I have simply been trying to find the time to come and meet you here, but, first and foremost, because this is one of those republics which in recent years—I am not speaking now about distant history, about the Belorussian people and their character, their self-possession, and their contribution to everything which has been done on this land. I am not speaking now about those victims and those losses these people have sustained, and who, drawing on the friendly extended hand of fraternal aid, have truly raised themselves from the ashes, having lost so many lives, so many young people, and having lost whole towns and villages.

I am speaking about Belorussia in the context of the present. The Belorussian people are showing their character here. I will not say that the Belorussian people immediately launched themselves into the battle as soon as they heard the word perestroyka. That would not be true. But I have been observing the republic, its party organization, its science and culture, and I have seen how the Belorussians, after reflecting—assessing this, weighing up that—accepted perestroyka, and entered into it. I very much value such an approach by people to everything. I value it an awful lot. I don't trust those who dash straight into things, having heard something, or getting worked up maybe because of strong drink, which has been recalled here already, you know, they have an idea ready, or an answer ready for all questions, and are even ready to propose a recipe to save the country. I don't like such people, I don't respect them, and sometimes—now, even—I despise them, because they prevent us from carrying out a most immense and difficult task, and prevent us proceeding successfully along the road we have begun. Therefore, for this reason, first and foremost, I had to come here just for a long chat.

I have visited Belorussia, but not as I should have, as the times demand. My coming to you has simply been delayed. I regret this. Especially for moral reasons, of course, I am sorry that my coming here to you has been so delayed after the catastrophe that befell you. We did not even know what the catastrophe and its aftermath was like. I think we still don't know, even now.

I hear that we want to bring charges about something against each other, or something. But I still don't even know what charges can be brought. There are things which are clear, charges have been brought, and the court has decided, and so forth. But there is much else. We must do so much to understand this.

I very much appreciate the call by Academician Platonov, saying that evidently this is now the time not only to look back, but also to think, and, on the basis of our knowledge, to deal with the problems that have become clearly manifest, and let the people feel this, and—the main thing—for us to pass on this knowledge to everyone. After all, this really is a global problem. Nuclear weapons may not be used, but if these reactors fall victim even to a natural disaster... [changes thought] Seventy, 60, or whatever percent of French electricity is being generated by nuclear power stations. This is happening throughout Europe. Indeed, everywhere.

The United States turned it over in its mind, but again started implementing its new energy program. It has again renewed construction of nuclear power stations. All the studies show that we cannot avoid this. But in this case, therefore, we must all the more consider everything and check and measure everything a thousand times. Above all we must ponder, gain experience, and draw conclusions for everyone in order to come to the aid of the people of Belorussia, and support them, because this is the fate of not only the present generation, but also the fate of future generations. In order to be armed with knowledge, given the fact that we cannot part with nuclear power, and if we are not parting with it, then consequently we must be armed with great knowledge in all respects.

Well, a moral debt obliges me to visit here, and of my three days' stay in Belorussia I want to devote two days to staying in Gomel Oblast and Mogilev Oblast, in order to be there, to listen, to see and to look at everything again, as it were, to digest it, because I think that the main questions and the main problems we have to solve are still ahead. I can only say that we welcomed the active work of both the academy and the authorities of your republic, which undertook the adoption of a law on social protection. It is very important and people-orientated. I am not referring to other areas of work. They are all very important.

Now, on the basis of these proposals, and also the proposals of Ukraine and Russia, a working variant of a Union law on this matter has been prepared. Right now it is being studied by experts in the Cabinet of Minisers and in committees of the Supreme Soviet. After it is approved and polished it will be introduced as a draft law for adoption by the Supreme Soviet. What was reported to me yesterday, and earlier, both in Moscow and here, by Comrade Dementey in particular, shows that in essence there is a coincidence of approaches there in both laws, both in the one which the republic adopted here and in the Union law which is being prepared.

I am extremely pleased with this immediate and spontaneous exercising of minds, so to speak, and I particularly appreciate it when people talk about what worries them and what we are living through. Both the mood and the significance of the introductory speech by your president communicates, has communicated, itself to me. I value his opinion very much—like you, I hope. I have made notes which must without fail be included in current knowledge, when we are resolving questions that will decide the future of the life of the country.

The comrades, even though in brief, have raised very important questions, particularly the subject—I see that it worries everyone—the subject of disintegration: The disintegration of the economy; the disintegration of science; the disintegration of culture; and the disintegration of human relations. This is the subject, in my view—I would put it at the center—which has been raised here, and which is of enormous significance, and we must understand to what it can lead. Of late I have been very concerned, like you, by the fact that everything positive that is laid down in democratization, that is laid down in decentralization, and the freedom of the enterprises, of the labor collectives, the scientific establishments, and the republic,—if this takes place without a feeling of (?moderation), not within the framework of a balanced system, then this can, without fail, turn into its opposite, into absurdity. Therefore I very much welcome this competent discussion of the need to remember that we all need each other; of what we have lived through, that there is a common destiny before us, a common destiny; that there are common problems before us, and that we will only be able to get out of them together. Do we really need to return to a condition of the state, roughly recalling the times of Ivan Kalita [Ivan I] so as to start from scratch, so as to realize that we are needed, that otherwise we will not cope, will not successfully accomplish our tasks, and exert our influence in today's world, a stern and tough world, but with great prospects, so that we will count for something?

That is why I said—I'm already repeating it—why I said this sentence to workers today: I don't believe that we will be able to part as easily, freely, and simply as some people think: by having a meeting night, by raising our hands, and by solving everything! That is an adventure rather than politics. It is speculating with the sacred feelings of people who are attached to their land, to being free, and feeling themselves to be a people with their own language and culture. So we must give that feeling to people and to all the peoples through a renewed federation.

That is what we must do. So the topic of disintegration is highly dangerous here, too. It is the road to civil conflict, and I don't know when we will sort out who is to live where, where the borders run, and what is to be done with our families and with those 75 million who live outside the confines of their own republics. Only madmen can urge people to take a different road.

That is how I wanted to react to what you said and, apart from that, when there were also absolutely concrete thoughts, I took notes, especially from the speech by the director of the Radiology Institute. Of course, I say thank you to Ivan Gavrilovich. I have listened to speech that I understand, since I can understand simple speech, not on a very great artistic or intellectual level, in Russian-...[corrects himself] that is, in Ukrainian and Belorussian. I understood you well. Thank you. [applause]

Now I will admit something. We are meeting at my request. I don't know whether you know that or not. It is my request to the republic's leadership. I have prepared for this meeting and do not wish to hide anything. I could talk about many things, but I have especially prepared a speech on a very topical problem that worries me, that I want to unfold before you and discuss for a while, and I want you to listen to me. What I want to say is important to me. I don't know how important it will turn out to be to you. What is the point here? I will get down to my theses, as it were.

As you know, the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies has been held. You will remember how acute the debates were. They began with a debate on confidence, or lack of confidence, in the president. The discussion was a frank and open one; there was a clash of positions. Major decisions were made, including starting with one on the question of what to do with the president—to support him, or to deny him support. A little over two months have passed, and after all this, and after these major decisions were made, questions such as the referendum and attitudes toward the Union—in other words, decisions which affect our life today on fundamental issues—again we hear the same talks and appeals—what is happening, where are we going, what future awaits us?

Probably there is nothing surprising in this because my conclusion is that the peak of the crisis has not passed. Ahead of us still lie difficult matters and difficult decisions which affect us all. Suffice just to name a few—price reform, taking property out of state hands, a referendum on the state of the Union, and the debate on the draft of a new Union treaty. One could go on, but this is enough to say: About what are we speaking? Questions of an immense scale and importance are being tackled, and it is understandable that people want to have a better idea of what is happening, because the foundations of that which will determine what we will be like in the future, and what kind of life we will be living for decades, or if you like, centuries to come, are being laid today. Everyone wants to understand this so that they can make decisions and act with confidence. So disputes, discussions, and, if you like, even a well-known intellectual ferment—there are signs of it everywhere, it is there—all this is natural for any historical turning point in time, like the one we are going through at the moment.

Well, after the congress, there was a brief period—a feverish period, one may say frankly—a shortage of time, a mass of problems, we are trying in accordance with the congress' decisions, we are now shaping a new structure of bodies of power, a cabinet of ministers has been formed and is beginning to develop its work. Already at its first session the most burning topics were examined, which literally—well, if they are not solved—and they have not yet been completely solved, then they have to be tackled, things like power engineering, metallurgy, transport, and food. In other words, all the things which, if today [as heard] then (?it would be disaster), everything would come to a standstill, and the country would be paralyzed.

The first stages are being implemented. At least the first steps have been carried out, and work will continue on implementing the program on the transition to the market approved by the congress. Work experience in the new Federation Council is already being accumulated. Let's put it that way. Work on the new draft Union treaty has advanced. Representatives from all republics are working near Moscow now. In one case, as observers or spies, so to speak, because as they say someone has said that we are not going to accept advice from someone else's country. Thus the invitation to work upon the Union treaty is considered by some as an invitation from a foreign state. All this does exist. Still, active work on the treaty is being carried out. Everything put forward at the three Federation Council sessions by the representatives and the leaders of the republics is being discussed.

Progress has taken shape in this aspect. I think there will be a version of the Union treaty by 3 or 5 March, which will be based on implementing proposals put forth by the republics. A security council will be set up and will get down to work in the next few days.

To put it in one word, we are getting this entire process going. Far-reaching changes are also taking place in the republics. All this is so. All this is so. Many specific features are being introduced. Life will show what will come of this, what it will confirm, what forms will stand the test of time. These issues are too big to be able to claim unequivocally and 100 percent that one or another solution will be fully justified.

Hundreds of thousands of working collectives in the country are working under the most difficult circumstances. I must note that the difficulties that have arisen in economic activities are not only not decreasing, but are still even increasing as a result of the violation of the economic links.

We are doing everything possible. We are getting things going and making efforts. But despite all this, the country is not managing, in any way, to overcome difficulties and the situation is simply not getting any

better, but is getting worse in several directions. It is getting worse. It is developing a threatening character. What is the reason for all this?

There is no unequivocal answer to that question. One of the reasons, broadly speaking, lies in the complexity of the tasks we and you are undertaking.

This is undoubtedly so. We still have to learn a lot and acquire new knowledge, because we cannot build and assimilate new forms of life on old approaches and on old knowledge. This is indubitable. Miracles enabling one to jump from the authoritarian command system of economy, a distributive economy, to a market economy in one leap, from a unitarian state to a new federation, a union of sovereign states, republics, do not happen. Another reason is miscalculations during the development and implementation of reforms. Here we committed a considerable number of follies while we were searching for correct approaches, both to matters of the development of the economy and to problems of constructing the state. This knowledge, and the decisions we have now adopted and begun to implement, have not come easily. Even so, even noting these two particularities, these two reasons which determine the present state in society, I have to say that I think all this is surmountable. We can already see ways of solving these tasks.

In the last year or year and a half, the efforts we have made have to a considerable extent been blocked by the most severe power struggle which has unfolded. This, Comrades, is the essence of the thing. Therefore, I want to dwell in my speech on questions of the dislocation of political forces and the nature of the political conflict being thrust upon us. I will begin with the fact that we will not manage to get to the bottom of the events taking place unless we reject the outdated ideas to the effect that everything which is done in the country depends on the will of the ruling center. Even in pre-perestroyka times that was only partially true. Even then factors operated which neither the party nor that regime of power were able to keep under absolute control. Even that selfsame totalitarian authority could not keep them under control.

You and I know this well. The more so today, when the fundamental renovation of state structures has begun, new sociopolitical movements, and now even parties, have proclaimed themselves, and freedom of the press has become a reality, this formula would be an even greater simplification. One has to come up against this, basically, at every meeting and every talk, probably because we have been accustomed to simple solutions. [as heard] It turns out that they did not solve pressing problems, but merely complicated them. We only thought we had solved them. What we are now observing, both the good and the bad, is not being done by someone's supreme will, but is the result of a most complex interaction and struggle between political forces, which is now a reality of our present situation, of our life. If you do not see this or try to analyze and understand the arrangement of forces, or make an analysis, it means that you are not dealing with what you should, if we are talking about the political process and the elaboration of policy. This political struggle became especially harsh when perestroyka approached its decisive phase, the redistribution of power and ownership on a democratic basis. We have approached that.

Let us recall how events developed. In the first stage, the party gave up the monopoly on power, its concentration in the hands of the general secretary and the Politburo. Wider and wider strata of society gradually became involved in the adoption of decisions through new forms of democracy and glasnost, through elections and the establishment of new representative bodies as a result of those elections, held according to new approaches, in conditions of democracy. Moreover, this happened both at the level of the center, and at the level of the republics, and at the local level. It happened everywhere, in all areas.

At the same time as the transfer of power from a narrow sector to the whole of society, a process of decentralization took place, about which I have already spoken in response to speeches by comrades here: The democratization of the national-state structure. Most powerful forces were released: Local, and ultimately national, initiative, the thirst for national revival. That again added new portions, so to speak, to all these processes, and acted as a catalyst for them. This process developed from the extension of the republics' rights to their proclamation of sovereignty. The right of peoples to self-determination and self-government is now recognized in legislation. We have entered the phase, the real phase of transforming the Union into a federation of sovereign republics.

I have to say that it was precisely after these profound changes in the political sphere that the processes of changes in the economy began to advance more quickly, probably logically and completely explicably—in the economic system and, most importantly, in ownership relations.

A search has started and continues today for forms of economic life that make it possible to return the individual as the master with full rights, to return the individual to the means of production, to the land, to overcome that very alientation—to use the language of [social] science—to stimulate interest, that is, to bring into play powerful springs, stimuli, to strengthen motivation of labor, of each individual. Here, it can be said, we have been ascending step by step. You remember, there was financial autonomy, self-financing, first the Volga motor vehicle works, and what did we have? The Sumy enterprise? I have already forgotten, it seems so long ago. They are almost in BC times. Then the gradual transition from supplying resources centrally, by plan, to the wholesale method. Then cooperatives, then leasing. Finally, we came right up to dismantling state ownership, to shareholding, and we began the real transition to the market. Over such a short period.

You know, for two years we held meetings, we thought that we really needed to change life, we were very glad, inspired, we applauded, everyone wanted perestroyka, and everyone was in accord. Then, from 1987, we began to move the economic reform, and its implementation immediately came up against the administration system, against the institutions of power, and nothing moved. Then, in 1988, we embarked on party competition, and we acknowledged the need for political reform, so as to unfetter, to open up the road, so that perestroyka should not hold up all of these processes regarding ownership in the economy everything started moving. Now, two years have passed, and what has happened to us over these two years, and where have we emerged?

At the time there existed quite a broad degree of accord and understanding. We were satisfied with one another, until perestroyka, and the real processes, started to impinge on everyone—the party, the soviets, the labor collectives, the Army, science, culture—everyone, every family. It turns out that we were in accord, and we thought that this accord was sufficient to begin real movement, and as it turns out, insufficiently durable—probably we didn't think about everything, we didn't discuss everything, and we were very naive in certain cases. So we found ourselves in this real transition from one set of forms of life, so to speak, to others.

We are leaving those and have not yet arrived at these. In this interim gap we are all literally frantic and shaken by the confusion in our minds and worry and alarm at what will happen to us. This is where we are. What is the choice? It is clear that we must go forward. I am convinced that there are no answers from behind. We have already realized that we cannot live as we lived as we approached the beginning of the 1980's. We had already seen that then. You and I maintained ourselves by exploiting our enormous natural riches, large labor resources, and a favorable market for oil. We added vodka on top, and so on. Then everything came like this and we proved to be unready to maintain labor productivity, to preserve capital productivity, at a certain level, to exploit resources in a rational way and to obtain the national income growth which we need. Thus, we need to look for answers not from behind but in front.

I have to say that since movement has started and there is no way back, the process of the demarcation of political forces has actually begun to gain momentum—since the middle of last year, I would say. Political platforms and the real confrontation of forces have begun to crystallize. Naturally, every social stratum should have the opportunity to express and defend its interests. Therefore, all the appearances of new political movements and parties on our political spectrum are a normal process, and we have said that we are renouncing the [Communist] party's monopoly on power and welcome political pluralism. This stratum cannot only express but also defend its interests through the political parties, trade unions, and other organizations.

But these interests must be dealt with precisely within legal procedures, in a constitutional form. This is the first principle of every democracy. Once you have won the position of the ruling party, force, proclaim your policy and carry it out, relying on what you have gained in society. But one has to remark that in the conditions of our fragile, still weak democracy, certain political tendencies which have formed in our country have set about achieving the realization of their plans outside the framework of the Constitution, and not thanks to the existing legality, but often in violation of the laws.

In that in essence lies all the dramatic character of the present situation in our society, the root of all the difficulties that we are going through. Impatience and radicalism have started turning into intolerance and aggressiveness. We can see that in front of us. There are attempts to substitute the course for a mixed economy with adventuristic demands for total privatization, with a transfer to full supremacy of private ownership. The lawful striving of peoples for independence, for rebirth, for their national rebirth, is being artificially transformed into nationalist self-isolation and autarky. The war of laws which has been unleashed in accordance with this ideology has to a great extent paralyzed authority; has torn the market to pieces, and is disorganizing lively ties that took shape, formed, over decades. Attacks have intensified on the Congress of People's Deputies, on the Supreme Soviet, and on the president. A paradoxical situation has come about whereby in moving away to the side far from the course of perestroyka and striving in essence to change both the aims and the guiding lines of perestroyka, they accuse the center of supposedly curtailing reforms and preparing a dictatorship. In reality a struggle for power is under way which ignores the requirements of the law, and moral norms, which destabilizes the situation in society, and which, generally speaking, increasingly hinders transformations to the Union and to the whole of our society and country.

All of this threatens to throw us off the road of reforms, toward confrontation, right up to civil war. Until this intolerable situation, from the point of view of the vital activity of society and the state, is removed, the crisis will deepen, threatening to develop into civil war, and sharply weaken the country, if not put it back by decades.

I may be told that if the shelves in the shops will be full, we'll stop the processes of economic degradation, and all problems will resolve themsevles. But the shelves cannot be filled unless order and legality is introduced into the country, unless there is stability. The general conclusion and opinion of all scientists of all countries and of all authorities, is that one cannot have a successful transition to the market in conditions of chaos, disorganization, and instability.

It is along the road of reforming property relations, the road to the market, of reforming the Union, that we want to arrive at the new forms of life, to ensure a new dynamic for the development of the Union. Without cohesion, without the purposeful will of the majority of

the people, the tasks that we have approached in real earnest are too great for us. That is what it is all about. That is where the root of all the complexities and drama of the current situation lies.

In this connection I must speak with regret about the evolution that the democratic movement, which started off well here, has undergone. There are even today, in general, under its banners many progressively thinking people, who both sincerely desire the well- being of the fatherland, and are worried about its fate, the future, about their country's present and its future. But the sad thing, Comrades, is that the slogans that inspired these forces, these forces for perestroyka, active forces for perestroyka, have to a large extent, largely been emasculated, are emasculated, modified, and are being used to cover up far-reaching intrigues, which in a number of cases have been born in alien scientific centers and in alien heads. That means that someone needs them, but it isn't us.

The groupings acting under the flag of democracy are a mixed bag, but the programs and purposes of their leaders have emerged quite clearly already. Where do they want to lead us—or at least propose their services, these new found friends of the people? Here is the first thesis of their program: Defederalization, by which is understood the break-up of our great multinational state. One of the democrat ideologists, Popov, chairman of the Moscow Soviet, is speaking openly, without emotion, as they say, and without feeling, of the possibility of splitting up the Soviet Union into 40-50 states, the resettlement of whole peoples, the redrawing of borders between republics.

This anti-Union, anti-people plan passes for the credo of democracy. Moreover, these policy directives are also followed by political actions. I have in mind the furious attacks on the center, attempts to cast a shadow on the referendum on the future of our multinational state, and not just cast a shadow, but try to wreck this referendum, substitute its aims. Just look at the attacks the referendum is subjected to at individual forums. We should not be surprised that these democrats, in inverted commas, I would say, are entering into a political alliance with separatists and nationalist groupings. They have a common aim: to weaken, and if they can, demolish the Union.

It does not matter that the reputation of the extremists, Sajudis, Rukh, these allies of the democrats, is not irreproachable. Allies can be forgiven even such sins as organizing moral, and in a number of cases, even armed terror against those who speak another language or think another way—like the demolition of monuments to Soviet servicemen, the propaganda of pro-fascist or semi-fascist views. I think that you already have more than enough of this miserable reading material in your possession. Today we can place on record that the so-called democrats have in the recent period taken an openly anti-communist line. The invitations from the CPSU which were made on behalf of the 28th Congress, and in the program statement containing an invitation to all patriotic forces interested in the country's destiny—they were left hanging in the air. They reject this. Moreover, it is not a matter of not accepting the ideological position of the CPSU—this is, in the final analysis, the personal affair of everyone—but of calls to declare the CPSU a criminal organization, and bring it to trial. And this is 16 million people! A party that was the first to begin eliminating its monopoly on power, itself renounced it at its Congress, and opened up the road to democratization and glasnost.

What is the value of the democrats' mocking behavior with regard to the formula of socialist choice? I am very pleased with the interesting thoughts of your writer on this matter. What choice can be meant, they say, when it is not known what socialism itself represents? I must say that behind these arrogant giggles there lies either ignorance—but that is to be ruled out. As a rule it is doctors, academicians, or something like that—and the comrade rightly said...[pauses]...Chegrinov. Since they reject all of this...perhaps, they should have taken a sort of moral step and refused their titles, which they received for defending and laying the foundation of the scientific character of this phenomenon which is, so to speak, the idea of socialism.

No, this of course is not the point. The matter lies in the striving to delude people and to misrepresent the essential issue. In actual fact, it cannot be believed that the democrat ideologists, rejecting Marx, Engels, and Lenin, have heard nothing about modern socialist tendencies. Incidentally, they are developing vigorously in the world. As is well known, there is an international association of these socialist movements.

Without going into a detailed discussion on this issue—and this is a major issue—I would like to emphasize that for us the socialist choice—I am frequently reproached: Stop making all these avowals, president, that you are a communist and that you are in favor of socialist choice—but this, for me, is a matter of principle. I just happen not to belong to those people who yesterday warmed themselves at one bonfire, and we are today already at another. They feel fine, the same. This depends on people, on their morals and conscience, and their convictions.

Therefore, these are not just words for us, somehow called upon, to symbolize in some way a link with the past. No. For us it is a totally clear and precise idea of the future. We, in speaking about the socialist choice, have in mind first and foremost humanist values. The rights and freedom of a human being, an understanding of man as the most important value. We also have in mind the democratic organization of society, a parliamentary system, the principles of division of powers, the creation of a rule-of-law state, and the triumph of law.

We have in mind, finally, a mixed economy, a diversity of forms of ownership under conditions of social justice and solidarity. I cannot fail to speak about the attempts

of the opposition to claim personal possesion of the slogans of democracy. Now if Yeltsin and Popov can declare themselves democrats, then millions of communists have far more grounds for doing so.

And there is another far from formal matter. Representatives of this tendency declare themselves to be left-wing and they are even offering the center the creation of a left-wing center bloc. So they are left-wing, left of center. They are more radical. Fine, but let's think a little about this. All in all, the time has simply come for there to be clarification of this matter also. Since the French Revolution, when this kind of terminology came into political use, the left-wing implied those who defended the lower social classes, and in modern times, adherents of socialism and communism. This is generally recognized terminology. But the democrats reject not only the authoritarian bureaucratic model of socialism which we had in the past and which the party itself has rejected; they also reject the socialist idea and are in favor of making society capitalist. Is it not clear that what we are dealing with here is a typical opposition of a right-wing kind. We should call a spade a spade.

In setting up a new state structure presupposing political pluralism, we were aware that sooner or later this would take shape in the country just as it has done in the world, strictly speaking, since time immemorial—tendencies like the left-wing, the right- wing, and center or, alternatively, democrats, conservatives, liberals, and so on. This could easily have been foreseen and predicted. But here is the paradox, connected to the specific nature of the processes taking place in our country. A political force that is right-wing by nature has taken up methods of struggle characteristic of left-wing radicals. This can easily be explained. The democrats are striving for power. Since the initial calculation to seize it with lightning speed by lawful means through the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet did not work out, they have decided to use what certain analylsts are today calling neo-Bolshevik tactics.

You recall and understand what I am talking about. This is taking the struggle out into the streets, organizing demonstrations [demonstratisiya] meetings, strikes, hunger strikes; and creating a psychological atmosphere which would unsettle both the people and the representatives of other political movements. Over the past few weeks we have been able to observe these tactics at their peak. Giving a distorted interpretation of the democratic events in the Baltics, and then the actions of the Union authorities in reinforcing law and order—I mean the decrees of which you are aware, and which are very unpopular—the right-wingers raised a heart-rending cry about the onset of dictatorship and even the threat of a coup.

Just think, what cynicism! Those people arguing about a coup are the same ones who virtually from the First Congress of People's Deputies were demanding the dissolution of that body, the first democratically-elected body in the history of our state since the revolution, and the elimination of the Supreme Soviet! How is one to evaluate the attempts to correct their falling political popularity rating and to draw attention to themselves, to raise a fresh destructive wave in society—using all possible means to do so. You and I want to conduct, within the framework of the new political culture that is being acquired, discussion, and comparison of positions, criticism and so on. Not everyone knows how to do this, sometimes people on this side try to nail things down and be done with it. But what suggestions are made from the other side? A fight is being waged against us from the positions of psychological warfare.

With no positive programs behind them, an appeal is addressed—going over the head of the legislature—to the people, to the working class. The situation is strained, after all, perhaps we'll pull it off, that's precisely the calculation in mind—to pension off, to disband this, that and the other, to get the president to resign. This is being done at a critical moment of the state's existence, at a crucial stage, at a stage of profound transformations, when everything is overstrained, when the people are literally, so to speak, on the brink of breakdown.

So I ask the question: Who then is preparing a coup? Who is calling for unconstitutional forms of political struggle? We categorically reject any attempts to repeat a violent seizure of power, which would almost inevitably be followed by civil war. I declare this decisively, and I hope you understand what we are talking about. We have the experience, we have the lessons, both our own and those of other peoples, in order to draw such a conclusion.

You may ask me whether Communists can speak in a negative way about a manifestation of neo-Bolshevism? The question is legitimate, and I shall answer it. The fact is that one cannot equate today's situation with what was happening 73 years ago. Historians can discuss whether the Party and its leadership acted rightly or wrongly then, in taking power and later dissolving the Constituent Assembly. But one cannot fail to see that this was a part of the revolution's development which had to respond to the fundamental demands of the people: land, peace, bread, property, freedom.

The situation today is completely different. The ruling party has not only decided to give up a monopoly of power. It has put forward a program of radical changes and reforms, on the basis of democratization and glasnost, of bringing people into the processes of transformation, and the rebirth of whole peoples. These aims, step by step, though not without errors and not without difficulties, are being implemented. Here is where the meaning of perestroyka lies. We do not intend to leave this road.

So let us give up our illusions and naivete. We are working in conditions where an opposition exists, for which the sole correct position is criticism of everything we are doing, and this is being done only because it is not in accordance with the aims laid down in the program.

On the one hand, we hear cries about the weakness of power, about the paralysis of power—even about the paralysis of power. But as soon as that power starts to take some steps to show its character, there comes a cry about excessive firmness and even about the threat of dictatorship.

I have said before that it reminds me of the story of Nasruddin in Bukhara. You probably remember, I have already told it. When he rode his donkey people shouted: Where has anyone seen such a thing, an old donkey carrying a young one? Hearing this he placed the donkey on his shoulders and started to carry it. All the same, cries of where has anyone seen such a thing went on, but this time with a different punctuation mark. We must keep in mind the goals outlined and our choice, and follow the road we have embarked upon. We must also be aware that we are being fought against, and I would like to repeat—not from the positions of criticism nor of defending the truth. I am very pleased that your president said here that it is the task of scientists to seek truth.

Yes, we need truth. So, this political fight is being conducted not from the positions of the search for truth, not from the positions of constructive criticism, not from the positions of society's interests, but from positions of vilification. We must bear this in mind. Comrades, why is it that the opposition is unwilling to see the real picture and interprets everything in its own way, misleading people? It is because the program, which we are persistently implementing, step by step, namely the fundamental renovation of society within the framework of socialist choice—no longer satisfies the forces which are standing behind these politicians. They themselves are the hostages of these forces. The second point: It is not to the advantage of the opposition when someone else implements the reforms. That is why it tries not only to discredit the policy but tries as much as possible to torpedo all these processes and measures.

Here is our reality. It is natural that all this also affects the economy in a strong and painful way, despite the frantic efforts we are trying to make. This affects the activities and positions of many republican bodies and the search for balanced relations between the center and the republics. In general, this is what we all should be very concerned with. At the same time, life itself raises questions, and we see what disintegration processes lead to—the disruption of the market, and the disruption of economic ties and cooperation. This has already turned into a misfortune. If we fail altogether to stop these processes—this by the way was the main topic which was discussed at the plant, in conversations in shops, and at the meeting with people, starting from the director and ending with a fettler, I do not remember his name, who spoke there—that if we fail to secure the economic ties which have already been significantly disrupted, and if we fail to restore them, then failures and a decline in production are in store for us, with all their consequences, first and foremost social consequences, followed by political consequences, because the people will not tolerate this any longer.

So, we have to resolve these matters within the scope of continuing our political course, otherwise disintegration, a collapse of economic ties, a fall in production will lead to very severe measures being required, very severe measures. We cannot tolerate this, if we have all realized that this is necessary, we can see this danger, and it has to be done. Then...from the chaos there will indeed arise dictatorial methods and forms of administration. We have decided, this issue is one of the main ones submitted for discussion by a session of the Cabinet of Ministers on 4 March, which will examine how the economic agreement, the food supply agreement, signed by the republics, is being implemented.

It has been signed by everyone, everything, all the principles are laid down there, but they are being violated to a substantial degree, and this is having an effect on the functioning of the whole of our economy, and the life of society. I think that we'll try to invite to this session of the Cabinet the leaders of the governments of the republics, their deputies for supplies and agrarian affairs, and I was given an idea today by the leaders of your association of industrialists, that they, too, should be invited to this session. Because they think that the government organs are far from adequately expressing and understanding the whole of the situation, and really expressing the pressing problems, and solutions which have to be borne in mind, without which we won't make any further progress. In general, we'll try to penetrate to the core of the issue, this has to be done now, and I promise—since I shall be leading this session of the Cabinet of Ministers—the most benevolent, not any kind of abusive situation, but the most benevolent, but principled investigation of what is going on in our country, and what has to be resolved. In a word, there will be everything, except, perhaps, sumptuous refreshments. At one time the period of stagnation was criticized, on the grounds that this was too widespread; I see that our great supporters of perestroyka, or at least those who pass for supporters of perestroyka, have also, it seems, now become drawn into these matters. Well, this is, as they say, by the way. But speaking seriously about all of this, I am a resolute opponent of going back in relations between the center and the republics in the sphere of the economy; we shall proceed along the road of redistributing powers. The center has to retain that which the republics need: that is, defense, transport, power supplies, communications, the basic sciences, everything that provides us with growth, that enriches us, in which we have an interest. But everything else has to proceed based on normal redistribution, on the Union treaty, and of course, on switching to new forms of life, and thereby, delegating both rights and all responsibility, all responsibility—because this is the situation today.

Back in 1985 a republic—yours, for instance—had just a few percent at its disposal, under its jurisdiction, whereas today the figure is 52 percent, and soon it will be 78 or 80 percent. So this is where answers have to be sought in the main—in this. This is something everyone has to get used to. There has to be an end to Moscow

deciding every last trivial detail—where every nail should be knocked in and whether it should be a nail or a pin, and that sort of thing. We have been through all that, finished with it, it's all behind us, and it has shown that we are not capable in this huge state of living any longer in that way. Matters have to be carried through to their end, but at the same time we should not descend to stupid behavior, make a mess of things, wreck the country, the market, the collectives. We should not be tormenting and pestering people. We have to act in a very responsible way. It seems to me that if we act in such a sense and take such approaches then we shall in the end be able to create everything—a new center and a new position for the republics.

I should like to end my address with some thoughts to the effect that whether the center has been buried or whether it exists—I have in mind the political centerground, not in the sense of the central organs of authority—what does that mean? The fact is that it is said at present that the trouble for the center, its tragedy—including the inspiration of that center, the president, the general secretary—lies in the fact that it simply won't make a choice. It is for this that it is rightly criticized both from the right and from the left. But I have already said to you...and let us agree as to where is the left and where is the right for us, where do we see it, so to speak. I think it is time for us...the time has come to introduce clarity here. I think, Comrades, that when we come to see all of this, and when we see that on both the right and the left wing there is a mass of people who have an interest above all in pulling the country out of crisis and resolving the problems of the market and of the normal operation of all enterprises, of maintaining all these living economic links with enterprises...it seems to me that we cannot permit a split in society, for whatever...on the basis of whatever...or for whatever reason this might happen.

This applies when we talk about the market, when we talk about the Union, and when we consider everything that is of concern to us today, we must not permit the most important thing, which is already happening in real terms. That is the civil conflicts that have resulted in the loss of people's lives. We must be conscious of all this and understand it. Under these conditions, I consider that the most responsible role as savior falls straight to the political center. The political center is called upon to prevent clashes of extreme positions and to offer society a realistic way out of the crisis.

It is always more difficult for the center. I have already said why. Here I would like to concur with Aleksandr Isayevich Solzhenitsyn who spoke most pertinently on this with great artistic force of expression. Here are the words many of you have read, and it is no misfortune to once again recall them in the context of the current very serious and important conversation: Most difficult of all is to draw the middle line in the development of society. Neither the loud voice, the fist, the bomb, nor the prison bars help as they do at the extremes. This is very pertinent. At the extremes, everything is simple. The solution offers itself—you shoot, and that is all. There are methods for resolving things and there are approaches in reserve, so to speak.

The middle course demands the greatest self-control, the most determined courage, the most careful patience, and the most precise knowledge. This [taps microphone for emphasis] is worth our sacrifice, at some cost, and this should also happen in the Academy of Sciences. I consider this a scientific achievement for the writer.

I would like to emphasize that I do not conceive the center as some sort of geometrical center between two points. The point is not to adopt some sort of intermediate stance at a precise distance from left and right, from these two extremes. Such a stance would be totally without any sort of dynamic, and it would be dead. As I understand it, the center is an approach that sets for itself the aim of transforming society on new bases, offering it a revolutionary perspective. This is not on the basis of setting one section in opposition to another, not on the basis of confrontation, and particularly not by declaring the side opposed to you to be an enemy, but on the basis of uniting an overwhelming majority of society. Common sense will always triumph in any society.

This is the real base, the mass base of the political center. It may not be as loud or as noisy as the extreme wings, but it is the main bulk of our people. The center is anxious about the future of the country and is very responsible. At the decisive moment, the center will always have its say, as long as we conduct dialogue—all the time, constantly—on the basis of knowledge and arguments, and do not disregard the views of this enormous mass, this decisive mass of people in our country.

This is the whole point of perestroyka: Work through reforms, deep and revolutionary, and not through confrontation, not through a new version of civil war—one against another. Let's be done with reds and whites, blacks and blues, and so on. We are one country, one society and, within the framework of political pluralism, comparing programs, contesting and struggling before the people's eyes, we should find the kind of answers that will meet the fundamental interests of the people and that will move the country. That is the task of the political center. These are the aims of perestroyka.

That is how I have seen things right from the start, despite all the mistakes that have been made, including those connected with my own omissions. I am not going to change my political course or my policy or stance. I cannot agree with accusations against the president or unjustified vacillating and lack of determination. I assure you that that is not it. There is nothing simpler, as I have already said, than to give in, under the influence of emotions, under the pressure of, frankly speaking, the crowd, in—so to speak—ochlocratic [mob rule] circumstances, and to make a whole lot of decisions that could later result in a very grave calamity.

One should also not forget that the post of president, by its very nature, makes it obligatory to take into consideration the views not of individual groups but of society as a whole. My dear party brothers, nowhere, before no audience, am I embarrassed to say that I am a Communist and adhere to the socialist idea. I will go out with this and, as they say, I will go into the next world with it. But I will remain. I will not have to change this. The time has already gone for this. The choice was made long ago, and not only by me, but also my grandfather and father and so on. For me, this matter has been settled once and for all. But this does not mean that when the president, within the framework of his functions, makes contacts with all political currents and enters debate with those very representatives who may even evoke dislike in all of us—our Communists should see this and not call into question the political stance and adherence of the president... [does not finish his sentence] All the same, here I have to [changes thought] yes, and moreover, we are, I think, even now proving that our idea that we serve within the framework of the Communist Party is an idea that unites, that reflects the interests of all strata of our people. This is what we are saying.

So let us respect it then. Indeed, it is not for our party organizations to turn into sects, but from positions of their own conviction and well-grounded arguments to conduct a dialogue and find answers. I think that arguments based on truth, on knowledge will in the final resort convince everyone, and receive support in society.

That is a flight of lyrical digression, too, so to say, but I think it is also pertinent. Because I do get letters the essence of whose questions boils down to asking: Who are you with, president? Whose side are you on?

So as not to allow a further worsening of confrontation everyone must first and foremost stop acting on the principle of who gets the better of whom. In actual fact we have in the past few days come up against this way of putting things by the other side: Let's reject it publicly before the whole country, before the whole world.

No, we cannot accept this principle. In saying this I am not calling for unprincipled reconcilation, for kissing all round or something. No. Political struggle is inevitable in conditions of democracy, but it must be waged in the framework of legality, of political culture, with different positions set against each other. That's how.

As for those who are not big enough for that, in the final resort the people will understand who they are dealing with, and in my opinion are beginning to understand. Perhaps it is because the people are beginning to understand who is who that they are hastening to implement the goals that they were not disguising very carefully.

In today's extreme conditions, it is necessary to bring about a sort of truce with them, so that things do not get so far as setting our house on fire. Acute though the situation is, we must not panic, Comrades. We face huge dangers, but we have immense, superlative possibilities for taking the situation in hand, and once having battled through this crossing place, emerging onto the high road of normal development.

We have everything we need for that as well. At the present time, we must not panic, we must not lose our way and we must not have a head-on confrontation. Some people want this to happen. This is because they cannot put forward a rival program and they want to push us into confrontation and by this method realize their ambitions. What is needed at the present time? One must consistently implement a program to combat the crisis. Firstly, it is a question of progressing toward the market while providing people with strong social protection. The changes that have come to a head in the system of prices and pricing should be carried out with compensation and in conditions of extensive glasnost. Today I tried to tell the workers frankly about the way that we are approaching this, and you will see this.

Second, it is a question of the gradual taking of property out of state hands and the transition by this means to a mixed economy, giving priority to public forms of ownership, but without proscribing other forms of ownership.

Third, it is important to conclude a new Union treaty as soon as possible. A great deal is connected with this. Before the conclusion of a Union treaty the only basis of any action should be the USSR Constitution. The bodies of executive power right from the top to bottom should proceed from this. The problems that crop up should also be resolved within the framework of the Constitution and the law, within the framework of discussion, within the corresponding political institutions.

Fourth, it is necessary to preserve the internal unity of the system of bodies of law and order and render them every kind of support so that an end is in the main put to organized crime in 18 months to two years. Today that is one of the very acute tasks, problems.

Fifth, the deportation of the non-indigenous population from the territories of the republics, which is being implemented by passing anti-Constitutional laws, and the organization of the persecution of citizens who speak a different language should be stopped immediately. The priority of human interests and rights over any others should be made constant norms of life.

Sixth, one must consistently adhere to the unified position of the republics in the world arena. I would like to stress that. One must stop the attempts to try and achieve unilateral gains by opposing one's own interests to those of others.

The political struggle within the country should not be taken out into the world arena: Just look how this is being made use of. Analysis of what happened in our foreign economic ties and of the deals concluded last year shows we have lost at least 25 percent of revenue. There are mechanisms for implementing this anticrisis program, both the Supreme Soviet and the republican

institutions, the Federation Council and Cabinet of Ministers which are now being formed upon the new principles: But the more effectively the republics.... [changes thought] The more effectively the center and the republics interact, Comrades, the more effectively these mechanisms will operate. This is the key to understanding the problem. I should say that operating in this way, we will resolve the most acute problems and will avoid the inadmissible that could happen. For the axiom is: Dictatorship is engendered from disorder, while democratic law and order is in fact the most reliable guarantee against dictatorship.

I am coming to the end of the section on internal affairs, and should like to say just two words in answer to questions regarding this. Someone has from here in the Soviet Union now put it about in the foreign sphere, too, that changes of a dangerous order are under way in the Soviet Union; that the policy of perestroyka is being renounced; world public opinion has been fed the story of a growing dictatorship; there has been talk that in this case, it is not worth maintaining normal relations with the present leadership, since the latter has renounced what it declared to its people and to the peoples of all countries. It is these same forces that want to put this about. We must bear this in mind, but at the same time, we must be correctly understood now—as I said at the start of perestroyka—in all countries with which we have relations.

What we are doing is our affair. Perestroyka is necessary for us. The forms and methods of implementing that perestroyka are our responsibility and for us to decide. We preserve and recognize for every people the sovereign right to choose the forms of its life, its social system and so on. We also proceed from the premise that it should similarly be recognized that we, too, possess such a right, all the peoples of this great state. For this reason attempts either to adopt the pose of an instructor in comparison with... [corrects himself] toward us, the Soviet Union, this great state which has done and continues to do so much for human civilization—that is unacceptable to us. To take a superior attitude toward us is all the more inadmissible. If someone was calculating on our disintegrating or changing our choice, that is their problem. We have to disappoint them. We will do what we need to do.

But we also have to tell those who, when travelling abroad, have lost their sense of responsibility and patriotism and who anathematize everything connected with today's difficult times and sufferings... and this is not to mention that those who travel abroad are representatives of particular interests, from particular circles that do not represent the whole country, the whole of what might be termed our spectrum of opinions; rather those who travel are those whose trips are paid for, while we economize on foreign currency and only make trips that are necessary for the state's interests. We will remain faithful to our choice, to the new thinking. It is essential for us. It is in the fundamental interests... it is essential for all the peoples who have tired of the arms race, of tension, and who want to make use of all resources, both natural and intellectual, in the interests of improving people's lives. So in every area we have to say firmly that we remain devoted to our choice and shall follow that path.

I should like to hope that this provides an answer also to the unease that sometimes arises among our people about whether we have lost or weakened our positions in the context of the new thinking. No, Comrades. No. Neither has our defense capability suffered. And huge profits have been obtained for our people and for many. We are releasing enormous resources to be used in people's interests. And all of this has to be done.

We must not see other peoples as our enemies, and we must not give those forces linked with war, with the military party, the chance to gamble on the approaches that previously existed, when we permitted ourselves to get drawn into the arms race and the cold war. We will continue this, because this is our vital concern and the vital concern of all peoples. This does not mean that everything will go smoothly. Everything, I think, lies ahead, the main thing is still ahead. We are at the start of a new and lengthy period of peace. I am concluding this address. I have delivered it to you with all frankness, since I believed it necessary to do so because time dictates it. Thank you for your attention. [applause]

Wait a minute. I have questions here. Should I answer them? [shouts of "yes!"] You've a great deal of patience. As far as I'm concerned, there's no problem.

[Seredich] Now here's a question straightaway, you see. Mikhail Sergeyevich, society is literally suffocating from economic problems. Yet at the same time, huge resources, huge resources are still being invested in the military industrial complex. One gets the impression that we are taking the shirts off people's backs, and giving them tanks and assault rifles instead. I think it is necessary to carry out conversion and Army cuts more vigorously; what is your opinion? Josip Pavlovich Sevich, er...Seredich, chief editor of NARODNAYA GAZETA.

[Gorbachev] I think that we are on the right track. Within the context of the new thinking, we called a halt to the arms race, arrived at a treaty on medium-range missiles, arrived at a treaty on the reduction of conventional weapons and troops, and the treaty with the United States on a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear (?weapons) is nearing completion. We have confirmed and defined our doctrine as one of military defense, and we are restructuring the Armed Forces in line with this. I think that it is precisely this that has allowed us recently to cut and release thousands of millions of rubles, including in the present Union budget which we cut by approximately 6-7 billion rubles in addition to what we [word indistinct]. Yes, of course, it was like this.

Speaking to the workers today, Comrades, I said that for example, in the previous five-year plan the national

income was planned to grow by 22 percent, I think it was in the last five-year plan, and at the same time, defense expenditures were to grow by 45 percent. That means everything would have been swallowed up and would have disappeared, and of course, at the expense of the standard of living and at the expense of the development of the social sphere and the solution of problems of which our country is so full. That is why I think that from every point of view, from the point of view of avoiding a nuclear conflict, from the point of view of putting an end to the arms race, from the point of view of creating a world in which problems will be resolved by staking not upon force but upon political means, this policy is the correct one and it must be continued.

Our defense is strong. No one must have any doubts on that score. We will continue to do this, but to do it intelligently and not in the way some people, including people from the opposition side, have suggested. To cut arms expenditures by 40 percent—this is simply unrealistic. These are all very serious problems. It was, incidentally, that same 500 days program that included cutting everything: closing down unprofitable enterprises, disbanding unprofitable collective farms, cutting defense expenses by half. Resolving everything in one single stroke, and thereby avoiding shortages. Yes, we would all have liked that. But such a policy is unreal. Even in these conditions the entire defense sector of our economy is in a very difficult position. Huge capacities are being released there, the best qualified personnel and the best reserves: This must all be turned round and restructured.

If we break up everything at once, we cannot restructure everything at the same time. So one needs a program. We do indeed have one, we have ratified the state conversion program. This is the road along which we must proceed, and proceed seriously and responsibly, as should be done in a serious state, and in no other way.

Unfortunately, destructive forces have made successful attempts at destroying our economy and our Union, there is still the Army and the KGB to break down. It is no accident that these forces have unleashed a fierce campaign of slander against the Army and KGB. I have a question connected with this: why does the country's leadership not give a decisive rebuff to the slanderers?

No, the position of the country's leadership, and in my position as the president, has been set out absolutely precisely, in my speeches which were some times long ones, both to the Supreme Soviet and to the military, and it is known. We should keep in a fitting state those institutions, the institutions which from the pillar of statehood which are connected with the defense and security of the state, display concern for them, and no one is entitled—nor will we allow this—to continue blackening the Army. Naturally advantage is being taken of the opportunities offered by democracy to continue this. But this is becoming increasingly difficult for them to do, and I think they will not be able to implement their plans and their calculations will misfire.

I advise you to take advice from the conversation of worldly-wise people, but I am convinced that public stress will be a few points less if Comrade Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comes out with the initiative which is conditionally referred to as O-O, renunciation and clearing out. The renunciation and condemnation of the sinister figures from among the membership of the former Central Committee, guilty of deporting the cossacks, deporting the peasants, genocide against their own people, and so forth. Among them are the authors of the design for the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station including Academician Aleksandrov. The clearing out from the ranks of the CPSU of those members who only need a party card to do damage from within, isn't that the case, to do harm from within, to use the word shkoda in the Belorussian sense [meaning "harm"] so to speak.

I think that we, after a well-known plenum of the party's Central Committee, where we examined the issue of cadre policy, already at that time, and at our party conference and then at the congress, made an assessment of the activity, evaluated the activity of the party in a self-critical way, gave it its due for what it had done for the country and the people as well, and those generations that linked their fate to that party and first and foremost the generations that fought at the front, and at the same time we rejected what was unacceptable, what was inculcated in the party leadership, and not in the party, in the conditions of the Stalin years and condemned that.

I think that politically, we have acted correctly, and it is in this way that we should continue to act. I see from this note... here we are being urged to revive the version of 1937-1938, in the new 1990-1991 edition. This is a way, so to speak. I do not think this is the right way. I think we are acting correctly. There is a decree on the complete rehabilitation of those—you know about this—of those peasants who suffered misfortune as a result of de-kulakization, of the extremes of the carrying out of this campaign. The necessary political resolutions have been adopted on this account. Judicial resolutions have been adopted by the court on the rehabilitation of people who suffered. Their honor and dignity so to speak, have been fully restored. We have been doing this, we are continuing, and incidentally, are completing this task, and the result of completing this task will probably be further publications about personal participation in the bloody affairs during the cult of personality and violence against people.

So we hold a position of principle, but we must do this within the framework of political responsibility and adherence to principle. The clearing-out of the party ranks is going on. It is taking place in two ways. On one hand there are those who are breaking away from the party, abandoning it since it now no longer offers any privileges. This is a natural process; this is a normal process. Nothing positive has come from these people being in the party. There are also people whose position is worthy of examination and evaluation by communists. This is a normal occurrence in party life. At the 28th

congress principled judgements on this account were expressed. One should work from these. Undoubtedly, party life should be built upon the basis of democracy, party responsibility, and adherence to principle. [pauses] Here, Comrades, a note has been written. It is lengthy. Comrade Klitsko writes, and the sense of it is that yes, Belorussia, finding itself in trouble after the Chernobyl disaster, is in need of help both from the republics and from other countries in the world, but not in the form of parcels containing old things and little morsels of foodstuffs.

It seems to me that this is actually done by people who want to make some kind of gesture. That is their affair. I do not wish this to be shifted to the level of state policy, nor to react on a state level. Whatever a person—whether he be somewhere in the country or in the republic, in the country, or in the world—considers it necessary to do in respect to some gesture or other, that is his affair. Let him make a choice and let it be resolved through particular public organizations. As for the attitude both of the Union and of the republics and other states, we welcome their participation. Many of them have been reacting in a very serious way. Where the Union is concerned, here I think the Belorussian people are entitled to count on very serious, thorough aid and support calculated in years, because this tragedy is one which wholly touches what one might simply call the destiny of a people. [applause]

Well, and here you have popped in some local questions for me; true, mixed in with the general ones.

[Rasolko] Esteemed president: Is the slogan, all power to the soviets, still as topical as it used to be? Or is it the case that the soviets are not what they used to be? If this were not so, would it really be possible for two new newapapers—NARODNAYA GAZETA, the organ of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet, and DOBRYY VECHER, the organ of the Minsk City Soviet—to find themselves faced with the threat of closure? The local authorities are unable to guarantee a roof over their heads, and—Kondopoga, is someone saying?—is refusing to supply paper. Allegedly your economic ties have not proved resilient. Comrade Rasolko, editor-in-chief of the paper DOBRYY VECHER.

[Gorbachev] Good everning, Comrade Rasolko [play on DOBRYY VECHER, meaning "good evening"—laughter in hall]. To your question I would say the following: It seems to me that we have so far only just gotten down in earnest to the real business of resurrecting the soviets. They have not yet assimilated their whole responsibility. It may well be that they have been accorded the rights, but as for the responsibility—they do not yet have enough competence, they do not have the mechanisms for action worked out; many of them are still just talking shop. All of this will pass. All that is needed now is to get on more quickly with adjusting the mechanisms so that executive authority might operate normally, from top to bottom. It is simply essential that there should be no break in the chain of operation of executive authority. Let our soviets hear our points of view and alternative programs, and then discuss them so as to make no errors in the decisions they make. But when the decision is made the executive authority must operate, and there can be no break here. This is where answers have to be sought, and this is how it has to be, so that the soviets might then start to work effectively, and the potential given to them via the effective executive authority might then be brought to bear. That is how it should be.

As for the papers, the founders have the right to set the direction of their papers. This conclusion follows from the law. They are the children of their parents, and the child should, so to speak, take into account the opinion of its parents. But that does not mean that it must copy them and repeat literally every one of their steps. But it should take them into account. That is my advice to you.

[Savchenko] Mikhail Sergeyevich, this question is worrying everyone. Did we not lose face as a great power the instant we did not use the right to veto regarding the decision by the Security Council to use military force to throw Iraq out of Kuwait? Did you not feel this with regard to President Bush's attitude to your peace initiatives when the guns were already roaring? Academician Savchenko.

[Gorbachev] Well, this same question was asked by the workers in more or less the same way, and I want to answer it.

I think, Comrades, that if we have made our choice and embarked upon the path of fundamental change and perestroyka in international relations, in order to leave confrontation behind and to regard other peoples as our natural partners; if we intend to develop relations with them, to normalize them, not to see them as our enemies, and not to think of war but to think of peace, of life, of a long peace, and to act in this regard by political means, I think we would have failed if we did not react at the very time that a large country, militarily a very powerful one, literally smothered a small country. I think that our position was politically correct, and morally so, too. This was at a time when in Afghanistan we were untangling problems by political means, when in Namibia we were untangling the knot, when we approached....[changes thought] Indeed, Iran and Iraq themselves were also disentangling themselves on the same basis. When we approached the solution of the Cambodian problem by political methods, and so on and so forth. When, in the final resort, all the acute problems in this Near East area of chronic conflict came together on the same plane and all this happened, then of course this was a very dangerous phenomenon. Here the United Nations had to act, and act in such a way as to reach future rash adventurers not to try it again. From the very beginning we have taken a principled position, participating in the passing of all the resolutions with the aim of forcing, obliging them to make the decision to withdraw their forces.

By the way, this morning, when I was leaving, I was told that a telegram arrived during the night from President Saddam Husayn that he has begun withdrawing troops from Kuwait, and he asked the Soviet Union to convey this statement of his, and decision, to the Security Council. We informed the United States, and gave instructions to our representative at the Security Council, Vorontsov, immediately to convene the Security Council, and to convey this. So I think that if we stop things now, nevertheless we have insisted and achieved, and this won't remain, so to speak, er... hasn't remained without effect. I think that this is how we should act. We warned that the decisions of the Security Council have definite scope, a mandate so to speak, and there is a threat of going beyond this mandate, and this is inadmissible. This standpoint has been understood by the whole community, including, hope, it is understood by the Americans. I hope that the U.S. leadership also understands all the responsibility of this situation.

[Tolkachev] What stage has elaboration of the new CPSU program reached, and in forming the relevant working group, has due account been taken of the experience of your contacts with Academicians Shatalin and Petrov? [laughter] Thank you! Tolkachev, Yevgeniy Arkadyevich.

[Gorbachev] Well, I can feel that you already have your own assessment of this experience of contacts. But I tried to tell you, reply to this question, a little earlier. Concerning what stage elaboration of the new program has reached: The first version, a rough, working version, I have here in my briefcase, and I am reading it. The working group is continuing its work. We advocate attaining a full-blooded program, one that is profoundly scientific, enriched with our own experience and the experience of the whole civilization. I think that we are talking about our being able to adopt this program this year, this is what I am taking as my basis, I don't know to what extent we shall succeed in this.

[Chairman of the Deputies' Commission of the Minsk City Soviet for Youth Affairs] Does the future Cabinet—of Ministers, I think—envisage having any kind of state structures that will reflect, represent the interests of young people?

[Gorbachev] Yes, we want to have a minister for youth affairs. We shall be submitting, and have already submitted, such proposals to the Supreme Soviet. I shall defend this, I am sure that it is necessary: It exists in many states.

Here is a question connected with it: Are there plans for the creation at the state level of an organizational mechanism to work on searching for our gifted youth? This problem concerns us. I think this is what we must... one of the issues we must deal with when these youth questions are tackled in the framework of state structures.

I think we need to set up a certain system for preparing the selection of gifted young people, and we have our own experience, especially in the Siberian section [of the Academy of Sciences], and there is foreign experience. All this needs to be borne in mind.

[Satsevich] The decentralization of the economy and the centralization of ecology. Centrifugal forces are in the natural order of things. Could a centripetal flow [laughter] of a new ecological policy appear? How do you regard the Ecological International? [laughter]

[Gorbachev] I'll answer the last question in the affirmative, and that is the main thing. This is very serious. This is very serious. Because when at the 27th congress we were looking for a formula and registered for the first time that we live in an interdependent, even contradictory, world, and we are all connected with each other, we were thinking of the fact that today we are linked by information technology, and the common problems of resources concern us all, and global problems, and first and foremost ecology, demand that we combine our efforts. For that reason I welcome this thesis in every way, and I welcome everything that is in accordance with these aims, including the creation of new structures.

I think I have answered everything, Comrades. Thank you. [applause]

[Moderator] So, Comrades, let us express our thanks. [applause] Well, Comrades, you heard Mikhail Sergeyevich say that he himself expressed the wish to come to see us and visit the academy and meet us here. I consider this a high honor for us, but I would like to note that we have been given another high honor today. We have been the first to hear, listening attentively, a program speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich, and I hope you all noticed this. So allow me to express our heartfelt gratitude to Mikhail Sergeyevich, and to wish him good health—and he has a special need for this now in these most difficult conditions when he is engaged in massive work both inside the country and on the international level.

[Unidentified speaker] And (?your) support.

[Moderator] Yes. I hope that our meeting today has helped us to better understand all the basic ideas and principles by which our country, our Union is guided at the current stage of our development and that this will enable us not only to understand better, but I hope that it will be a stimulus for all of us for specific actions to consolidate our forces as the creative intelligentsia. I think that we shall be able to influence the all of our people via the creative intelligentsia. Thank you again very much. [applause]

[Gorbachev] Thank you. I want to say once again, to stress the idea expressed here: the rallying role of culture and of our intelligentsia. We need it today as we need oxygen, as we need air. The position of our scientific and artistic intelligentsia is very important today, dear Comrades. I felt this here in your mood. Thank you. For that I wish you success, too, and I hope you will make new achievements and discoveries. [applause]

TASS Gives Address Highlights

LD2602203391 Moscow TASS in English 2005 GMT 26 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent]

[Text] Minsk February 26 TASS—Political struggle in the country intensified when perestroika "approached its decisive phase", President Mikhail Gorbachev told Belorussian scientists and creative intellectuals during a meeting with them here today.

Despite efforts being made by the leadership of the USSR "the country has not been able to overcome difficulties. In a number of fields, the state of affairs deteriorates, acquiring a threatening character, rather than improve," Gorbachev said.

He mentioned such causes of the current situation as the complexity of tasks being addressed and "miscalculations in the elaboration and carrying out of reforms".

Having pointed out that the problems are surmountable, Gorbachev specially noted that "over the past 12-18 months our efforts have been largely blocked by the most intense struggle for power". The struggle, he said, "became particularly fierce when perestroika approached its decisive phase—the redistribution of power and property on a democratic basis."

The interests of various political currents, the president said, should be upheld "within the framework of legal procedures." At the same time he said that some political currents began to seek the realisation of their plans outside the constitutional framework and quite often in defiance of laws.

Herein is "the entire dramatism of the current situation and the root of all current difficulties", Gorbachev emphasised.

He stated that the struggle for power, which "ignores the requirements of law and moral norms and destabilises the situation in society," increasingly hinders the remaking of the country and society.

"All this threatens to push us off the road of reforms onto the path of confrontation, right up to a civil war," Gorbachev said.

"It is impossible to accomplish a successful transition to the market under conditions of chaos, disorganization and instability," the president said. "Without rallying the people, the tasks of reviving the country cannot be accomplished," he stressed.

Mikhail Gorbachev expressed regret about the evolution of the democratic movement in the Soviet Union. "The trouble is that the slogans, which inspired these forces, the active forces of perestroika, became devoid of substance, rephrased, and are being used to disguise long-term plans, in some cases hatched in alien research centres," he said.

Gorbachev subjected to criticism those who favour defederalisation, the term used to mean the dismemberment of our great multinational state. Even Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov, he continued to day, "openly speaks about the possibility of splitting the USSR into 40 or 50 states".

"This anti-union and anti-popular plan is passed off as the credo of democracy," Mikhail Gorbachev said. The president also said that these pronouncements hide practical activities of 'democrats', like their attempts to disrupt the March 17 referendum.

"Here is no need to wonder that these 'democrats' enter a political alliance with separatists and nationalist groups. They have one aim in common - to weaken and - if possible - to dismantle the union," Gorbachev stressed.

The president said that "recently the so-called democrats have embarked on a frankly anti-communist road, calling for proclaiming the Communist Party of the Soviet Union a criminal organisations and stage a trial". He described as "jeering exercises" their pronouncements concerning the formula of "socialist choice".

"This supercilious mocking hides the desire to lead the people astray, to distort the essence of the matter," he stressed. "For us these are lucid and clear-cut ideas about the future".

Gorbachev said that opposition is trying to claim its singular right to use democracy slogans. "If Boris Yeltsin and Gavriil Popov proclaim themselves Democrats, millions of Communists have by far more reasons to call themselves such," he noted.

The president pointed out that the democrats who say they are left-wing are in fact a typical right-wing opposition. "It is necessary to call things by their proper names," the president said.

The president of the USSR urged the opposition to abandon attempts to carry out a "Forcible seizure of power, which would almost inevitably be followed by a civil war".

"Political struggle under conditions of democracy is inevitable but it should be waged within the framework of legality, political culture and comparison of positions," he said.

Since the original expectation by the opposition forces to seize power legally through the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet failed, they decided to employ "neo-Bolshevist tactics", Gorbachev said. "This means transferring struggle to the streets, organising demonstrations, rallies, industrial stoppages and hunger strikes, and creating a psychological atmosphere which would unsettle both the people and members of other political movements," he explained.

"Over the past several weeks we could watch the peak of these tactics," the president said. "Upon interpreting in

a distorted way the events in the baltics and then the federal authorities' actions to strengthen law and order, the rightists raised hue and cry about a looming dictatorship and even the threat of a coup d'etat".

He emphasised that those who call themselves left radicals are virtually a right-wing opposition, since they "Reject the socialist idea and favour the capitalisation of society."

Gorbachev criticised attempts by opposition figures "to bolster up the declining political rating, with the lack of positive programmes to address the people and the working class over the head of parliaments and to compel the president to resign."

"This is being done at a critical moment of the existence of the state and at the crucial stage of deep transformations when everything is overstrained and people are literally on the verge of breakdown", he said.

The president stated that he sees the task of the centre in "preventing a clash of extreme positions and offering society a realistic way out of the crisis."

The centre, he said, should strive to remake society "on the basis of uniting an overwhelming majority of society, not on the basis of confrontation, still less by labelling the opposing side as an enemy".

Gorbachev stated the firm attention of the federal leadership to consistently implement the anti-crisis programme which envisages headway towards a market with strong social protection of people, gradual transition to a mixed economy, the earliest conclusion of a union treaty, and, before that, the observance of the USSR Constitution by everyone, the maintenance of the integrity of the system of law enforcement agencies, an immediate end to discrimination against the non-indigenous population of republics.

He called on republics to adhere to a common position in the world arena, and "Discontinue attempts to seek a one-sided benefit by counterposing their own interests to those of others".

Gorbachev categorically refuted assertions that have appeared abroad about the soviet leadership's alleged renunciation of the policy of perestroika and about an "impending dictatorship" in the country.

The head of the Soviet State described as "unacceptable" any attempts to pose as lecturer with regard to the USSR.

Gorbachev on Preserving Union

LD2702174991 Moscow TASS in English 1732 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] Gomel February 27 TASS—President Mikhail Gorbachev favoured the preservation of the USSR as a united multinational state in today's speech at a meeting with residents of Gomel, a regional centre in Belorussia.

He stressed that "it is impossible to return to feudal disintegration to meet somebody's political or separatist ambitions and then to switch back again to the difficult road after becoming convinced of the results of this return".

Gorbachev said that the USSR "needs renovation and improvement rather than destruction and disintegration".

The president expressed confidence that during the March 17 referendum, the Soviet people "would definitely vote for the preservation of the Union and its renovation on the principles of a federation".

Speaking about the concept of building a renovated Union, Gorbachev said that "we are leaving a unitarian state and coming to a normal federation, which we need: It will consist of strong republics having great powers and responsibilities and a strong centre, which would efficiently serve this powerful united state in the interests of all peoples".

The president censured those politicians, who now understand sovereignty as "Diktat of local egoism", which "has brought about isolation and the disruption of economic relations".

Gorbachev said that the Soviet Government would hold a meeting on March 4, which would examine progress in fulfilling an economic agreement for 1991 signed by republics and presidential decrees to preserve economic relations.

He noted that "the disruption of economic relations is still threatening our economy with general destabilisation and a drop in production".

The president noted that some republican leaders continue to show their stubborness, disrupting long-established ties between regions and enterprises. Gorbachev noted that, without tough measures in this sphere, "we shall come to anarchy after abandoning all-Union diktat".

Talks With Vetka Residents

LD2802001491

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian at 1800 GMT on 27 February, on its "Vremya" newscast, carries a three-minute report by A. Melnikov from Vetka, the rayon center of Gomel Oblast, which USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev visited today. The video shows Gorbachev talking with a group of agitated people. On his way here from Minsk, Gorbachev visited two completely deserted villages which suffered from Chernobyl fallout. There are many people left in Vetka. A woman complains that she cannot evacuate to the countryside and that after more than 20 years working in a textile factory, she is not capable of doing farm work.

Gorbachev replies: "Well, what I want to say is that, of course, this is a very great misfortune. What else can one say? This misfortune here is not just a one-year business, as they say. Everything connected with this territory we, together with the whole Republic and all the scientists—and there is a lot of news here—because we are absolutely not prepared for this matter, we do not understand all this. That means the main question after all is to decide how to [word indistinct] and where."

After hearing more complaints, Gorbachev asks: "Well, tell me—do you think the question is clear already, and it is certain that you cannot live here anymore?" Most of the citizens answer that they cannot.

Gorbachev then asks: "Is it clear to you or do you not know?" The citizens complain about the school and one woman suggests Gorbachev should visit the local school to see how ill the children appear.

Gorbachev responds: "Generally, I understand your condition. This is clear to me. I understand all this. We will think over what is to be done." Gorbachev then walks away and talks with some girls who offer him the traditional bread and salt. Gorbachev asks: "Are you cold? Are you at school? In what year, the eleventh? You, too?"

Arrives in Mogilev Oblast 28 Feb

LD2802091991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0735 GMT 28 Feb 91

[Text] Mogilev, Belorussia, 28 Feb (TASS)—Continuing to familiarize himself with the state of affairs in Belorussia's areas which suffered from the Chernobyl catastrophe, Mikhail Gorbachev, USSR president, arrived in Mogilev Oblast today. He intends to visit a number of inhabited localities affected by the disaster, to meet with residents, and to visit those who have resettled in uncontaminated territories. A conference with local leaders and a meeting with an aktiv have been planned.

Ukrainian Prime Minister on Miners' Demands

LD2702205491 Moscow TASS in English 2021 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] Kiev February 27 TASS—The Ukrainian Government believes that demands by the regional union of strike committees in the Donets coal basin, southern Ukraine, to raise by 100 or 150 per cent miners' wages are too high, Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin said on republican television today, reports the UKRINFORM News Agency.

His speech was a response to a meeting by the regional union on Tuesday, which discussed a strike by miners on March 1.

The prime minister noted that miners have grounds to be dissatisfied with progress in fulfilling decisions made by the former Council of Ministers of the USSR.

He noted at the same time that on January 26 the republican government and the regional union signed a protocol, under which the government confirmed its continuity in questions of control and implementation of the above decisions.

Coal prices for 1991 were raised from 22 to 90 roubles 93 kopecks per tonne, which enables every miner to earn now 1,000 or more roubles per month. The industry will receive a 12-billion-rouble subsidy and nearly one billion roubles for capital investments.

"Regrettably, we have not heard a single reciprocal commitment from the regional union, although we have justifiable claims to miners," the prime minister said. "The output dropped by 15 million tonnes last year alone.

"At the same time wages rose by 18 per cent. This year coal production dropped by another three million tonnes. Such a disastrous drop in production has never been registered."

"To meet the demands to raise wages by 100-150 per cent, it is necessary to find about five billion roubles additionally," the prime minister stressed. The republican budget is in the red by 11 billion roubles.

"If we meet miners' demands, we will have to slash the sum appropriated to compensate the population for retail price rises and to repeal the announced wage rises to some workers in other industries. The government cannot take these measures."

He pointed to possible disastrous consequences of the strike. The prime minister, a former miner with a 20-year service record, called on miners to think well before taking this decision.

Work collectives at mines will have the final say about the date and methods of a strike.

Caucasus

Georgia Suspends Gorbachev's 26 Jan, 4 Feb Decrees

LD2702232991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1925 GMT 27 Feb 91

[By SAKINFORM-TASS correspondent Eduard Ediberidzes]

[Text] Tbilisi, 27 Feb (TASS)—The Georgian Supreme Soviet has suspended the validity of the USSR president's decrees of 26 January 1991 "On Measures To Ensure the Struggle against Economic Sabotage and Other Crimes in the Sphere of the Economy" and of 4 February 1991 "On Measures To Intensify the Struggle against the Most Dangerous Crimes and Organized Forms of them." A decision to this effect was adopted today at a routine sitting of the first session of the supreme organ of state power in this Transcaucasian republic. The Georgian legislative decisions adopted

today confirm that the struggle against such crimes will be conducted on the basis of the republic's current legislation.

Militants, Weapons in Georgia Roundup Updated

AU2702173091 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] On the situation in Tskhinvali:

As reported by the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry, it was relatively quiet in Tskhinvali from the evening of 26 February until the morning of 27 February. Only sporadic shots could be heard. On 26 February, a special squad of the Georgian militia and the USSR Interior Ministry revealed a street in the village of Avnevi of the Znauri Rayon on which landmines had been planted by Ossetian extremists. Five extremists were detained in the same village: Zhaur Maldiyev, tractor driver of the Tskhinvali "Emalprovod" plant and resident of the village of Chataguri; Alam Khudayev, resident of the village of Kuchi of the Azov Rayon, Rostov Oblast; Konstantin Khatagurov, secretary of the primary Komsomol organization of the village of Khatagurovo of the Tskhinvali Rayon; Slava Dzhuloyev, worker of the Tskhinvali forestry; and shepherd Akhmed Milzibuyev, resident of the village of Khatagurovo who were about to attack the village. Confiscated from the detained extremists were a Nagant revolver with seven live cartridges, a combat rocketlauncher, complete with a rocket and a factory-made appliance for aiming it. Launchers with combat rockets and a factory-made appliance for aiming them as well as weapons were confiscated from five Ossetian combatants detained on 26 February by a special squad of the Georgian militia and the USSR Interior Ministry in the village of Avnevi of the Znauri Rayon, on the territory of South Ossetia. As correspondents of [word indistinct] and TASS were told in the press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry, in the same village, a Ministry of Interior squad managed to clear the street from the landmines that had been planted by the Ossetian militants.

Two days earlier, the Georgian village of Avnevi was subjected to intensive shelling with rocket projectiles and submachine guns as a result of which four persons were killed and eight, including militiamen, wounded.

Meanwhile, the past 24 hours in Tsinkhvali, the administrative center of South Ossetia, have been relatively quiet. There has been none of the intensive shooting that took place before. At the request of the Georgian leadership, the Independent Trade Union of Georgian Power Workers has lifted the blockade against Tskhinvali, and electricity has appeared in the city for the first time for several weeks. The republican militia is continuing to disarm the illegal Georgian militarized formations, some of whom, according to certain sources, have been operating in South Ossetia. The internal affairs bodies of the Republic of Georgia have already confiscated the following from the illegal armed formations: two tanks, three armored personnel carriers, two anti-hail cannons, one machine gun, 12 assault rifles, 25 pistols, 12 hand grenades, 11 rifles, five carbines, 16 hunting guns, 11 portable radio transceivers, and 151 cars and trucks of various makes.

As a result of joint action taken in the city of Tbilisi on 26 February by the [Internal] Ministry's Criminal Investigation Directorate, the Tbilisi City Internal Affairs Directorate, and the Marneuli Internal Affairs Department, two tanks and two anti-hail cannons were confiscated in the grounds of the Georgian Construction Ministry's mechanization directorate, located in the settlement of Vasnitsvari. One of the cannons had been stolen on 31 January by members of the recently-founded (?Slaneti) organization. On 24 February in the town of Marneuli in the grounds of house No. 66 on 26th May Street, officers of the Marneuli Internal Affairs Department discovered a Kamaz truck without license plates which had been appropriated by the Mkhedrioni. As a result of measures taken by officers of the Tsiteli-Tskaro Internal Affairs Department, the following vehicles, which had been stolen at various times by the Mkhedrioni, were confiscated from Mkhedrioni member Villi Vodulashvili: a GAZ-2410 which belonged to the District Executive Committee; a UAZ which belonged to the (?Uganskiy) collective farm; a UAZ which belonged to the Tsiteli-Tskaro collective farm; a UAZ which belonged to the agro-industrial association; and a Niva which belonged to the (?Gamarzhetskiy) collective farm. On 25 February in Gzhitvili, a Kalashnikov assault rifle was confiscated from a room in offices belonging to the Mkhedrioni. On 23 February Mkhedrioni member Levan Bogolauri appeared at the Rustavi City Internal Affairs Department, having handed in to the Militia two disassembled Kalashnikov assault rifles with several pieces missing. He had also handed in to the Militia a mine and three GAZ-69 cars. On 24 February officers of the Akhmetskiy District Internal Affairs Department confiscated a ZIL-130 truck belonging to the Telavskiy Ardasi, a Moskvich with no license plates belonging to the Akhmetskiy (?Ardasi), and a GAZ-23 belonging to the Akhmetskiy Raykom of the Georgian Independent Communist Party, which had all been stolen by the Mkhedrioni. The confiscation of weapons and equipment stolen by the illegal armed formations continues.

NKAO Tension 'Not Falling'; Violence Reported

LD2702191191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 27 Feb 91

[Text] A TASS correspondent reports from Stepanakert: Tension in NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region] is not falling. Shooting with automatic weapons and grenade launchers is continuing, as is the seizing of hostages, explosions on roads, and the deaths of innocent people.

Yesterday one of the internal troops' mobile groups arrived in Martuninskiy Rayon in an APC in response to hostage-takings and the murder of one of them, an

Azerbaijani militia worker. The night was a difficult one for the personnel. The situation was not relieved until this morning.

The APC and the soldiers set off for a temporary stationing point. The fatigue and tension of the previous night and last few days unfortunately were the cause of the APC turning over on the slippery Agdam-Matruni road. As a result of the tragedy, two soldiers were killed and the rest received slight injuries.

Explosion in Stepanakert Cuts Water, Heat Supply

LD2602213991 Moscow TASS in English 1255 GMT 26 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert February 26 TASS—Unidentified persons exploded a water intake on Monday night, leaving some 60 percent of residents of Stepanakert without drinking water and central heating.

This is the 14th diversion in the city's water supply over the past year.

"In spite of repair works started at the water intake under the protection of the military, we cannot hope that this was the last diversion," chief engineer of the Stepanakert Vodokanal Branch Robert Grigoryan told TASS.

"The water intake providing water for Stepanakert's Armenian population, is near the Azerbaijani-populated village of Gaibaliy and is not protected sufficiently. It will take at least three days to restore it," he said.